Results that Matter
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 | Charles Mailloux |
Congratulations to Charles Mailloux for a defense verdict on the issue of liability in Bronx County on 8/9/13 before Judge Barone in the case of Sinkler v. Valerio (Index no: 300435/09).
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Employee of the Month
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Cristina Hardie is an extremely bright and energetic recent college graduate who has been with our office for close to a year working in an Office Support position, performing a potpourri of tasks. Christina graduated from Mount Saint Mary College in 2012 with a Bachelors in Communications. We are glad to have her at the firm and salute her for her efforts. She certainly has a bright future and we are proud to have her aboard.
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Look for upcoming news about the opening of our new office in Westchester.
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Trial Tips - The Biomechanical Expert
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 | Frank Scahill |
A frequent scenario in today's litigation from low impact automobile accidents is an asymptomatic plaintiff who goes on to have some type of surgery. Arthroscopic procedures for knee and shoulder complaints are the norm. Cervical and lumbar discectomies and fusions are common place. Just about every file has a consult from Dr. Lattuga or Dr. Radna with a recommendation for surgery. How do you defendant these cases on a theory of causation where the plaintiff was active and working prior to the accident and now claims total disability and is collecting SSD benefits?
A biomechanical expert can be the bridge for you to take the jury out of the world of personal injury litigation back to the world of science. You can show the photos and ask for common sense and reason yourself, without an expert, but plaintiff's surgeon will testify the injury was caused by the accident. A biomechanical expert can precisely tell the jury what type of force is applied to a human body in a low speed motor vehicle accident and what PEER reviewed studies have shown is the amount of force necessary to herniate a disc, tear a meniscus, cause a SLAP lesion in a shoulder joint.
I have attached a transcript of the testimony of our biomechanical expert from a recent trial. In this case the plaintiff claimed both knee and shoulder surgeries from a rear end impact. The jury returned a defense verdict on damages. After qualifying our biomechanical expert and bringing him through to his opinion I asked the following:
Q. Before I ask your conclusion, how do you know, you were not there, you were not at the scene, you did not see the plaintiff immediately after, how can you come to this conclusion as a biomechanical expert?
A. That's the beauty of science, you learn from science what you did not know before. You know the amount of damage to the car, we know the velocity or maximum velocity that can be sustained during the accident, we know the extent of damage and the movement of the person inside... There is no compression or pushing downward type of force on her knees. And her movement is rearward, away from the dashboard and the steering wheel and the structures in front of her. That's the simple physical question... it's physically impossible to cause damage to the knee, especially the meniscus...If you do not have enough force...there is no way to get that type of injury to that certain part of the body.
This type of testimony can be extremely helpful in defending the low impact surgical case. Two caveats---one, your expert needs to have impeccable credentials that will carry weight with the jury. The second, your cross examination of the plaintiff's expert has to roll out the red carpet for your biomechanical expert. Unless you plant that seed of doubt by cross examining the plaintiff's surgeon, no one will listen to your expert.
On the admissibility of the expert's testimony see Mary Plate v. Palisade Film Delivery Corp 38 A.D.3rd 835 (2009) "The Supreme Court erred in its determination that the defendants' biomechanical engineering expert was not qualified to testify regarding whether the force of the impact in the subject accident could have caused a serious injury or exacerbated a preexisting injury to the plaintiff's cervical spine and in precluding that testimony(see Borawski v Huang, 34 AD3d 409, 824 NYS2d 362 [2006]; Moon Ok Kwon v Martin, 19 AD3d 664, 799 NYS2d 63 [2005])."
Read the transcript here.
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Ethics Opinion Regarding Social Media Evidence | | The New York County Lawyers' Association issued an ethics opinion on July 2, 2013 on what is appropriate advice to give a client with respect to postings on social media sites. The opinion notes Americans spend 20% of their time on social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter.
