Writing in the National Review, including the above quote, Hans von Spakovsky offers, "In U.S. v. Danielczyk, the district court held that the Supreme Court's Citizens United decision had undermined the rationale for the ban on direct corporate contributions . . . The judge's decision makes perfect sense. But he has just issued an order indicating he is reconsidering. He has asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs on two separate prior decisions of the Supreme Court. This includes FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), in which the Supreme Court specifically upheld the direct ban on corporate contributions.  Predicting judges' decisions is riskier than predicting the outcome of a horse race, but today's order sure indicates that the judge may be having second thoughts about the scope of his ruling."

Lyle Denniston of SCOTUS BLOG goes further: "Whatever prompted Judge Cacheris to do so on Tuesday, he issued a two-page order directing both sides in the Danielczyk case to file new briefs on the Beaumont case and its potential impact. The briefs, the order said, are to address "whether, in light of FEC v. Beaumont...and Agostini v. Felton...(1997), this Court should reconsider its ruling" of last Thursday against the corporate donation ban. (The Agostini precedent has been read by some judges and others as a stern reminder to lower courts that they are not to find a Supreme Court precedent to be no longer binding unless the Supreme Court itself has said so.)"

Paul Prados, writing in the Northern Virginia Lawyer Blog, offers a detailed analysis of the practical limitations of this ruling, the precedent it does (and does not) establish, and the likelihood of little to no immediate consequences.  Even if Judge Cacheris's ruling were to stand, it would not necessarily apply beyond the particular facts and circumstances of the underlying criminal case, and need not be followed even by other Judges in the Eastern District of Virginia.  At its most expansive, the ruling would likely only effect corporations in the Eastern District, and corporations that have some level of operation in other areas as well may still be subject to the ban (an interesting question about "corporate residency" for another day).  As a practical matter, ending the ban on contributions by a corporation does not necessarily mean the prohibition on campaigns accepting corporate contributions is lifted, or that it is lifted for any but those candidates whose constituencies are in the Eastern District (several House seats, both Senate seats, and presidential campaigns).

Even were some corporate contributions to some candidates permissible, they would still be subject to the same limits as individual contributions - $2,500 per candidate per election, and $46,200 over each 2 year election cycle to all candidates.  However, it is highly unlikely that a corporation would risk making any contributing in such an uncertain legal environment. Even the shadowy, deep-pocketed bogie-men suggested by those seeking to limit constitutionally protected political speech are unlikely to invest the time and money necessary to create new corporate entities solely to make such limited contributions.  It is possible that any such spontaneous creation could be treated as a PAC, being that it would be a corporation formed for no other purpose but to contribute to candidates (and which has a higher contribution limit of $5,000 per candidate per election), which would offer it greater ability to contribute, but potentially subject contributions from a deep-pocketed founder/controller to being treated as personal contributions.

It is likely the Judge will reconsider his ruling, though the Strategist still predicts that this outcome - contributions by corporations to candidates subject to the same limits as individuals - is inevitable.  However, despite the strong indications towards this outcome in Citizens United, it failed to explicitly address the matter and the precedent in Beaumont still controls until the Supreme Court ultimately revisits this issue.

If corporate contributions to PACs may not be banned, neither may corporate contributions to PACs.  Functionally, corporation & association PACs (SSF's) receive significant corporate support for all or most of their administrative and operating expenses.  Though such support is strictly prohibited from use for actual contributions, it serves as a vital conduit to raising those dollars - and many SSF PAC managers candidly admit to spending more raising money than they actually raise - such is the greater value of contributable PAC dollars.

However, if direct corporate contributions are permitted, this may create pressure to reconsider the SSF model in one of two ways.  Congress will either be asked to shoot their main source of campaign funding in the foot by eliminating the administrative fund support of SSF's, or the Courts will be asked to accord individuals the same rights as corporations - making unlimited contributions to PACs for purely administrative expenses.

For those following our pending case, Carey v FEC, this would also likely lead to the called-for acceptance of unlimited contributions to any PAC for Independent Expenditures in segregated funds.

For the non-connected PAC - driven solely by the limited contributions of individuals, this offers the ability to raise funds directly from small businesses beyond the individual contributions of their owners - something that many grassroots, locally-based PACs would see as a significant boon.  If accorded the same ability as SSFs for unlimited administrative funding support, this would further empower these local grassroots activists.

This is still speculative, but what is clear is that the pace of change in campaign finance regulations is going to continue to speed up.  PACs and other politically active organizations should carefully monitor these developments and be ready to rapidly adjust to changes in the law.