Israel Connections

The Arab Spring has escalated into the "Syrian slaughter" as Bashar Assad massacres his own people in an attempt to remain in power.  In consequence, Hamas has turned-tail on its chief ally -Syria- as its leaders have expressed support for the Syrian rebels.  While this turmoil is escalating, we are seemingly moving closer to confrontation with an ever-dangerous Iran.  Read on!

 

 

Steve Gevarter, Chair & Josh Weintraub, Vice-Chair
Israel Advocacy and Awareness Committee

The Israel Connection is brought to you by THE ASSOCIATED: Jewish Community Federation of Baltimore and the Baltimore Jewish Council. This e-newsletter includes such items as: news updates about Israel and the Middle East, Action Alerts, and upcoming programming.  Our goal is to provide you with relevant information that you can use in your advocacy efforts and to express your support and solidarity with the people of Israel. We always enjoy your feedback - please email us at bjcrsvp@baltjc.org or call the Baltimore Jewish Council at 410-542-4850 with your comments.

Hamas Leader Backs Syrian Protestors

By Matt Bradley in Cairo and Charles Levinson in Jerusalem

February 25, 2012

The Wall Street Journal

  

  

 CAIRO-Hamas has thrown its political clout behind an uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Palestinian Islamist group's longtime patron and host, a shift that cracks a formidable alliance and further widens the Middle East's sectarian divide.

 

Ismail Haniyeh, prime minister of Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, told worshipers at Cairo's Al Azhar mosque during Friday prayers that the political party and militia was supporting the uprising against Mr. Assad, calling the revolutionaries "heroic," according to the Associated Press.

 

He made his comments alongside several Muslim Brotherhood members in front of thousands of admirers at Al Azhar, one of the oldest religious universities in the world and the seat of Sunni learning, lending sway to his Sunni world view. Hamas is the Palestinian wing of the international Muslim Brotherhood movement which has its headquarters and ideological center in the Egyptian capital. 

 

Hamas's policy shift marks a diplomatic setback for Mr. Assad's embattled regime, as Arab and Western leaders gathered in the Tunisian capital, Tunis, to debate international support for an 11-month old uprising that has killed thousands of Syrian dissenters.  

 

It removes a crucial partner from a powerful anti-Israeli coalition that stretched from Iran through Syria to the banks of the Mediterranean Sea, where Hamas and Hezbollah, the majority Shiite Lebanese militia and political party, formed a powerful front against Israel-with Hamas the only Sunni member.

 

Still, for Israel, Hamas's decision looks to be a mixed blessing. It will likely deal a blow to the Iran-backed axis sworn to Israel's destruction. It could continue the gradual shift away from violent resistance of a group that has long stood as one of Israel's most violent foes, responsible for scores of fatal bombings and rocket attacks.

 

But the altered loyalties could raise further questions about the prominent role Islamists are playing in the Syrian rebellion. The leader of al Qaeda, the Sunni-aligned global terrorist movement, recently backed the Syrian uprising as well. Several recent attacks on Syrian military operations bore al Qaeda trademarks, according to the Syrian government and some security analysts.

 

The Hamas shift could push forward a reconciliation with Hamas's Palestinian rivals, the Fatah Party of President Mahmoud Abbas, and move Hamas firmly into the orbit of Sunni-led Arab states with whom the U.S. has close ties. Washington considers Hamas a terrorist organization.

 

The shift especially suggests a wider alliance with Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, which could complicate relations with Egypt for Israeli leaders and the U.S.  

 

In his speech Friday in Cairo, Mr. Haniyeh asked the Muslim and Arab world to defend Jerusalem against Israeli attempts to weaken its Arab identity of the city, according to the Associated Press.

He recited an Arabic poem that says that the path to Jerusalem starts in Cairo. The crowd cheered when he said Hamas wouldn't recognize Israel, and chanted, "Hey, Haniyeh, do not leave the gun" and "To Jerusalem, we march in the millions." 

 

Many in Cairo have long speculated that Hamas might be considering a move toward the Egyptian capital as Iran's regional clout declines and antiregime protesters encircle the Syrian capital, where Hamas has its headquarters in exile. 

 

The move away from Damascus draws bolder lines across the Middle Eastern sectarian patchwork. Hamas will be drawn into the Sunni political arc widening across North Africa; Sunni Islamist movements are celebrating electoral victories in newly formed governments in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

 

"The Sunni Islamist groups have the benefit of being popularly elected. They have a legitimacy that many of their counterparts can't claim," said Shadi Hamid, the director of research at the Brookings Doha Center, Qatar, who has written in support of the rebels. "The so-called resistance axis is done. It is now a thing of the past."

