Results from Select Meetings
Annual meeting season is finally here, with a flurry of meetings taking place in the last couple weeks. Here are select highlights. In all cases, the percentage of votes calculation is based on For/(For + Against).
Ameren Corporation had two shareholder proposals come to a vote; a proposal to establish an independent chair received 26% of shares voted, and a proposal requesting a report on lobbying received 37% of shares voted. A third proposal on reducing greenhouse gas emissions was included in the proxy, but withdrawn prior to the meeting.
Pfizer also faced a lobbying activity report proposal, but it received only 6% of shares voted. A proposal requiring that shareholders actually approve political expenditures received only 4%, while a written consent proposal received 44% of votes cast. Pfizer's say on Pay (96%) and stock plan passed easily (88%).
A proposal to establish written consent at AT&T received 41% of shares voted, while proposals requesting reports on lobbying and political contributions each received 25% of votes cast. Citigroup also faced a lobbying proposal, which received 26% of shares voted. Other shareholder proposals did not fare as well: the popular proposal that executives retain a significant percentage of shares acquired through equity pay programs until reaching normal retirement age received 4%, a proxy access proposal received 6%, and a proposal requesting that the Board institute a policy to make it more practical to deny indemnification for Directors received only 2%. Citigroup's say on pay proposal received 85% support, while its equity compensation plan received 97%, and directors received an average of 97% support.
Coca-Cola's meeting received plenty of attention. Its say on pay proposal received 91% while its much talked about equity compensation plan received 83% of shares voted. There was considerable commentary around Warren Buffet's decision to abstain from voting on the plan, and his decision not to communicate his view that the plan was excessive until after the annual meeting (see here). A shareholder proposal to establish an Independent Board Chairman received 32% of votes cast.
Six shareholder proposals came to a vote at General Electric. Two received more than 20% of votes cast: cumulative voting (26%) and written consent (21%). The others all received less than 4%: Senior Executives Hold Option Shares for Life (3%), Multiple Candidate Elections (3%), Cessation of All Stock Options and Bonuses (4%), Sell the Company (1%). Say on Pay received 94%.
Johnson & Johnson's say on pay proposal received 96%, while a shareholder proposal that executives retain a significant percentage of shares acquired through equity pay programs until reaching normal retirement age received 26%.
We have begun to add vote results to the Shareholder Proposal Database located here. We are also including the average support received by the board for companies that had shareholders proposals on their ballot.
Proxy Monitor is also tracking shareholder proposal and say on pay vote results for Fortune 250 companies here.
Proxy Statements
The number of proxy statements coming out has slowed, especially among larger companies.
Wal-mart's proxy contains an effective summary, including attractive graphs describing director demographics and experience. The proxy also has an extensive discussion on peer groups, of which it uses three, as well as a comprehensive "What We Do; What We Don't Do" table on pay practices. The company also provides shareholders with many ways to contact the board and company, including individual email addresses for each director, and a smartphone app where shareholders can provide feedback to the investor relations department. UnitedHealthcare has a summary of its entire proxy, as well as an executive summary of its executive compensation. It also has a detailed list of the duties of an independent Chair of the Board or Lead Independent Director. Other companies with effective summary statements include Priceline, Activision Blizzard, Inc., Roper Industries.
Devon Energy contains an extensive discussion of realizable pay, including a unique four quadrant box that maps Devon's realizable pay and TSR versus that of its peers. Other companies that discuss realizable pay include Western Refining, Approach Resources Inc., and Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. LifePoint Hospitals has an especially attractive schematic (pg. 31) that provides an overview of its executive compensation program.
Supplemental Proxies - Peer Groups; Burn Rates; ESG Proposals
Anadarko Petroleum filed in response to ISS's negative recommendation on say on pay noting a settlement of an adversary proceeding that had kept the stock price, and consequently, TSR, depressed: "Anadarko's relative total stockholder return for 2013 did not reflect the company's exceptional operational and financial performance largely due to uncertainty relating to the Tronox Adversary Proceeding."
Colfax Corp announced the extension of the CEO's employment contract and new equity grants in connection with the extension.
EnteroMedics filed a supplemental proxy to solicit support for its equity incentive plan, noting its burn rate, which apparently ran afoul of the maximum ISS burn rate test for their industry group, and total potential dilution:
The Company's . . . burn rate, was 9.39% as of December 31, 2013, which is slightly higher than the maximum burn rate of 9.08% for the Company's industry group under Institutional Shareholder Services Inc.'s ("ISS") applicable policy guidelines for 2014 and slightly lower than the maximum burn rate of 9.92% for the Company's industry group under the ISS's applicable policy guidelines for 2013. . . The total potential dilution (on a fully diluted basis) as of December 31, 2013 if the increase to the number of shares authorized under the Plan is approved would be approximately 6.9%."
