New York Labor Law Section 200 applies to all contractors and owners "except owners of one and two-family dwellings". The same applies for section 241 of the Labor Law. What if the homeowner is converting a five story building in Manhattan into a single family residence? Is the this the type of home the legislature sought to exempt from the provisions of the Labor Law?
Judge Catterson from the Appellate Division, First Department, in a strong dissent, questions the applicability of the homeowner's exemption found in NY Labor Law § 240(1) and § 241(6).
Lopez v Dagan, decided on August 21, 2012 (
2012 NY Slip Op 05999) involved construction work at a five-story building located at 333 East 51st Street in Manhattan owned by the defendants Rafael and Jacklin Dagan. The homeowners hired R & L Construction, Inc. to convert the building to a brick and limestone single-family townhouse. The homeowners also hired an architect and structural engineers to design plans for the renovation. The plaintiff, Fredy Lopez, was employed by R & L Construction as a laborer at the site. On the morning of January 9, 2006, he was removing containers filled with dirt, stone, and brick when a section of the plywood floor on which he was standing collapsed. He claimed injuries to his back, neck, and left knee when he fell approximately eight feet into the basement of the townhouse and a container fell on top of him.
The majority dismissed plaintiff's claims under the NY labor law, including his section 200 claim, stating "The (lower) court, however, should have dismissed plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims as against the owners. With respect to plaintiff's claim pursuant to Labor Law § 200, the owners made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that plaintiff's accident was caused by the means and methods employed by the general contractor, namely, the improper installation of a temporary floor, and that they had no supervisory control over the operation (see
Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877 [1993]; Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 295 [1992]). In response, plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact."
Judge Catterson strongly disagreed: "Contrary to the majority's equivocal holding, in my opinion the plaintiff's injuries resulted from a dangerous premises condition, and thus the issue to be determined at trial is whether the defendant homeowners had either constructive or actual notice of the condition....there is no difference between asserting a claim based upon the common-law principles of negligence or one which alleges that the defendant violated section 200 of the Labor Law. Section 200 is nothing more than a codification of the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to provide a safe place to work."
Read the decision here. _____________________________________

Willets Point Chiropractic P.C. v. Allstate Insurance, decided on August 16, 2012 by Judge Straniere of the Civil Court of The City Of New York, Richmond County (2012 NY Slip Op 51614(U)), is a hot topic on every no-fault blog in New York and is worth a review by our readers.
The issue involved whether a Chiropractor could properly bill for an MUA procedure, manipulation of a body part under anesthesia. In the no-fault world MUA's are a frequently litigated service as Chiropractors charge $1,641.92 per procedure and usually conduct at least three procedures before a bill is sent. Judge Straniere began his discussion by stating, "This court is concerned by the growing number of no-fault claims for MUA which seem to be proliferating over the last year or so in the court system. Several carriers refuse to recognize MUA as a compensable treatment option under no-fault or other health related insurance policies. In fact there is debate in the medical and chiropractic communities as to the effectiveness of MUA as a treatment."
After a long and philosophical discussion on the problems in the current no-fault system the Court concluded, "Chiropractors are prohibited from performing MUA in New York. In addition, plaintiffs failed to establish that the patient's injuries were causally related to the motor vehicle accident and that a physician screened the patient before the MUA was performed. Plaintiffs failed to establish that the MUA was chiropractically necessary. Even if the court were to determine that MUA was chiropractically necessary the plaintiffs are not permitted to collect the full CPT Code rate they are restricted to 68.4% of the relative value unit allowable for medical doctors [New York State Workers' Compensation Board Office of General Counsel letter August 14, 2009; see also Flatbush Chiropractic, PC v Metlife Auto & Home, 35 Misc 3d 1203(A) 2012]. Again this is not to say that properly trained chiropractors should not be prohibited from performing MUA. It is the function of the legislature to expand the definition of the chiropractic profession and not the court system."
Judge Straniere has kept his sense of humor on the bench. His decision is a clarion call for reform and is worthy of our review.
Read the decision here. ________________________________
What is reasonable compensation for an ankle fracture

requiring two surgeries and a herniated disc requiring back surgery in a 23 year old plaintiff?
If your answer was $3,040,645.50 you are correct.
Guallpa v Key Fat Corp. was decided by the Appellate Division, Second Department on August 22, 2012 (2012 NY Slip Op 06013). Mr Gallupa, while working as a construction worker, fell 8 to 10 feet from a ladder, landing on top of the ladder on the floor, and sustained injuries including an ankle fracture, which required him to undergo two surgeries, a herniated disc at the L4-L5 or L5-S1 level, which also required surgery, and a rotator cuff injury.
At trial before Judge Orin Kitzes in July of 2009, the jury awarded $791,000 for past pain and suffering, $1,428,571.43 for future pain and suffering over 28 years; $87,360 for past lost earnings; $198,000 for future lost earnings over 28 years; and $535,714 for future medical expenses over 35 years.
The Appellate Division sustained the verdict amounts above indicating, ""The amount of damages to be awarded to a plaintiff for personal injuries is a question for the jury, and its determination will not be disturbed unless the award deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation" (Graves v New York City Tr. Auth., 81 AD3d 589, 589; see CPLR 5501[c]; Chery v Souffrant, 71 AD3d 715, 716; Keaney v City of New York, 63 AD3d 794, 795; Vaval v NYRAC, Inc., 31 AD3d 438, 438).
There is no merit to the defendant's contention that the jury's award for future medical expenses should have been set aside as speculative (see Janda v Michael Rienzi Trust, 78 AD3d 899, 901; cf. Strangio v New York Power Auth., 275 AD2d 945, 946-947; Sanvenero v Cleary, 225 AD2d 755, 756; Cramer v Kuhns, 213 AD2d 131, 139; Buggs v Veterans Butter & Egg Co., 120 AD2d 361, 361), and this award did not deviate from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501[c]).
The plaintiff established his claims for past and future lost earnings with reasonable certainty (see Shi Pei Fang v Heng Sang Realty Corp., 38 AD3d 520, 521-522; see generally Lodato v Greyhawk N. Am., LLC, 39 AD3d 494, 495-496), and these awards did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see CPLR 5501[c]).
Finally, considering the nature and the extent of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the awards for past and future pain and suffering did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation (see
CPLR 5501[c]). "
Read the Decision here.