 

Mr. Hamid added that Hamas's shifting stance also draws it closer to those established Sunni political powers that enjoyed significant diplomatic clout even before the Arab Spring of successive pro-democracy uprisings.

 

Western-aligned states such as Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia are the most prominent voices among those Sunni Islamist regimes.

 

Hamas officials couldn't be reached for comment on Friday.

 

Essam al-Erian, head of the Egyptian Parliament's Foreign Affairs committee and a senior official in the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party said that no decisions had been reached on hosting Hamas in the Egyptian capital. The group, however, would be welcome, he said.

 

"I think that after this revolution, Hamas is welcome in Cairo, in Tripoli in Libya and in Tunisia and also Morocco," Mr. Erian said. "This is the time of the people, not the regime."

 

News of Hamas's break with Damascus came late on Friday, after most Israeli officials had turned off their phones for the Sabbath.

 

In recent months, as Hamas showed early signs it was moving toward a break with Damascus, Israeli officials remained largely silent, standing by their years-old posture that Israel's view toward Hamas would remain unchanged as long as the movement refused to recognize Israel's right to exist or renounce violence.

U.S Bulks Up Iran Defenses

Pentagon Plans New Sea, Land Measures to Counter Any Attempt to Close Persian Gulf Oil Gateway 

By Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes

February 25, 2012

The Wall Street Journal

  

 

The Pentagon is beefing up U.S. sea- and land-based defenses in the Persian Gulf to counter any attempt by Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz.  

 

The U.S. military has notified Congress of plans to preposition new mine-detection and clearing equipment and expand surveillance capabilities in and around the strait, according to defense officials briefed on the requests, including one submitted earlier this month.  

 

The military also wants to quickly modify weapons systems on ships so they could be used against Iranian fast-attack boats, as well as shore-launched cruise missiles, the defense officials said.

The readiness push is spearheaded by the military's Central Command, which oversees U.S. forces in the Gulf region, these officials said. It shows the extent to which war planners are taking tangible steps to prepare for a possible conflict with Iran, even as top White House and defense leaders try to tamp down talk of war and emphasize other options.

 

The changes put a spotlight on what officials have singled out as potential U.S. shortcomings in the event of conflict with Iran. The head of Central Command, Marine Gen. James Mattis, asked for the equipment upgrades after reviews by war planners last spring and fall exposed "gaps" in U.S. defense capabilities and military preparedness should Tehran close the Strait of Hormuz, officials said.

 

The Central Command reviews, in particular, have fueled concerns about the U.S. military's ability to respond swiftly should Iran mine the strait, through which nearly 20% of the world's traded oil passes.

"When the enemy shows more signs of capability, we ask what we can do to checkmate it," a U.S. military officer said. "They ought to know we take steps to make sure we are ready."

 

Tensions with Iran have soared as the U.S. and its allies have tightened sanctions against the country over its nuclear program. Tehran has responded by threatening to close the strait. Israel has accused Iran of being behind a recent series of botched bombing plots targeting Israeli diplomats, a charge Iran denies. Iranian officials, in turn, accuse Israel and the U.S. of conducting a secret campaign to assassinate scientists working on Iran's nuclear program. The U.S. has denied the accusation, while Israel has declined to comment

 

New suspicions over Iran's nuclear ambitions emerged Friday. In a report, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, said Iran has increased its stockpile of uranium that is enriched beyond the purity level needed for civilian power reactors, and begun producing it under a mountain of rock and soil that some U.S. and Israeli officials say could be immune from attack.

 

Iran denies it is trying to build atomic weapons. It refused this week to allow U.N. inspectors access to suspected weapons sites, adding doubts to prospects for negotiations.

The U.S. is concerned that Israel-which believes that Tehran will soon be able to assemble a weapon, and that time is running short to stop the bid-may choose to strike Iran by this autumn to stymie such a program. That, defense officials worry, could provoke retaliation that could prompt U.S. military action to defend its troops and key allies, and to keep the Strait of Hormuz open.

 

The U.S. moves outline the potential shape of a conflict between Iran and the West: Iran could rapidly mine the strait and use heavily armed speedboats to attack or ram Western ships trying to clear the waterway. A successful Iranian attack on a U.S. warship could drag America into a larger conflict.

