In Hawley v. Tseona, No. WD76358 (Mo. App. W.D. Nov. 25, 2014), the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed a $946,465.20 judgment for pre-judgment interest because the plaintiff's failure to include properly executed medical and employer authorizations with his demand made the demand defective. The Court, in so ruling, explained that Missouri's pre-judgment interest statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.040.2, must be strictly construed and all elements of the statute must be satisfied before a plaintiff may recover pre-judgment interest.

The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Basta v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. WD77251 (Mo. App. W.D. Dec. 16, 2014), held that an electric utility owes a duty of the highest degree of care in the maintenance of its power lines to prevent injury to the public. The Court, in affirming the trial court's $1 million wrongful death judgment for the plaintiffs, rejected the utility's argument that in cases involving low voltage power lines that a utility should only be held to the ordinary care standard.

Where the plaintiff claimed injury because of a spider bite and mold infestation, the Missouri Court of Appeals, in Brown v. Seven Trails Investors, LLC, No. ED100593 (Mo. App. E.D. Dec. 9, 2014), held the "sudden onset" doctrine was unavailable to excuse the requirement of expert medical testimony to establish causation. The Court explained that the "sudden onset" doctrine only relieves the plaintiff of the burden to prove medical causation in very limited situations when the obvious symptoms of the injury follow the trauma immediately and the injury is of the type that is normally sustained in the kind of trauma involved. The Court, in its opinion, also provided a good discussion of medical causation generally and the nature of expert testimony necessary to establish this element of a plaintiff's claim.

In Travelers Comm'l Cas. Co. v. Vac-It-All Servs., Inc., No. ED100802 (Mo. App. E.D., Dec. 16. 2014), the Missouri Court of Appeals held that pre-judgment interest on a judgment entered on an insured's breach of contract claim for overpaid premiums began to run when the insured filed suit, and not before, because the insured had not made a pre-suit demand for payment. In affirming the trial court's judgment, but reducing the interest award to those sums that had accrued after the insured filed its claim, the Court rejected the insurer's argument that the insured was not entitled to interest because the exact amount of the insured's damages was uncertain, explaining that an exact calculation is unnecessary for a claim to be liquidated, and that a court may consider equitable principles of fairness and justice when awarding pre-judgment interest. 

In order for a client to successfully prosecute a legal malpractice claim against the client's attorney, the client must show that actual damages were proximately caused by the lawyer's conduct in settling a negligence claim. The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Estate of Bonifer v. Kullman Klein & Dionenda, P.C., No. ED101161 (Mo. App. E.D. Nov. 18, 2014), affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for the client's lawyer because the client failed to prove any damages resulting from the lawyer's alleged malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. The Court explained that the client failed to produce any non-speculative evidence of damages that the claim could have been settled for a sum greater than the settlement sum negotiated by the lawyer, but which the client rejected.

In a coverage dispute that turned on the governing law applied to the claim, the Missouri Court of Appeals, in Kaskutas v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. ED100487 (Mo. App. E.D. Aug. 19, 2014), addressed the rare situation in which a dispute over the principal location of the insured risk, i.e., in Missouri or Illinois, was decided by the jury. The jury concluded the principal location was in Illinois, and based upon the jury's finding, the trial court applied Illinois law, which compelled a judgment for the insurer. While the appellate court's decision addressed procedural issues unrelated to the jury trial on the conflicts question, the decision highlights the possibility of trying commonsense questions of fact to a jury in declaratory judgment actions rather than having them decided by a judge in a bench trial.

John Greffet won a huge victory for his defendant car dealer client in a Missouri Merchandising Practices Act case where the customer claimed over $100,000 in damages, attorney fees, interest, and consequential damages. The jury returned only a $1,500 verdict after a three-day trial in the City of St. Louis.

Ken Burke and Tucker Blaser won summary judgment in St. Clair County Circuit Court in a case that involved an action alleging medical malpractice and breach of contract claims against a physician and his practice group. A motion to dismiss the medical malpractice claims was filed on the grounds that the plaintiff's proffered certificate of merit was insufficient under the requirements of the Illinois Healing Arts Malpractice Act. The court granted the motion and dismissed the medical malpractice claims with prejudice. A summary judgment motion was then filed on the remaining breach of contract claim arguing that the alleged oral contract that formed the basis of the breach of contract claim lacked consideration and/or was rescinded through subsequent performance of the parties. The court granted the summary judgment motion and entered an order dismissing the breach of contract claim with prejudice effectively resolving the entire case.  

Peter Spataro and Morgan Murphy obtained a defense verdict after a week-long medical malpractice trial in St. Louis County Circuit Court. The plaintiff alleged the defendant failed to timely diagnose and treat a DVT/pulmonary embolism (PE) following a lumbar spine surgery. The decedent had experienced symptoms suggesting a PE. When chest CT results confirmed a PE, the defendant prescribed heparin. The decedent died within an hour of the heparin order and heparin was never administered before his death. The plaintiff's expert alleged that the defendant should have prescribed heparin immediately. However, the defendant's expert emphasized the risk of bleeding if heparin were ordered without first confirming PE, and furthermore, testified that the heparin ordered would not have prevented the decedent's death three hours after the chest CT was ordered.