Broadcom seeks approval of its executive pay despite negative recommendations by both ISS and GL. It notes the cyclicality of the industry, and future changes to reduce stock-based compensation and more directly align pay with performance.
The semiconductor industry is cyclical and as such we use relative revenue performance and operating performance, as well as achievement of pre-defined strategic objectives. We believe relative revenue growth is an important measure of our success in growing our market share. We further believe that the non-GAAP operating margin metric delivers meaningful economic value within our target economic model and that in cyclical periods where the market declines, a free cash flow metric is important to encourage and maintain tight fiscal management and protect Broadcom's assets. The final metric - a list of pre-determined strategic objectives - permits our Compensation Committee to award a bonus component based on strategic accomplishments (such as technology advancement, key customer wins, environmental consciousness, etc.) that are not purely financial but are critical to our long-term success, as well as the Committee's qualitative assessment of individual performance and achievements. We disagree with ISS' comment that the program is overly "discretionary."
Assured Guaranty Limited takes issue with ISS's peer group selection noting that only one other company does the financial guaranty insurance business, and it is privately held. It also notes that the company has a market cap of nearly 3X that of the average of the the ISS peer group. "Our achievements cannot be measured according to a strictly applied formula"
Consol Energy also disputes ISS's peer groups, as well as other assertions: "Contrary to ISS' Assertion, CONSOL Has Not Lagged in Total Shareholder Return ("TSR") or other measures of performance." The filing notes changes made in its stock plan program (reducing threshold payouts to 50% of target) and its LTIP (pay-out contingent on achieving both TSR and Return on Capital Employed), as well as reduced pay for the CEO and President. Consol also notes that Glass Lewis gave the company credit for its changes whereas ISS did not:
Glass Lewis evaluated these changes and concluded "[o]n balance, we believe these changes should serve to strengthen the link between executive payouts and the Company's overall performance, and go a ways toward addressing certain longstanding concerns that Glass Lewis has raised with regard to the Company's compensation practices."
ISS acknowledges these substantial changes as addressing some key issues, but takes the position that it is too early to determine whether the programs will fully address concerns.
Core Laboratories NV files to modify (decrease) the number of shares sought for its equity plan.
Xylem's filing relates to management's recommendation for a special meeting proposal at a 25% threshold in response to a proposal the previous year. The supplemental reiterates its description in the proxy regarding investor outreach resulting in the conclusion that a 10% threshold was too low:
- We proactively engaged our 25 largest shareowners, holding over 100 million shares representing more than 50% of our outstanding shares of common stock at the time.
- As a result of this engagement, we conducted extensive interviews with the 17 shareowners . . . . [which] held over 76 million shares representing more than 40% of our outstanding shares of common stock. . . .
- Of those interviewed, holders of 80% of the shares indicated that a 10% threshold was too low and that they would support a management proposal with a threshold of 25%, while only 11% indicated that they supported the 10% threshold contemplated by the 2013 shareowner proposal. One shareowner, representing approximately 9%, could not provide a view at that time.
- In establishing the 25% threshold in the 2014 special meeting proposal included in our 2014 proxy statement, the Board considered this feedback from investors which overwhelmingly supported a 25% threshold.
Capella Education explaining the details of a one time grant award to the CEO seeking support for its say on pay proposal.
Veeco Instruments takes issue with Glass Lewis' negative recommendation on pay and withhold against directors.
Strayer Education notes that the CEO voluntarily gave up a legacy tax gross up and single trigger change in control clause after learning that shareholders did not approve.
Borg-Warner files to disclose its stock incentive plan burn rate and total potential dilution even though ISS and GL both recommended in favor of its say on pay proposal, at a shareholder's request. See also Covanta Holdings filed to supplement its disclosure on burn rate and overhang, which it noted passed ISS's tests. It also added language regarding the Criteria Relied Upon for Equity Award Grant Decisions and its Security Ownership Guidelines.
Similarly, Murphy Oil Corp. filed additional information including certain performance metrics in connection with payouts under its annual incentive plans, and information about how its retirement plan was administered, apparently in response to a shareholder request.
EOG Resources filed a supplemental proxy urging holders to vote against two shareholder proposals on hydraulic fracturing and methane emissions. The filing sets forth the company's existing disclosures "regarding the environmental, health and safety aspects of our operations and our practices for managing the related risks" and notes that Glass Lewis supports the Board's position on the proposals.
|