In Dunlop v. Saint Leo the Great R.C. Church and Catholic Diocese of Buffalo, defendant Diocese of Buffalo, N.Y., incorrectly sued as Catholic Diocese of Buffalo, represented by Chelus Herdzik's Katie Renda, moved for dismissal of the action on the grounds that plaintiff failed to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

The Fourth Department of the Appellate Division noted that to avoid dismissal of the action, plaintiff was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction was obtained over the Diocese.

Plaintiff argued that jurisdiction was obtained over the Diocese by service of a summons with notice on its agent, Saint Leo the Great R.C. Church. The Court held that plaintiff's argument was without merit as the record established the Diocese and the Church as separate and distinct business entities and plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Saint Leo was designated as the Diocese's agent for service of process. Moreover, the plaintiff had not established that the Church was an "involuntary agent" of the Diocese. As a result, plaintiff's claims against the Diocese were dismissed with costs awarded to defendant.

In Caudill v. Rochester Institute of Technology, plaintiff brought, amongst other claims, a Labor Law Section 241(6) claim after he injured himself by stepping on a softball-sized clump of dirt as he descended a ramp into a trench. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that a Labor Law Section 241(6) claim arose through the violation of New York Industrial Code Section 23-1.7(e)(1). New York Industrial Code Section 23-1.7(e)(1) addresses tripping hazards in passageways. The regulation provides that: "all passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping."

Concluding that Section 23-1.7(e)(1), had not been violated ,the trial court dismissed plaintiff's 241(6) claim as it was based on a violation of that regulation. Plaintiff appealed.

The Fourth Department of the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's decision holding that "[a]lthough a single rock or clump of dirt does not constitute an "accumulation of dirt and debris"...it may nevertheless constitute another "obstruction or condition which could cause tripping...."

In Zimmer v. Town of Lancaster Industrial Development Agency, et al., plaintiff brought a claim under New York's Scaffold Labor Law 240(1). Plaintiff's wrist was fractured while he stood at ground level with a co-worker and attempted to set an extension ladder in place. The upper section of the extension ladder fell and struck plaintiff.

The trial court granted plaintiff's motion with regard to his Section 240(1) scaffold law claim.

On appeal the defendant argued that that since the feet of the ladder were at the same level at which plaintiff was standing and that the ladder extension fell only a short distance, this was not the type of injury the scaffold law was intended to protect against. The Fourth Department of the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court decision granting plaintiff summary judgment. The retraction of the ladder onto plaintiff's hand while he stood on the ground was held to be an elevation related risk.

In Sisemore v. Leffler and Mullane Motors, Inc., plaintiffs commenced a personal injury action for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Prior to trial, defendants brought a motion in limine which sought to strike plaintiffs' second supplemental bill of particulars regarding future surgery and future lost earnings. Defendants argued that the second supplemental bill of particulars was actually an amendment that required plaintiffs to seek leave from the court. The trial court denied defendants' motion and defendants appealed.

The Fourth Department of the Appellate Division noted that plaintiffs had alleged in their earlier bill of particulars that plaintiff might require future surgeries and that there would be a claim for lost earnings. Therefore, plaintiff's second supplemental bill of particulars which stated that plaintiff could require an anterior C5-6 and C6-7 discectomy and fusion and estimated future lost earnings, were "anticipated sequelae" of the injuries previously alleged. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision denying defendants' motion in limine.