This is an update by Daniel Pipes and also Stratfor. Two of the best, most reliable sources of understanding the middle east.
March 29, 2011
Barack Obama's rejection of George W. Bush's Middle East policies in large part fueled meteoric his own rise to the top of American politics. He reviled the war in Iraq, criticized the one in Afghanistan, promised to close down Guantnamo, establish a new respect of Islam, and quickly solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Two years later, what is striking is how much Obama's policies have come to reflect Bush's in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the "war on terror," in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the responses to turmoil in Tunisia and Egypt and now in Libya, as the 3,400-word speech he gave last night exemplifies. Certain flourishes (such as the jibe at the costs of the Iraq effort), to be sure, reminded the audience who was speaking, but the overall theme of a noble United States working with allies to help an Arabic-speaking people in danger to win the freedom "to express themselves and choose their leaders" could have been spoken by his predecessor.
Obama's rapid shedding of his own ideas and his adoption of Bush's policies suggests that, however great their philosophical differences, Americans have reached a working consensus on Middle East Policy
Four Middle Eastern Upheavals
by Daniel Pipes
March 29, 2011
http://www.danielpipes.org/9630/middle-eastern-upheavals
FoxNews.com title: "Revolution Comes to the Middle East -- A Look at Libya, Egypt, Syria and Yemen"
After decades of stasis, the Middle East is in uproar. With too much going on to focus on a single place, here's a review of developments in four key countries.
Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi in full military splendor.
Libya: With most Americans not quite realizing it, their government haphazardly went to war on Mar. 19 versus Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi's Libya. Hostilities were barely acknowledged, covered with euphemism ("kinetic military action, particularly on the front end") and without a clear goal. Two Obama administration principals were out of the country the president in Chile, the secretary of state in France. Members of Congress, not consulted, responded angrily across the political spectrum. Some analysts discerned a precedent for militarily attacking Israel.
Perhaps Obama will be lucky and Qaddafi will collapse quickly. But no one knows who the rebels are and the open-ended effort could well become protracted, costly, terroristic, and politically unpopular. If so, Libya risks becoming Obama's Iraq or worse if Islamists take over the country.
Obama wants the United States to be "one of the partners among many" in Libya and wishes he were president of China, suggesting that this war offers a grand experiment for the U.S. government to pretend it is Belgium. I admit to some sympathy for this approach; in 1997, I complained that, time and again, because Washington rushed in and took responsibility for maintaining order, "The American adult rendered others child-like." I urged Washington to show more reserve, letting others come to it and request assistance.
That's what Obama, in his clumsy and ill-prepared way, has done. The results will surely influence future U.S. policy.
Egypt:
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces sponsored a constitutional referendum on Mar. 19 that passed 77-23. It has had the effect of boosting the Muslim Brotherhood as well as remnants of Hosni Mubarak's National Democratic Party, while shunting aside the Tahrir Square secularists. In so doing, the new military leadership confirmed its intention to continue with the government's subtle but long-standing collusion with Islamists.
Two facts underpin this collusion: Egypt has been ruled by the military since a 1952 coup d'état; and the so-called Free Officers who carried off that coup themselves had close ties to the military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The "Free Officers" in 1952. Note Gamal Abdel Nasser seated at the far left and Anwar el-Sadat seated at the far right. The spirit of Tahrir Square was real and may eventually prevail; but for now, it's business as usual in Egypt, with the government continuing Mubarak's familiar quasi-Islamist line.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fetes Bashar al-Assad in Tehran in 2010.
Syria: Hafez al-Assad ruled the country for thirty years (1970-2000) with brutality and nonpareil cunning. Seized by monarchical pretensions, he bequeathed the presidency to his 34-year-old son, Bashar. Training to become an ophthalmologist, Bashar joined the family business under duress only after the death of his more capable brother Basil in 1994, basically maintaining his father's megalomaniac policies, thereby extending the country's stagnancy, repression, and poverty.
As 2011's winds of change reached Syria, crowds yelling Suriya, hurriya ("Syria, freedom") lost their fear of the baby dictator. Panicked, Bashar wove between violence and appeasement. If the Assad dynasty meets its demise, this will have potentially ruinous consequences for the minority Alawi community from which it derives. Sunni Islamists who have the inside track to succeed the Assads will probably withdraw Syria from the Iranian-led "resistance" bloc, meaning that a change of regime will have mixed implications for the West, and for Israel especially.
Yemen:
Yemen presents the greatest likelihood of regime overthrow and the greatest chance of Islamists gaining power. However deficient an autocrat and however circumscribed his power, the wily Ali Abdullah Saleh, in office since 1978, has been about as good an ally the West could hope for, notwithstanding his ties to Saddam Hussein and the Islamic Republic of Iran, to exert control over the hinterlands, limit incitement, and fight Al-Qaeda.