"Although all of the major social media outlets have password protections and various levels of privacy settings, many users are oblivious or indifferent to them, providing an opportunity for persons with adverse interests to learn even the most intimate information about them. For example, teenagers and college students commonly post photographs of themselves partying, binge drinking, indulging in illegal drugs or sexual poses, and the like.... Rather than hire investigators to follow claimants with video cameras, personal injury defendants may seek to locate YouTube videos or Facebook photos that depict a "disabled" plaintiff engaging in activities that are inconsistent with the claimed injuries." Hello Hello, anybody home, Think McFly, Think! Do you think those photos of you waterskiing after your back surgery are going to help your case ? Trying to stop a young plaintiff from posting on Facebook is impossible. The New York County Lawyers' Association concludes that an attorney may properly review a clients' social media pages and advise the client that certain materials posted on a social media page may be used against the client for impeachment or similar purposes. Further, "Provided that there is no violation of the rules or substantive law pertaining to the preservation and/or spoliation of evidence, an attorney may offer advice as to what may be kept on "private" social media pages, and what may be "taken down" or removed" Practice Tip for Defendants-Together with your answer send a certified letter to plaintiff's counsel advising the plaintiff to preserve for discovery all social media postings as of the date of the accident or the date the litigation commenced. See Frank Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc. (2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41909 (USDC.N.J., where Magistrate Mannion sanctioned a personal injury plaintiff for closing his Facebook account while suit was pending. In order to preserve the "spoliation" charge, a court must find that four factors are satisfied before giving the jury instruction: (1) the evidence was within the party's control; (2) there was an actual suppression or withholding of evidence; (3) the evidence destroyed or withheld was relevant to the claims or defenses; and (4) it was reasonably foreseeable that the evidence would be discoverable. (See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Co., 72 F.3d 326 (3rd Cir. 1995).) Read the ethics opinion here. |
Appellate Decisions of Note
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"You've Got Mail" and CPLR 2104
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Consider this nightmare for a defendant's attorney. On May 3rd you send an email to your adversary that reads, "Per our phone conversation today, May 3, 2011, you accepted my offer of $230,000 to settle this case. Please have your client execute the attached Medicare form as no settlement can be issued without this form."
On May 11, you receive an email alert advising you that you just won summary judgment and the case against your client was dismissed the previous day, May 10th. Meanwhile the same day, by fax, you receive the signed releases and stipulation of discontinuance and the overnight package with original documents comes in the next morning. Your carrier gets wind of everything and is furious, "Send a letter immediately rejecting the release and withdrawing the offer!" screams the Claim manager.
You then fax and mail a letter dated May 12, 2011, to the plaintiffs' counsel, advising that the release and stipulation of discontinuance "is hereby rejected." Your letter further stated that, since "there was no settlement consummated under New York CPLR 2104 between the parties, you consider this matter dismissed by the court's decision dated May 10, 2011". Are you on the hook for the $230,000? The answer is YES you are.
CPLR 2104 provides: "An agreement between parties or their attorneys relating to any matter in an action . . . is not binding upon a party unless it is in a writing subscribed by him or his attorney." On July 24, 2013, the Appellate Division , Second Department in Forcelli v. Gelco (2013 NY Slip Op 5437)
addressed this very issue. "...given the now widespread use of email as a form of written communication in both personal and business affairs, it would be unreasonable to conclude that email messages are incapable of conforming to the criteria of CPLR 2104 simply because they cannot be physically signed in a traditional fashion (see Newmark & Co. Real Estate Inc. v 2615 E. 17th St. Realty LLC, 80 AD3d 476, 477-478, 914 N.Y.S.2d 162 ["e-mail agreement set forth all relevant terms of the agreement . . . and thus, constituted a meeting of the minds"]).
In this case, Greene's email message contained her printed name at the end thereof, as opposed to an "electronic signature" as defined by the Electronic Signatures and Records Act. Nevertheless, the record supports the conclusion that Greene, in effect, signed the email message. Accordingly, we hold that where, as here, an email message contains all material terms of a settlement and a manifestation of mutual accord, and the party to be charged, or his or her agent, types his or her name under circumstances manifesting an intent that the name be treated as a signature, such an email message may be deemed a subscribed writing within the meaning of CPLR 2104 so as to constitute an enforceable agreement. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the plaintiffs' motion which were to vacate so much of the order dated May 10, 2011, as granted the motion of the Gelco defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them and, thereupon, to enforce a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the Gelco defendants, and properly entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the Gelco defendants in the principal sum of $230,000, in accordance with CPLR 5003-a(e)."
Read the decision here.
