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Section 1983
Case Law Updates:
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Greetings!
Here are the latest case law updates in the field of Civil Rights Litigation as they relate to allegations of police misconduct. We try to keep you informed on new decisions reached in this area of litigation. You can now sign up for Case Law Updates on our website. You can also access prior case law updates on our site or our blog. If you have any decisions you would like to circulate on our updates, please contact me. As always, you can contact me if you have any questions or comments.
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Judge Lindberg Refuses To Find Probable Cause To Arrest, Despite Administrative Hearing Officer's Findings That Vehicle Contained Illegal Drugs At The Time Of Plaintiff's Arrest.
Blackwell v. Kalinowskifficers et. al., (2009 WL 1702992) (June 18, 2009)
According to the allegations in the complaint, in the early morning hours of October 17, 2007, plaintiff Blackwell was seated in the passenger seat of a legally parked car. [Defendants], Chicago police officers, approached the car and ordered Blackwell to get out. They searched Blackwell and the car, but found no contraband. Defendants nevertheless arrested Blackwell, and seized the car. At the police station, Blackwell was shown bags containing what appeared to be a controlled substance. When Blackwell protested that he did not have any drugs on him, defendants replied, "You do now." Blackwell was charged with felony drug offenses and traffic charges, and spent two months in jail. After Blackwell prevailed at a suppression hearing, the prosecution dismissed the charges against him. According to defendants, [owner] contested the impoundment of her car in a hearing at the City of Chicago's Department of Administrative Hearings. The hearing officer found [car ownder] liable under City ordinance 7-24-225, which provides:
The owner of record of any motor vehicle that contains any controlled substance or cannabis, as defined in the Controlled Substances Act, 720 ILCS 570/100, et seq., and the Cannabis Control Act, 720 ILCS 550/1, et seq., ... shall be liable to the city for an administrative penalty of $1,000.00 plus any applicable towing and storage fees. Any such vehicle shall be subject to seizure and impoundment pursuant to this section.
Judge Lindberg held that collateral estoppel barred plaintiff's state law conversion claim, but did not bar plaintiff's unlawful search, false arrest, or malicious prosecution claims.
The Court explained: "Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, applies if: (1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior litigation, (2) the issue [was] actually litigated, (3) the determination of the issue [was] essential to the final judgment, and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked [was] fully represented in the prior action.
See Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir.1994)."
As to the unlawful search claim: "the hearing officer in the impoundment hearing made no determination as to whether defendants had probable cause to search [owner's] car. Nor was a probable cause determination implicit in the finding of liability, since the exclusionary rule does not apply in impoundment hearings."
As to the false arrest claim and malicious prosecution claims:" [t]he Court finds that collateral estoppel does not bar Blackwell's claims, because he did not have an adequate opportunity to litigate in the impoundment hearing. Although Blackwell testified as [owner's] witness in the impoundment hearing, he was not a party to that proceeding. Therefore, Blackwell was not entitled to have counsel represent him in the impoundment hearing, or to seek discovery, make strategic decisions, present evidence, object to the City's evidence, cross-examine witnesses, make a closing argument, or appeal the hearing officer's decision. Nor does the Court agree that [owner], a pro se litigant seeking the return of her car, necessarily adequately represented Blackwell's interests.
The Court also dismissed plaintiff's due process claim, explaining "[plaintiff's] criminal charges were dismissed prior to trial, and therefore he could not have received a more favorable result in his criminal case if the evidence had been disclosed."
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Supreme Court Rules Convicted Man Has No Right To DNA Testing
District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne
The United States Supreme Court ruled, in a 5-4 vote, that
convicts have no constitutional right to test DNA evidence in hopes of
proving their innocence long after they are found guilty of a crime. William Osborne won a federal appeals-court
ruling granting him access to a blue condom that was used during the
attack. Mr. Osborne argued that testing its contents would firmly
establish his innocence or guilt. Separately, in parole proceedings,
Mr. Osborne has admitted his guilt in a bid for release from prison.
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate ruling.
The opinion is attached, but Judge Samuel Alito's discussion in Alito's Concurrence is worth noting: .
"I see no reason for such intervention in the present case. When a
criminal defendant, for tactical purposes, passes up the opportunity
for DNA testing at trial, that defendant, in my judgment, has no
constitutional right to demand to perform DNA testing after conviction.
Recognition of such a right would allow defendants to play games with
the criminal justice system. A guilty defendant could forgo DNA testing
at trial for fear that the results would confirm his guilt, and in the
hope that the other evidence would be insufficient to persuade the jury
to find him guilty. Then, after conviction, with nothing to lose, the
defendant could demand DNA testing in the hope that some happy
accident-for example, degradation or con- tamination of the
evidence-would provide the basis for seeking postconviction relief.
Denying the opportunity for such an attempt to game the criminal
justice system should not shock the conscience of the Court."
Further noting "There is ample evidence in this case that [Osborne] attemtped to game the system.".. |
About Our Firm
Andrew M. Hale & Associates is a firm which specializes in the defense of civil rights lawsuits brought against municipalities and its police officers. The firm's principal attorneys, Andrew M. Hale and Avi T. Kamionski, have significant experience in defending cities, municipalities, police officers and other governmental employees in civil rights lawsuits. Mr. Hale and Mr. Kamionski have tried numerous civil rights cases before juries in the Northern District of Illinois and are seasoned trial attorneys. Contact Andy or Avi to discuss any of your legal needs.
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The information you obtain in these case law updates is not, nor is it intended to be, legal advice. You should consult an attorney for advice regarding your individual situation. We invite you to contact us and welcome your calls, letters and electronic mail. Contacting us does not create an attorney-client relationship. Please do not send any confidential information to us until such time as an attorney-client relationship has been established.
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