Not so long ago before automation took over, throttle commands from the wheelhouse on a steamship were transmitted to the engineer by way of the engine order telegraph.

Full, half and slow bell commands were marked on each side of the telegraph semicircle.  One side was for astern and one side was for ahead.  The stop bell was found in the middle.  The mate on watch would move the telegraph handle to the throttle position desired and a bell would ring in both the wheelhouse and the engine room.  The engineer would acknowledge the command by matching his telegraph handle to the pointer on the semicircle.  Once the order was acknowledged, the ringing would stop.

The engineer would open or close the throttle valves to the ahead or the astern turbines producing the desired revolutions fore/aft or to stop the propeller.

As a shipboard engineer, we would often use the term "Slow Bell" to emphasize that planning and care need to be taken when starting and working on a project.  Our Chief Engineer would tell us to "Put it on a slow bell when rebuilding that pump".  His message to us was to think the project through and take time to do it right.

Using "slow bell" thinking is as valuable in Towboat operations today as it was aboard ship.

Let's look at a serious marine incident that happened six years ago and see how slowing down and thinking through the operation could have made all the difference.  The details below are from the findings of a United States Coast Guard inquiry completed after the incident.

On the evening of March 27, 2008, a Higman tow departed up-bound from Wilson Lock on route to Decatur, Alabama.  After a successful single set over locking, the tow was reassembled and pushed into the Tennessee River on a course toward Wilson Point Light.  It was a dark night.

The tow quickly sped up to an average speed of 10.9 mph as estimated by the Coast Guard.  The deck crew remained on the head of the tow to prepare mooring lines for their arrival at the Decatur dock.  Both spotlights on the top of the pilot house were illuminated and trained forward to provide additional lighting for the crew.  One crewmember recalled not having a flashlight with him but was able to complete his work with the deck illumination.

Approximately fifteen minutes after leaving the lock, the head of the tow collided with a 32 foot pleasure boat operating with four people aboard. CG findings concluded that the pleasure boat did not display running lights.  All four occupants of the pleasure boat lost their lives as a result of the collision.

The conclusions of the CG inquiry found fault in both parties.  Obviously the pleasure boat underway at night without running lights was a main factor, but what simple changes could the tow crew have made to minimize risk?

Start by slowing down.

• Having a deck crew work at night on open water while the tow is running at full speed is not safe.  The tow could have left the lock at a minimal speed, allowing the crew to work in a safer environment.   The tow then could have gotten underway at a "safe speed appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions" after the crew completed their deck work......Rule 6, Safe Speed

• Using the spotlights to illuminate the deck compromised the wheelman's night vision.  Under these circumstances, the wheelman may not have been able to make out the approaching pleasure boat with the glare of the spotlights trained ahead........Rule 5, Look-out

• With the spotlights energized, the CG concluded that the sidelights and special flashing light on the tow may have been obscured and not easily observed by the pleasure boat.  The rules state that, "such lights cannot be mistaken for the lights in these rules or do not impair their visibility or distinctive character".  The rule goes on to say, "or interfere with the keeping of a proper look-out"......... Rule 20(b) Lights and Shapes

• Back to the look-out rule; by having to observe his deck crew working on the head of the tow, the wheelman was not able to be his own look-out.  The special rules permitting the wheelman to act as his own look-out clearly state that a separate look-out may be eliminated only after "all relevant factors" including traffic, weather, etc are "carefully assessed".  The wheelman did not have his full attention on the navigation of the tow....... Rule 5, Look-out

• A crewmember working on deck without a flashlight indicates to me that pre-evolution conference was never completed.  Though not discussed in the CG inquiry report, a short meeting to discuss what is about to happen could have reminded the deck crew to have all their PPE with them. 

This example, though extreme, shows us that foregoing planning and forgetting common sense can have a disastrous ending.

Use a "Slow Bell" thought process to plan out any task ahead, big or small.  Analyze each part of the operation to ensure that what is about to be undertaken is done safely and within our policies and procedures.

Be safe.....operate under a slow bell.

Good ideas need to be shared, refined and become "Best Practices". A "Best Practice" is defined as a method or technique which shows results superior to those achieved with other means, and that is used as a benchmark.  In addition, a "Best Practice" can evolve to become better as improvements are discovered. 

This column is dedicated to sharing the best practices developed while operating your tow. Each issue we will outline a "Best Practice" sent in by the fleet.  Share your Best Practice by sending to Gordie.

  One of the practices that Jerry used while Captain of the M/V Saint Charles was to start a watch with a steersman by going over the charts. Charts are a readily available guide to the areas that you will be operating in. Jerry likes to point out important areas and have the steersman mark them directly on the chart.  

Charts can be marked to note when to broadcast positions, where to hold up for traffic, what mile markers to check in with VTS, and changes in VHF for certain areas. They can also be marked for shallow areas, and other hazards such as cross currents, narrow and congested areas, and landmarks such as bridges, locks and docks. Don't forget that these marks can be made on both paper charts and electronic charts.

Submitted by: Jerry Casagrand

What is an ebb current?

a. A current at minimum flow
b. A current coming in
c. A current going out
d. A current at maximum flow

What is the light phase characteristic of a lighted isolated-danger mark?

a. Interrupted quick flashing
b. Very quick flashing
c. Long flashing
d. Group flashing

Under the IALA Buoyage Systems, a yellow buoy may mark __________.

a. fish net areas
b. spoil areas
c. military exercise zones
d. All of the above

Which buoy is NOT numbered?

a. Green can buoy
b. Preferred-channel buoy
c. Red lighted buoy
d. Green gong buoy

Safe water buoys may show ONLY __________.

a. flashing red lights
b. flashing green lights
c. white lights
d. yellow lights

The Wreck of the U.S.S. Hatteras

The U.S.S Hatteras was the only US Navy ship sunk at sea in the Gulf of Mexico

During the Civil War the major strategy of the Northern forces in the Gulf of Mexico was to blockade the southern ports.  During that time only one U.S. Navy warship ship was sunk at sea while enforcing the blockade.  That ship was a USS Hatteras

Constructed in 1861, the vessel was originally known as a St. Mary.  She was an iron hulled, side wheel steamer of 1450 tons.  Renamed the USS Hatteras after purchase by the U.S. Navy later that year, she was armed with four 32 pounder cannons.

In 1862, the Hatteras was ordered to join the blockade fleet in the Gulf of Mexico.  That fleet, under Admiral Farragut, prepared to retake Galveston in January 1863.

On January 11, 1863, while the blockade fleet gathered off of the Texas coast, a set of sails was cited just over the horizon.  The Hatteras was ordered to pursue.  After a four hour chase, the Hatteras came close to the square rigged, black hulled vessel.   The Captain of the Hatteras, Commander Homer C. Blake, ordered the square rigged vessel to identify itself.  "Her Britannic Majesty's ship Vixen," was the reply.  The Hatteras launched a boat to inspect the British vessel. 

Almost as soon as launch left the side of the Hatteras,  a new reply came from the mystery ship.  "We are the CSS Alabama." 

Today, the wreck of the Hatteras rests in the 58 feet of water about 20 miles off of Galveston.  The 210 foot hull is completely buried under about 3 feet of sand.  The wreck remains virtually intact and makes it one of the most important underwater archaeological sites in United States.

© 2014 HIGMAN MARINE SERVICES, Inc.