In the matter of Ziolkowski v. Han-Tek, Inc., 126 A.D.2d 1431 (4th Dept., 2015), the defendant issued a subpoena duces tecum to the plaintiff's accountant directing him to produce documents relating to the plaintiff's residential real estate business. The plaintiff, in turn, filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which was granted by the trial court and led to this appeal.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed the trial court's order and denied the plaintiff's motion. The Court ruled that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing that "the information sought is utterly irrelevant to any proper inquiry". Rather, the Court noted that these financial documents were relevant to the plaintiff's claim for lost wages, as well as the defendant's affirmative defense of failure to mitigate damages.

In the matter of Carr v. McHugh Painting Company, 126 A.D.3d 1440 (4th Dept., 2015), the plaintiff allegedly sustained a back injury while working on a hydraulic lift. The plaintiff, along with a coworker, was installing a door while using the hydraulic scissor lift. As a result of an impediment on the ground, the workers were forced to position the lift 20 to 24 inches away from the second floor opening where they wished to install the door.

While attempting to maneuver the door across the gap, the plaintiff felt a "twinge" or a "pop" in his lower back. The plaintiff sued the defendant under New York Labor Law §240(1), §241(6), §200, as well as under common law negligence.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the plaintiff's entire complaint. Meanwhile, the plaintiff cross moved, seeking partial summary judgment as to liability under Labor Law §240(1). The lower court denied the defendant's motion and granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, as well as leave to amend his summons and complaint in order to add an additional violation under Labor Law §241(6).

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims under Labor Law §200 and common law negligence. The Court found that the plaintiff's accident resulted from the "manner in which the work was performed" and also determined that it was undisputed that the defendant had the authority to supervise and control the methods and manner of the plaintiff's work and that it in fact did exercise such supervisory control. The Court then determined that the defendant failed to establish, as a matter of law, that the risk of injury owing to moving a heavy door across a two foot gap while at an elevated height was "inherent in plaintiff's work".

However, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's ruling with regard to Labor Law §240(1). In this case, the Court reiterated that the protections of Labor Law §240(1) extend only to a narrow class of special hazards and do not "encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity". The Court reiterated that §240(1) was designed to protect injured workers from "harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person". In this case, the Court determined that the alleged hazard in this case had nothing to do with gravity. As a result, the plaintiff's claim under §240(1) was dismissed.

Finally, the Appellate Division agreed with the defendant that the trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to add a claim under Labor Law §241(6). Here, the plaintiffs specifically wanted to add an industrial code regulation that the Appellate Division found to be "factually inapplicable to the circumstances surrounding the happening of the accident". As a result, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims under this section.

In the matter of Smart v. Rivet, 126 A.D.3d 1474 (4th Dept., 2015), the plaintiff, an adult resident of a group home operated by the defendant, Oswego County Opportunities, Inc., (OCO), was taken on a supervised trip to a restaurant, owned by co-defendant, Rivet. At some point during the dinner, the plaintiff became agitated and walked away. He then exited the second floor door and fell several feet to the parking lot. Unfortunately, there were no stairs connecting the second floor door to the ground below.

The defendant, OCO, moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to safeguard its resident and that it was also not foreseeable that the plaintiff could become injured in this manner. The trial court granted OCO's motion.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed the trial court's order and reinstated the summons and complaint against OCO. In this case, the Court ruled that the degree of reasonable care owed to individuals such as the plaintiff is measured by that person's "physical and mental ailments as known" to the defendants. The defendant's duty to safeguard its residents is "measured by the capacity of the plaintiff to provide for his own safety".

Furthermore, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, determined that OCO failed to establish, as a matter of law, that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff could cause injury to himself if not adequately supervised. The Court determined that OCO also failed to establish that its alleged negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. The Court ruled that, "the issue of proximate cause may be decided as a matter of law where only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts". In this case, the Court determined that the established facts do not demonstrate conclusively that the accident was caused solely by the dangerous condition at the restaurant, or that it occurred so quickly that any lack of supervision by OCO was not a proximate cause of the accident.

In the matter of Redmond v. Redmond, 126 A.D.3d 1476 (4th Dept., 2015), the plaintiff was allegedly injured when she struck her head on the bottom of an above-ground pool after sliding head first down a waterslide. The injury occurred at approximately 1:00 a.m. during a party that the defendants hosted at their home.

The defendants' moved for summary judgment, contending that the doctrine of assumption of risk barred the action and that the plaintiff's actions were the sole proximate cause of her injuries. The trial court denied the defendants' motion.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department upheld the trial court's denial of the motion and analyzed the doctrine of assumption of risk.

In this case, the Court interpreted previous case law from the New York Court of Appeals to hold that the doctrine of assumption of risk is restricted to "cases appropriate for absolution of duty, such as personal injury claims arising from sporting events, sponsored recreative activities, or athletic and recreational pursuits that take place at designated venues".

The Appellate Division concluded that the defendants failed to meet their initial burden of establishing that the plaintiff's injuries arose from a sporting event, athletic or recreative activity sponsored by the defendants, or an athletic or recreational pursuit that took place at a designated venue. Rather, the Court opined that the plaintiff was injured in the early morning hours while engaged in what "reasonably could be characterized as horseplay during a party". As a result, it was determined that the trial court properly denied the defendants motion.

Prepared by Michael J. Chmiel