His incompetent handling of protests has alienated even the military leadership (from which he comes) and his own Hashid tribe, suggesting he will leave power with little control over what follows him. Given the country's tribal structure, the widespread distribution of arms, the Sunni-Shi'i divide, the mountainous terrain, and impeding drought, an Islamist-tinged anarchy (as in Afghanistan) looms as a likely outcome.
In Libya, Syria, and Yemen but less so in Egypt Islamists have opportunities significantly to expand their power. How well will the former Muslim inhabiting the White House,* so adamant about "mutual respect" in U.S. relations with Muslims, protect Western interests against this threat?
Mr. Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.
* FoxNews.com changed this phrase to "How well will our president, the current occupant of the White House."
Related Topics: Middle East patterns, US policy
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FROM: STRATFOR: GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
Middle East Unrest: Full Coverage
Last week, it appeared that certain Palestinian factions were making a concerted effort to provoke Israel into a military confrontation that could have seriously undermined the position of the military-led regime in Egypt and created a crisis in Egyptian-Israeli relations. From March 26-28, however, the region had calmed considerably. On March 26, an Israeli radio report citing a source who took part in a meeting of Palestinian militant factions in Gaza claimed that Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) had reached an agreement for Hamas to stop firing rockets at Israel and that Hamas would enforce the agreement as long as Israel maintains a cease-fire. Gaza-based rocket attacks have largely tapered off since, with zero attacks reported March 28, though an Israeli air strike the previous day killed two Palestinian men traveling by car who were allegedly planning to fire a rocket into Israel from the northern Gaza Strip.
The sudden drawdown in tensions raises a number of questions, particularly concerning the motives of Hamas, PIJ, Iran, Egypt, Syria and Turkey.
Hamas, PIJ, Iran
The brutal March 11 stabbing deaths of an Israeli family in the West Bank settlement of Itamar, the March 23 bus bombing in Jerusalem and the recent spate of Gaza-based rocket attacks into Israel appeared to be a coordinated attempt to draw the Israeli military into an invasion of Gaza. The timing and motive made sense for a number of Palestinian militant factions, as Israeli military action taken against Gazans could be exploited by Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to undermine the Egyptian military-led regime and thus threaten Israels vital peace treaty with Egypt. Hamas was careful to deny involvement in the attacks, while PIJ, which has a close relationship with Iran, claimed many of the rocket attacks. The Jerusalem bus attack went mysteriously unclaimed, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade-Imad Mughniyah, a shadowy organization with suspected links to Iran and Hezbollah, claimed the Itamar attack. As Iran continued its efforts to fuel Shiite unrest in the Persian Gulf region, there remained the strong potential for Tehran to pursue a destabilization campaign in the Levant, using its militant assets in the Palestinian territories and potentially in Lebanon to bog down Israel and undermine Egypts military regime. With an appeal for calm prevailing in the Palestinian territories for now, Iran may be facing significant hurdles if it is, in fact, trying to create a crisis with Israel.
Hamascontinued denial of involvement in the attacks raised speculation that the group was losing its grip over the Gaza Strip. Hamas is, after all, highly possessive of Gaza and has a history of preventing rival militant groups with competing ideologies from developing a base in the region. However, Palestinian militant factions often use front groups and deny direct involvement in attacks as a way of maintaining plausible deniability. Hamas may also have wanted to avoid being portrayed as a suspected Iranian proxy. If a group like PIJ were taking actions deemed threatening to Hamas, serious tensions between the two groups would have likely surfaced over the past several days. Instead, relations remained civilized, and it did not take long for the rocket fire to draw down. Hamas may be facing difficulty in asserting its authority over the Gaza Strip, but its denial of involvement in the recent attacks is not entirely convincing. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said as much in a March 24 statement, saying Israel still holds Hamas responsible for all rocket and mortar fire coming from Gaza, and Hamas has responded by vowing to stem the rocket fire as long as Israel abides by a cease-fire. Whether the cease-fire holds remains to be seen, but something was said or done in recent days to compel these Palestinian militant factions to shift gears and calm tensions.
Egypt
As the gatekeeper to the Gaza Strips only outlet to the outside world, Egypt has considerable influence over Hamas, and Egypts military-led government has every reason to clamp down on Hamas and PIJ in the Gaza Strip. That last thing the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt needs is an Israeli military intervention in Gaza that would portray the Egyptian regime as cooperating with the Israelis against the Palestinian resistance. For this reason, Egypt has kept a low profile in its mediation efforts with Hamas while trying to appear stern with Israel. Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil al Arabi publicly condemned civilian casualties in Gaza and warned Israel against military action while reportedly also meeting Israeli officials in the past week and reassuring them that the peace treaty would remain intact.
Syria
This latest escalation between Gaza and Israel concerns more than just Hamas and Egypt. Signs of Iranian involvement in the attacks is an issue that necessitates the involvement of Syria, the base for the exiled leadership of both Hamas and PIJ and the main channel through which these groups maintain communications with Iran.
