In Raynor Manufacturing v. Kelly and Janet Stoner, the Kansas State Court of Appeals ruled that the personal guaranty executed by two individuals for the debts of a garage door dealership business, which at the time of contracting was not incorporated, was valid and enforceable even after the business entity was incorporated because there was no novation or release of the guaranty. Thus, the individuals were liable for the debts of the dealership to the manufacturer.

The individuals argued that the personal guaranty, executed in 1983 when the dealership was only a partnership but not a corporation, guaranteed the debts of only the partnership entity, and that when a new application for credit was executed on behalf of the incorporated dealership in 1993, there was no new guaranty executed by the individuals. In rejecting the franchisees' argument, the court pointed out that the language of the guaranty clearly and unambiguously created a continuing guaranty for the debts of the dealership, the relationship between the parties remained status quo after the incorporation of the dealership, and there was no evidence that the manufacturer extinguished, released, and/or modified the guaranty. Although the execution and acceptance of a new credit application after incorporation of the dealership made it a close question, the guaranty remained in effect.

In Maaco Franchising Inc. v. Augustin Maaco brought suit to enforce a post-term covenant not to compete against a family-owned franchise after termination of the franchise agreement. The covenant not to compete in the agreements stated that "for a period of one (1) year after the expiration or termination of this [Franchise] Agreement, regardless of the cause of termination, or the date upon which Franchisee cease to operate the business franchised hereunder following termination or expiration of this [Franchise] Agreement, whichever is later, Franchisee shall not either directly or indirectly, for himself or through, on behalf of, or in conjunction with any other person, persons, partnership, or corporation ... Own, maintain, engage in, be employed by, lease real estate to, finance, or have any interest in any business specializing in whole or in part in providing automobile painting or body repair services or products at the premises of the Center or within a ten (10) mile radius of any existing or proposed of any existing or proposed Maaco location."

Even though the court found the covenant to be valid in that it was reasonable as to both time and territory, it refused to enforce the covenant for the full time-period requested by the franchisor because the franchisor had not moved quickly enough to bring the case to court after the termination. The covenant, by its terms, lasted one year from the later of "the expiration or termination of this [Franchise] Agreement ... or the date upon which Franchisee ceases to operate the business franchised."

The issue for the court was whether the one year period had commenced, and, if it did, when. Maaco argued that the covenant should not begin to run until Augustin stopped operating any auto painting and body repair shop or one-year from the court's order. Maaco argued that the failure to abide by the covenant and alleged misconduct during litigation required an equitable extension of the covenant. In rejecting the franchisor's argument that the franchisee's violation of the covenant not to compete extended the period of the covenant, the court stated that under Pennsylvania law covenants not to compete are to be strictly construed since they are "a partial restraint upon the free exercise of trade." The court pointed out that "if Maaco wanted such protection, it could have included language extending the covenant in the event it was violated."