In General Motors, LLC v. B.J Muirhead Co., Inc. (120 A.D.3d 927), the plaintiff, General Motors, entered into an agreement with the defendant, "Muirhead" for Muirhead to provide certain maintenance services at a plant owned and operated by General Motors. The agreement, as set forth in a purchase order executed by the parties, also required that Muirhead maintain insurance coverage for "liability arising from the premises."

After the execution of the purchase order agreement, one of Muirhead's employees commenced a personal injury action against General Motors alleging that he was injured as a result of a dangerous condition on the premises. General Motors sought defense and indemnification from Muirhead's insurer, which denied coverage to General Motors on the grounds that General Motors was not a named insured or otherwise covered by the defendant's insurance policy. General Motors thereafter commenced a breach of contract action against the defendant, contending that the defendant failed to comply with the contractual requirement to obtain insurance coverage for General Motors. The defendant moved to dismiss, and General Motors cross-moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied Muirhead's motion and granted General Motors's summary judgment motion. Muirhead thereafter filed an appeal.

The Fourth Department reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the purchase order agreement did not contain a provision which required Muirhead to obtain insurance coverage on behalf of General Motors. The Court disagreed with General Motors's contention that the provision of the contract requiring coverage for "liability arising out of the premises" could be interpreted as requiring Muirhead to obtain coverage for General Motors. Instead, the Court stated that a requirement that insurance must be purchased will not be construed as a requirement that a contracting party be named as an additional insured unless the agreement contains a provision which expressly and specifically states that such coverage must be provided. As there was no such specific requirement contained in the parties' contract, General Motors's action was dismissed.

In Dobinski v. Lockhart, (4th Dept., October 3, 2014), the plaintiff was allegedly injured when she collided with the defendants' dog while riding her bicycle in front of the defendants' house. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that they had no actual or constructive knowledge that the dog had a propensity to interfere with traffic.

The Fourth Department found that the defendants met their prima facie burden in establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The plaintiff, in response, failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The Court therefore reversed the decision of the trial court and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff in Jackson, p/n/g June v. Vatter (4th Dept., October 3, 2014) commenced a personal injury action against the defendant alleging that her infant daughter sustained injuries as the result of exposure to hazardous lead-based paint conditions at the defendant's property. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that she lacked any actual or constructive notice of a hazardous lead paint condition. The trial court denied the defendant's motion, and an appeal to the Fourth Department ensued.

The Fourth Department held that the defendant did establish, as a matter of law, that she lacked actual notice of a hazardous lead paint condition on her property. The Court found, however, several triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant had constructive notice of such a condition.

First, the plaintiff submitted evidence from which it could be inferred that the defendant was aware that there was paint peeling at the premises and that a child was residing at the property. The plaintiff also raised an issue of fact as to whether the defendant was aware of the potential hazards of lead-based paint to young children. Specifically, the plaintiff submitted evidence that the defendant subscribed to local newspapers which carried a number of articles discussing the hazards of lead-based paint to young children. Based on this evidence, the Fourth Department held that the defendant failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact with respect to constructive notice of a hazardous lead paint condition on her property, and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

In Johnson v. Murphy, (4th Dept., October 3, 2014), the plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries after his bicycle collided with a vehicle owned and operated by defendants. The accident occurred after the plaintiff rode his bicycle from his driveway into the road without stopping. Plaintiff's view of traffic in the direction from which the defendants' vehicle was travelling was obstructed by a commercial truck parked near plaintiff's driveway. At the time of the accident, the defendant was travelling under the speed limit, had the right of way, and did not see the plaintiff until the plaintiff collided with the passenger side of her vehicle, thus giving the defendant no opportunity to avoid the accident.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's own actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident. The Fourth Department held that the defendants had established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law and that the plaintiff, in response, failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.

Prepared by Katie L. Renda