Syrias minority Alawite-Baathist regime is struggling to contain opposition protests that have been concentrated in the southwestern city of Deraa and have shown signs of spreading to Damascus, Latakia, Homs, Hama and Qamishli though they have not yet grown to significant size. The regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad has previously used heavy-handed tactics to quell protests such as the 1982 massacre against the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood at Hama and could employ such heavy-handed tactics again as demonstrations escalate. However, it also remains wary of the precedent set by the Wests ongoing military intervention in Libya, which has been designed to protect civilians against such crackdown. Even though U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has so far maintained that the situation in Syria is different from that of Libya and not requiring intervention, the ambiguity embedded in such statements puts the Syrian regime in a most uncomfortable spot.
An outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Palestinian militant factions in the Gaza Strip could serve as a useful distraction for Syria as it resorts to more forceful tactics in suppressing protests. There are also indications that Syria is attempting to raise sectarian tensions in the Levant to demonstrate the risks of regime collapse. Toward this end, Syrian security forces may have instigated the sectarian clashes that broke out between Sunnis and Alawites in the coastal city of Latakia on March 26-27. While still too early to tell, recent militant activity in Lebanons Bekaa valley, where Syrian intelligence is pervasive, could also be related to this sectarian agenda. The March 23 kidnapping of seven Estonian cyclists and March 27 bombing of an Orthodox church in the Shiite-concentrated city of Zahle in the Bekaa valley have both been condemned by the Syrian regime as the work of Sunni fundamentalists. Should such attacks continue and spread to Beirut, where Syria also has a number of militant assets at its disposal, Damascus could use the threat of enflamed sectarianism to compel the Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf to shore up their support for the al Assad regime in its time of need. According to Syrias state-run news agency, al Assad received phone calls March 27 from the leaders of Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar expressing their support to the regime in face of an alleged conspiracy targeted Syrian security and stability.
One key questions remains: If Syria is looking to foment regional crises in an effort to distract from its problems at home, why then would it use its influence over Hamas and PIJ to calm the Israeli-Palestinian theater? Such a conflict could prove to be highly effective in keeping the attention of Damascus and creating too messy a situation for Western powers to contemplate expanding humanitarian military missions to Syria. Israel, already concerned at the prospect of what Sunni Islamist political model would replace the al Assad regime, would also likely be more compelled in such a scenario to reach out to Damascus in an effort to keep Hezbollah contained and avoid a two-front war. Moreover, Syrias weaknesses at home have given Iran an opportunity to shore up its alliance with the al Assad regime, with growing indications that several Hezbollah forces have been deploying to Syria to assist Syrian authorities in cracking down on demonstrators. If Syria is looking to Tehran for help with regime survival, it appears odd that Syria would switch gears and work against an Iranian agenda in the Palestinian territories.
Turkey
The answer to this question likely lies in Turkey, a rising power in the region now being pushed into action by the wave of Mideast unrest. Ankara has been active in trying to put a lid on the recent flare-up between Israel and Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip and prevent further destabilization in Syria. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said March 28 that he has twice talked with al Assad in the past three days and had deployed Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan to Damascus on March 27 for talks with the Syrian leadership. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also reportedly spoke to his Syrian counterpart following one of the conversations Erdogan had with al Assad.
Turkey, not facing the same public image constraints as Egypt in trying to manage this crisis, has been vocal about its intent to support the al Assad regime and facilitate reforms in Syria to prevent unrest from spreading. The Turks have a strategic need to stabilize its Arab neighbors, and they do not want to see a crisis erupt on Turkeys southern borderland with Syria, where a large Kurdish population is concentrated.
STRATFOR sources linked to Hamas and PIJ have claimed that the recent drawdown in rocket attacks against Israel was the result of Turkish mediation. While Egypt appears to have had some difficulty in getting through to Syria to rein in the PIJ, the Turks appear to have had more success in convincing Syria that its cooperation in facilitating a cease-fire in the Palestinian territories will be met with regional support for the increasingly embattled al Assad regime. Significantly, the Turks also have the advantage of mediating between the United States and Syria. If Syria were looking for assurances from Washington that its regime will not come under attack as crackdowns intensify, Turkey would be the likely messenger.
The al Assad regime sees the strategic value in building its relations with Turkey and views Turkish investment and diplomatic sway as playing an important role balancing itself in the region between U.S.-allied Sunni Arab regimes and its allies in Iran. Turkey, meanwhile, is continuing dialogue with Tehran and attempting to carefully counterbalance Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf with the support of the Sunni Arab regimes.
The details of the Turkey-Syria-PIJ-Hamas mediation remain unclear, and there is no guarantee that an informal ceasefire will hold. Syrias vulnerabilities at home are making the regime much more receptive to the influence of outsiders, particularly Turkey. If Syria is truly blocking an Iranian destabilization campaign in the Persian Gulf, it may run into other problems with the Iranians in dealing with Hezbollah. Here again is where Turkeys good offices could come into play in trying to keep certain regimes standing (for fear of the alternative) while trying to take the steam out of the unrest engulfing its backyard.
Copyright 2011 Stratfor. All rights reserved.
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