However, a medrash on this week's Parsha, quoted by Rashi (Breishis 42,14), provides us with a very specific connection to our topic. The medrash explains that during their first meeting with the Egyptian viceroy, the brothers mentioned that they have a brother who was taken into captivity and that they were looking for him. The viceroy asked them whether they would be willing to pay an exorbitant amount for him if that was necessary to free him. They replied that they would be willing to do that.
 
While the brothers' willingness to free their captive brother at all costs is certainly admirable, it seems to be at odds with the Talmud's view of things. The Mishnah in Gittin 45a states, "A captive is not redeemed for more than his worth (on the slave market) because that is best for the world." This statement of the Mishnah is codified in Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, 252:4.
 
A simple reading of the Mishnah would indicate that one should not do whatever it takes to free a captive, yet Yosef's brothers were prepared to do just that. While the brothers' apparent non-conformity to the halacha may be puzzling, this halacha, in and of itself, leaves us even more bewildered. Why should one not extend himself to free a captive? And why is not doing so "best for the world" as the Mishnah states? Obviously, further investigation into this halacha is in order.
 
The Talmud offers two possible ways to understand the Mishna. Firstly, it is well-known that the Jewish community will not abandon one of its own no matter how high the cost. However, there is a great danger that a policy of requiring the redeeming of prisoners for "whatever it takes" would drain the financial resources of the Jewish community whose responsibility it is to redeem the captive. That would not be "best for the world." Therefore, in spite of the emotional push to free him at all costs, the Torah puts a ceiling on the price that a community is required to pay. In other words, the halacha stated in the Mishnah is a minimum requirement that must be fulfilled by a Jewish community in its effort to free one of its members. Of course, a community (or any individual from the community) would certainly be allowed to go beyond that minimum requirement if it so chooses. According to this reason, Yosef's brothers were certainly allowed to redeem Yosef for as much as they wished. 
 
In contrast, the second reason given by the Talmud views the statement of the Mishnah as a prohibition against redeeming a captive for more than the market price. The reasoning behind this prohibition is that paying outrageous sums to free captives encourages the enemy to repeat the crime and take more captives. This cycle of kidnapping, paying huge ransoms, and further kidnapping, is an intolerable situation. By refusing to succumb to the enemy's blackmail, the cycle stops. According to this reason, neither a community nor an individual would be allowed to ransom a captive for more than what the captor would have been able to get had he kidnapped a non-Jew. Although such a policy might be very harmful to an individual member of society in the eventuality of being taken hostage, it provides a great benefit to society-at-large.
 
With regard to Yosef's brothers, we now can understand why their position was within the guidelines of halacha. Who comprised the Jewish community at the time that Yosef was held in captivity? Obviously, the Jewish community only consisted of Yosef's brothers. Since all the brothers had agreed to pay an exorbitant ransom for Yosef, they had also accepted upon themselves the risk of future kidnappings that paying such a ransom involves.
 
The halacha sets up fair-market-value redemption as the de facto policy for Jewish society. It does not forbid a society from unanimously accepting upon itself to forego the benefits of that policy if it wishes to do so in order in order to free an individual captive. However, when the Jewish community is wide-spread and diverse, unanimous agreement to waive this policy for the sake of one specific individual is not a realistic possibility. Noteworthy is the fact that the halacha requires the redemption of a Torah scholar even if it entails paying more than the market price, and thereby, demands that all members of Jewish society accept the risks and burdens involved in the waiving of this policy.
 
Let us understand the enormous moral implications that are implied by what we have just learned. What if wealthy family members are willing to subsidize the entire cost of the redemption of their close relative? In this instance, no burden would be placed on the financial resources of the community. Therefore, the first reason for the prohibition, to preserve the economic stability of the Jewish community, would not apply. However, the second reason to forbid paying astronomical sums to ransom Jewish prisoners still applies. Regardless of who pays the high price tag, whether it be the community-at-large or the captive's relatives, the enemy will be highly motivated to kidnap again. Based on this concern, the Rambam (Matanos Anei'im 8:12) and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 252:4-5) prohibit even family members to pay exorbitant sums to free their relative.
 
This is an amazing idea. It is possible that the family members are multi-millionairesand are easily able to redeem their loved-one. Nevertheless, if they give in to the enemy's extortionist demands, they will damage and endanger the entire Jewish people. In spite of the great sacrifice involved, the family must exercise restraint for the sake of the nation. In short, a Jew must be concerned about the ripple effect he has on society.
 
We find this principle of individual restraint for the good of society as a whole in other areas of Jewish law as well. When the gentiles were inflating the price of fish, the Rabbis decreed a mandatory boycott on the purchase of fish for Shabbos in an attempt to force them to lower their prices (Mishnah Brurah 242). The more affluent members of society likely complained, "How can we honor the Shabbos without fish?!? We can afford it!" Still, they were told to temporarily refrain from buying fish so that in the long run everyone in the community would be able to honor the Shabbos with fish on their table.
 
Generally speaking, in modern society boycotts do not work. People do not heed them. Yet, the Sages expected the Jewish community to be able to successfully carry out a boycott. They relied on the fact that a Jew will be concerned about the ripple effect he has on his society.
 
The restrictions that Orthodox Jewish communities have recently accepted upon themselves with regard to costly weddings also illustrate this point.  A wedding is not a private affair. It involves the community. While most members of a community generally plan a simcha according to the financial standards of that community, prosperous individuals may be tempted to plan more lavish affairs. However, this slowly and subtly raises the standard for the rest of the community, and puts pressure on the others to "keep up." There is a ripple effect. In order to establish and protect a reasonable standard for the Jewish community as a whole, the leaders of today's Torah communities have made great efforts to institute wedding-arrangement restrictions and guidelines. By and large, people are sticking to them. Certainly, these efforts are "best for the world."     
 
Finally, let us look at the present housing crisis in Israel caused by a freeze in the building of new homes. This freeze has caused an inevitable rise in demand for existing real estate, especially in Jerusalem. Consequently, prices have sky-rocketed. Many landlords have seized the opportunity to raise the rent on a yearly basis. Numerous unfortunate tenants, unable to afford the price hikes, change apartments every twelve months.
 
In response to this untenable situation, several communities have initiated local boards to assess and maintain fair prices for apartment rentals. They have received rabbinical approval and support. However, these attempts to maintain fair rental prices often fail, but not because of the landlords. They cannot raise the rents if no one will pay their prices. The rent control efforts break down when a renter says, "I need this apartment, and I can afford it." True, he can afford to pay the higher rent, but the cost of rentals will slowly rise in the neighborhood and other renters will suffer. Once again, a ripple effect takes place, and it is up to each individual to be aware of the contribution that he might be making to the overall problem.
 
Only a truly great halachic authority could be called upon to actually rule in a case such as Gilad Shalit's. This article has touched upon only some of the halachic considerations that are relevant in determining what should or should not be done to obtain his freedom. (And of course, we all hope and pray that Gilad will be freed soon.) However, we have learned more than simply the halacha. We have uncovered a moral imperative. The Torah expects from us something which we might mistakenly think to be beyond us. It expects that we forego our best interests when those interests cause a detrimental ripple effect on our society. Now, that is something that only the Torah can demand. In light of man's selfish nature, no one else would imagine we could do it. Sometimes we need the Torah to tell us just how good we can really be