The political upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia have yet to generate a demonstrably democratic transition and there is a serious prospect of authoritarian resilience or restoration in both cases.  But if a democratic breakthrough occurs, the experience of earlier transitions is promising, writes Cornell University's Nicolas van de Walle. A paradoxical lesson is that undemocratic processes can help ensure successful democratic transitions.

The anti-authoritarian revolts in Tunisia and Egypt are strikingly similar in two respects at least to several transitions witnessed in the celebrated Third Wave of democracy that began in Southern Europe in the mid 1970s and swept through Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa over the 1980s and 1990s.

Massive popular protests erupted against longstanding, entrenched and unpopular authoritarian regimes, leading to successful democratic transitions in Poland and Czechoslovakia (both 1989), Indonesia (1998), Benin (1989), Zambia (1991) and Mali (1991). The transitions in Spain (1975), Hungary (1989), Argentina (1983), Greece (1974) exhibit similarities that can be instructive, too.

Four key transition decisions - plus a 'meta decision'

The experience of these earlier comparable transitions suggests that four key decisions tend to determine prospects for successful democratization. Perhaps most significantly, determining the decision-making process critically shapes the four other judgments.

1. The nature of the interim government:

In each of these transitions, a power vacuum looms dangerously at the outset. Popular protests result in the ouster and exile of the discredited dictator, while neither the old government nor the single party legislature retains the legitimacy to govern. As the possibility of chaos looms, it is essential to fill the political vacuum.

2. A new constitution?

A second critical decision following the collapse of an authoritarian order is whether or not to devise a new constitution. The existing rules of the game have often been devised specifically to protect and sustain the authoritarian order. The power and privileges of the ruling party may be constitutionally enshrined, while the opposition's ability to compete for power may be curtailed. The opposition may believe that a completely new constitution is a precondition for a successful transition.

3. What timeline?

A third decision concerns the timeline and sequence to be adopted. How long will the interim government rule? How quickly will elections be convened? Should the constitution be revised before elections are held? Transitions vary considerably in the sequencing of these different steps, but in most cases, they last for a period of no less than six months, but rarely exceeding 15 months.

4. Should the old regime be prosecuted?

The fourth decision is what to do with the old regime's assets and whether or not to prosecute its various transgressions. The old ruling party has often amassed considerable real estate and financial assets which can typically be easily transferred to the state.

The meta decision - how to make decisions?

Each of the preceding choices is embedded within a broader judgment about how to make decisions to move the transition forward. This meta decision is problematic, precisely because the old provisions about rule making have been compromised, but there are as yet no new rules.

The old ruling class has been discredited, but not replaced. Some new political figures have emerged, but their popularity and legitimacy is unclear and often contested. The old legislature is made up of old elites and cannot be trusted to participate sincerely in the democratization process.

On the other hand, constitutional reform may have to precede elections, since the old rules tend to favor the ruling party. A variety of mechanisms have been employed to maintain the momentum of transition.

In some cases, a trusted individual figure may be able to spearhead the process. The Spanish transition relied in no small way on the legitimacy of King Juan Carlos, who had been put on the throne by Franco yet resolutely supported the process of democratization. In Czechoslovakia, the enormous legitimacy of Vaclav Havel - and to a lesser extent of Alexander Dubcek - helped the Velvet Revolution move forward. In Indonesia, the sitting vice president inherited power and orchestrated political reform.

Significantly, these leaders rarely emerged from participatory or particularly democratic processes. In other cases, however, the end of authoritarian rule results in such a fractious environment that no single person can engineer the process forward. In these instances, some kind of constituent assembly, national conference, or roundtable, is organized in which both the principal actors of the transition, and the process by which it will move forward are decided.

These transition processes succeed if and when the meta decision-making process stumbles onto the right formula. In some cases, it does not. In a number of African countries, the convening of a National Conference allowed the old regime to survive and begin the process of retaking power.

In Tunisia, it remains conceivable that the former ruling RCD party will manage to co-opt the Interim government and prevent real reform. In Egypt, at the time of writing, everything remains possible.

In both states, democratic actors are already confronting some of these dilemmas and choices. They can at least take heart that a number of states have successfully negotiated the tricky path they face, providing lessons which may help them anticipate and plan for emerging challenges.  

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