Detailed Explanation    

• A (leasee, socher) rented an animal from B(lessor, maskir) to perform a specified task. Due to no irresponsibility on A or B's part, the animal died while performing the task.

If the first part of the job is financially beneficial to A (leasee, socher), A pays for the first part of the job.

With regards to the half of the intended service never rendered, no one was at fault. It was rather resultant a fateful mishap. But to who's "fate, or mazal" do we attribute this mishap?

As the animal's death will affect B beyond the termination of the rental interval, we attribute the mishap to B's "fate".

As such, A (leasee, socher) is absolved from paying for the non rendered service. [Note 1: Under certain conditions, (see subsequent issues,) A (leasee, socher) can require B (lessor, maskir) to provide him/her with a fair replacement.]

• A (leasee, socher) rented an animal from B (lessor, maskir) for a specified interval. The animal did not die, but its functionality became temporarily severely compromised and would recover only after the prescribed time.

B will be able to benefit from the animal after the termination of the rental. However, for A's purposes, the animal "figuratively died".

No one was at fault. It was rather a fateful mishap. But to who's "fate, or mazal" do we attribute the mishap?

If the nature of the unforeseen "death-like mishap" was such, that it would have occurred equally under B's (lessor, maskir) watch, we attribute the mishap to B's fate. As such, B must absorb the loss (i.e. the regime searched the homes to impound the animals temporarily and would have found the animal in B's home as well).

If the nature of the unforeseen "death-like mishap" was such, that A (leasee, socher) indirectly facilitated the phenomenon (i.e. the regime searched the roadways on which A traveled to impound the animals), we attribute the mishap to A's (leasee, socher) fate. Hence, A (leasee, socher) must pay for the agreed rental price irrespective of whether he/she benefitted from the animal or not [Nesivos Choshen Mishpat 310: 2, 3].

Q. Should an army temporarily unforeseeably take over the rented home for the duration of the rental period, in a manner which makes the home unlivable; to whose fate do we attribute the phenomenon?

• Nesivos [ibid.] understands this phenomenon as such, that it would have occurred irrespective of whether A was renting the home; very similar to a situation where the regime was searching through the homes to impound animals. Accordingly, Nesivos attributes this phenomenon to the B(lessor, maskir)'s fate, and thus absolves A (leasee, socher) from paying for the time he/she was unable to live in the home.

• Machane Efraim [Hilchos Sechirus 6] agrees with Nesivos, were the army to overtake numerous homes. However, if the army only took over the rental home, and no other home in the area; Machane Efraim attributes the phenomenon to both A's and B's fate. As such, Machane Efraim compromises and rules that while A need not pay for the time he/she was unable to live in the home; if A already paid for the time he/she was unable to live in the home, we would not compel B to return the money.

Conclusion:

 When two valid conflicting Halachic views exist, the Lower Court employs the formula of hamotzi mechaveiro alav harayah and permits the status quo to continue (leaving the Heavenly Court with the duty to rectify the issue). As such, practically, though we would not compel A to pay for the time he/she was unable to live in the home; if A already paid for the time he/she was unable to live in the home, we would not compel B to return the money.

If however, the army took over numerous homes in the area in a manner which made it unlivable, the Friedman's may even demand a refund for the second week, as all authorities attribute this phenomenon to the fate of the lessor.