The weather in Paris on Thursday, June 19, was just about perfect, sunny and in the 70s. As for the temperature inside at 2, rue André Pascal, the headquarters of the OECD, we cannot say. We doubt it was too heated at the
2nd OECD Workshop on Trade and Investment by State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises. Yet there must have been some controversy, for the topic is inherently a contentious one. The reasons for that contentiousness, that conflict of interests, are well laid out in the paper
Alan Wolff submitted to the OECD for the occasion,
The State and Its Enterprises: Competition from State-Owned Enterprises and the Role of International Trade Agreements. Mr. Wolff is Senior Counsel at McKenna, Long, and Aldridge and Chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council. His June 19 paper for the OECD workshop is the source for today's quote. Here are a few more fragments, along with some other notes on the issue.
Different Actors, Different Mindsets. The first thing one notices in a discussion of SOEs is the difference in attitudes towards them. In announcing the June 19 workshop, for example, the OECD took note of the core issue from the perspective of private businesses, namely "the potential for distortions in international markets."
"At the same time," they wrote, "there is an interest in ensuring that trade and investment by state enterprises that operate according to market principles are not hindered or discriminated against."
Mr. Wolff approaches the issue of commercially competitive SOEs somewhat differently. He writes:
"There is a tendency in international discussions to recognize the need of states to create SOEs. There are also rather too often poorly defined references to the need for a 'level playing field' for commercial competition between SOEs and privately owned-companies. On the contrary, it should be recognized that any government creating or maintaining an SOE that is engaged in commercial competition should justify why this is necessary to its trading partners and the public. There should be a demonstrable overriding public purpose served and no resulting burden on international trade or investment. What is needed is not a level playing field, but close international and domestic scrutiny of the impact of state ownership on other participants in the market, and regulation imposed where necessary on these SOEs. Equivalency of the legitimacy of state-owned and private commercial competitors should not be conceded."
Different Kinds of SOEs. There are different kinds of SOEs, with different histories and different political rationales for their continuation. One example Wolff cites is the Indian railway system with its 1.4 million employees. It's the world 9th largest employer. As Wolff explains,
the Indian railway started out as a development measure but, politically, the employment it provides may be its most salient feature. Competing with foreign rivals is not an important part of that picture.
For the
Japan Display Corporation, however, competing with foreign rivals like Samsung is its "publicly reported purpose." Created in 2011, the firm is a hybrid, as it is 70 percent owned by the Japanese government - or more accurately by a Japanese government owned corporation - and 30 percent by three private companies. For Wolff, the Japan Display Corporation is an instrument of industrial policy.
"When industrial policy is the primary motivation of state intervention in the form of state ownership," he writes,
"the intent is often to affect international competitive outcomes." SOEs in Three Geographies. Alan Wolff is one of America's best known trade lawyers. So, it was not surprising that he highlighted the effects of SOEs in the same three markets one might consider in subsidies cases: the markets of third countries, the market of the private sector rival, and the SOE's home market. Briefly, there is not much a private company can do to defend itself in third countries. In its own market, the private firm can fight unfair competition from SOEs with antidumping and/or countervailing duty cases. In the home market of the SOE it is up against Goliath and without a slingshot. And when the SOE is Chinese, that's important because the Chinese market is, for almost everything, enormous. Wolff demonstrates the power of the SOE at home with the example of foreign producers of wind turbines in China. He writes:
"[W]hen government decides to promote an industry, it has many tools available to do so. In China, foreign-owned private company producers of wind turbines - companies from India, Europe, and the United States - saw their share of the Chinese market plummet from 77% to under 10% in just five years, beginning in 2005."