Police Personnel and Disciplinary records of a police officer are specifically protected from disclosure in New York State Courts. The New York  State Civil Rights Law requires either the "express written consent" of the officer involved or a Court Order before these confidential records can be released, (N.Y. Civ. Rts. Law §50-a(1)). Under the statute, "prior to issuing such court order the judge must review all such requests and give interested parties the opportunity to be heard. No such order shall issue without a clear showing of facts sufficient to warrant the judge to request records for review," id. §50-a(2). United States Magistrate Judge Hugh B. Scott, addressed the applicability of this State law in Federal Court actions, rejecting the argument that the State statute applies in Federal Court actions in Levy v. Harrington, (09CV720A) decided on October 31, 2011. "....that statute does not create a privilege recognized by federal courts. No federal rule prohibits discovery of police personnel or disciplinary files, King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)" Here the Federal Magistrate ordered an in camera inspection of the officer's personnel and disciplinary files to determine whether the files were relevant to the lawsuit and discoverable by the plaintiff.

Read more here.  

A recent trial presented a novel issue. Plaintiff's treating physician was subject to admonishment and censure by the New York State Office of Professional Medical Conduct for failing to keep proper records. The censure was the result of a "consent plea" which arose out of an investigation of the physician for writing prescriptions for "patients" for narcotic medications without examining the patient. To what extent could we use that censure on cross examination?
 
Professor Richardson sets forth the ground rules for cross examination when attempting to discredit an adverse witness at trial. (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-406)
§ 6-401. Impeachment of Witnesses.

The major methods of impeaching the credibility of an opponent's witness are by:

1. Showing the witness' general bad reputation with respect to truth and veracity;

2. Cross-examining the witness about any immoral, vicious, or criminal act which may affect the witness' character and tend to show the witness unworthy of belief;

3. Showing that the witness has made statements on other occasions which are inconsistent with the witness' present testimony;

4. Showing bias in favor of the party on whose behalf the witness testified, hostility towards the party against whom the witness testified or the witness' interest in the case;

5. Showing that the witness has been convicted of a crime;

6. Showing that, either at the time of the events to which the witness has testified or at the time of giving the testimony, the witness was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or was ill or mentally deranged.
 
"Subject to the limitations affecting cross-examination of the accused (see §6-410), all witnesses may be cross-examined about any immoral, vicious or criminal act which may reflect on their own character and show them to be unworthy of belief, Badr v Hogan, 75 NY2d 629, 555 NYS2d 249, provided the cross-examiner questions in good faith and upon a reasonable basis in fact."
 
In our case, the Court allowed the question on cross examination as to whether the physician was censured and reprimanded, but did not allow us to inquire on the underlying facts  holding, "the elementary premise that impeachment is a particular form of cross-examination whose purpose is, in part, to discredit the witness and to persuade the fact finder that the witness is not being truthful" (People v Walker, 83 NY2d 455, 461, 633 NE2d 472, 611 NYS2d 118 [1994], citing Fisch, New York Evidence §447 [2d ed]). The Court concluded that, upon cross-examination, reference may be made to the administrative proceedings, findings and determination of the Board to the extent said administrative proceedings, findings and determination related to the sustained findings.