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SUM Claim Denied
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Geico v. Avelar was decided by the Appellate Division, Second Department on July 17, 2013 (2013 NY Slip Op 5317). The issue in this proceeding is whether a claimant could make a claim for Supplemental Underinsured/Uninsured Motorist benefits (SUM) under a resident relative's policy.
Maria Avelar was a passenger in an Allstate vehicle involved in a two car accident. Allstate had a minimum policy ($25,000 per person/$50,000 per occurrence) with identical SUM limits. The adverse vehicle was insured by Travelers Insurance Company, also with minimum limits. Ms. Avelar made a claim for SUM coverage with GEICO under a resident relative's policy with SUM limits of $100,000 per person/$300,00 per occurrence. GEICO sought a stay of arbitration based on a denial of coverage due to a policy exclusion, The SUM endorsement under the GEICO policy provided, in relevant part, that it did not apply "to bodily injury to an insured incurred while occupying a motor vehicle owned by that insured, if such motor vehicle is not insured for SUM coverage by the policy under which a claim is made, or is not a newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of this policy."
The Appellate Division found in favor of GEICO, holding "This language must be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. This GEICO policy exclusion unambiguously excluded from SUM coverage claims for compensation for bodily injuries sustained by an insured when injured in a motor vehicle accident while occupying a motor vehicle he or she owns, which vehicle was not covered under the GEICO policy (see Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Polyakov, 74 AD3d 820, 822, 903 N.Y.S.2d 443; Matter of USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v Hughes, 35 AD3d at 488). There is no dispute that the respondent, at the time of the accident, was occupying a vehicle that she owned but was not covered under the subject policy (see Matter of New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v Polyakov, 74 AD3d at 822). "
See the decision here. |
The Head Swatted Plaintiff Prevails
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On August 3rd, 1863 William Travers and John Hunter opened a race track on the north side of Union Ave. A year later the track moved across Union Ave. to its present location. Saratoga Race Course is now the oldest race horse track in America and every August tens of thousands of race enthusiasts pack Saratoga for a month of racing.
As a defense attorney, you always wonder what could go wrong? Consider Robert Carey v. Burton Schwab which was decided by the the Appellate Division, Third Department on July 18, 2013 (2013 NY Slip Op 5370). In this case Diana Weaver and Jan Wilson took three horses into town to go to local tavern. This actually happened in May of 2008 (we are in the third department remember). Of course the horses ran off, The plaintiff, Robert Carey, tried to help corral the horses and ended up being "head swatted" by a horse named "Whiskey". (I am not kidding, read the order.) The ensuing lawsuit centered on liability for injuries caused by a domestic animal. As a general rule, an owner of a domestic animal will only be held strictly liable for the harm caused by such animal if he or she "'knows or should have known of that animal's vicious propensities.'" (Bard v Jahnke, 6 NY3d 592, 596, 848 N.E.2d 463, 815 N.Y.S.2d 16 [2006]. It is well established that a vicious propensity is "the propensity to do any act that might endanger the safety of the persons and property of others in a given situation" (Collier v Zambito, 1 NY3d at 446) and includes behavior that would not necessarily be considered dangerous or ferocious if those behaviors reflect a "'proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm'" Here the Court weighed the parties submissions on a motion for summary judgment and concluded the lower court properly denied the motion, "Viewing, in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, Merrills' testimony regarding his observations of defendant's paint horse, together with the evidence that Whiskey was the paint horse that defendant usually rode, and giving plaintiffs the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, we find that there are genuine issues of fact which preclude summary judgment." Score one for the "head swatted" plaintiff. Maybe the next time you see a horse running down the street from a Tavern, the best course of action may be to call the police. Read the order here. |
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If you have ever been to Breezy Point in the Rockaways, chances are you may have stopped into the "Sugar Bowl", a beach bar on George Timmons Way. The Sugar Bowl was more than a place for Drinks. The owners ran more fundraisers and memorial runs than any one in town. This was the place every young man in Breezy Point had his first beer, his first kiss and his first fight. Hurricane Sandy ripped the bar from its moorings and floated the bar seven miles away (still fully stocked) to Gerritsen Beach in Brooklyn.
Breezy Point was devastated by Hurricane Sandy with 110 homes destroyed by fire.
Now, like Phoenix rising from the ashes, The Sugar Bowl is back, maybe in a trailer, but back nonetheless.

Hope springs eternal!
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Picciano & Scahill, PC
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