Central Command officials have told lawmakers they want the new mine-detection systems fielded before this fall, according to defense officials, underlining the urgency of preparedness. 

 

In addition, U.S. special-operations teams stationed in the United Arab Emirates would take part in any military action in the strait should Iran attempt to close it, defense officials said. A military official said these forces have been working to train elite local forces in Gulf nations including the U.A.E., Bahrain and Kuwait, but added: "They would be used in the event of active operations."

 

According to defense officials, the Pentagon submitted a request to Congress on Feb. 7 on behalf of Central Command seeking to reallocate $100 million in defense funding to "bridge near-term capability gaps" in the Persian Gulf.

 

The request has yet to be made public because it is still being studied by lawmakers, defense officials said. The money will be used to upgrade patrol craft and unmanned drones, as well as to add small arms on surface ships, the officials said.

 

Congress was told the money was urgently needed, according to an official briefed on the plan. "You can buy it and deploy it rapidly," the official said.  

 

The new money comes on top of changes made last summer that provided Central Command with about $200 million for additional upgrades, some of which could be used in areas outside the Persian Gulf, defense officials said. The earlier request, which included money for a torpedo defense system, airborne antimine weapons and new cyber-weapons, was made by defense officials and backed without fanfare by Congress.

That request also included additional deployments of the SeaFox underwater drone, which is launched from a helicopter and uses a warhead to destroy mines. The system was deemed "an urgent operational need" by the U.S. Fifth Fleet, according to Navy officials.

 

The Pentagon and other U.S. agencies generally submit such reprogramming requests when they can't wait until the next fiscal year. The Pentagon started making some adjustments as early as a year ago, but those didn't require reprogramming.

 

The Pentagon told Congress that some of the new money would be used to modify existing weapons systems to be used against seaborne threats in the Persian Gulf and, specifically, the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard deploys some of the fastest naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. These craft may be small-only 17 meters, or 56 feet, long in some cases-but they can carry machine guns, torpedoes and the Iranian-made "Kowsar" antiship cruise missile. Some can reach speeds of 60 to 70 knots, according to U.S. military intelligence analysts.

 

Antitank weapons are being reconfigured for use against swarms of these boats that could threaten U.S. warships, the Pentagon told Congress. Similarly, rapid-fire machine guns designed to shoot down missiles are being tested for use against small boats.

 

Pentagon war planners believe the addition of smaller-caliber guns would quickly make U.S. destroyers, which were designed mainly to fight other large ships, more effective against the Iranian craft.

"We are using capabilities we already have in a different way," a senior defense official said.

 

The additional money for equipment upgrades is on top of the nearly $82 million the Pentagon sought in January to improve its largest conventional bunker-buster bomb, the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator.

 

The bomb, officials said, was designed to take out bunkers like those used by Iran to protect its most sensitive nuclear development work.

 

Western intelligence agencies had long suspected that the Iranian navy had between 2,000 and 3,000 mines, largely of Soviet or Chinese origin. But new intelligence suggests Iran may have as many as 5,000, including newer types that may be more powerful and harder to detect.

 

U.S. forces would also need to contend with Iran's coastal air-defense system, shore-based artillery, Kilo-class and midget submarines, remote-controlled boats and unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles, according to current and former U.S. officials.

 

The U.S. Navy has 14 minesweepers, three of which are stationed in Bahrain. Mackenzie Eaglen, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said U.S. minesweeping capabilities have slipped because the military has deferred critical maintenance, a shortcoming it is "working overtime" to address.

 

-Keith Johnson and Jay Solomon contributed to this article.

 

Gulf War III Isn't an Option

By Eugene Robinson

February 23, 2012

The Washington Post 

  

 

We've heard this quickening drumbeat before. Last time, it led to the tragic invasion and occupation of Iraq. This time, if we let the drummers provoke us into war with Iran, the consequences will likely be far worse. 

Rat-ta-tat-tat. Weapons of mass destruction. Boom-shakka-boom. A madman in charge. Thump-thump-thump. Mushroom clouds.

 

Tune out the anxiety-inducing percussion and think for a minute. Yes, there are good reasons to be concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. But it doesn't follow that launching a military attack - or providing support for an attack by Israel - would necessarily be effective, let alone wise. The evidence suggests it would be neither.

 

Obviously, Iranian officials are lying when they say that their nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes. But it is clear that Iran does not yet have the ability to build a nuclear weapon - and unclear whether the Iranian government, if and when it does achieve that capability, will take that final provocative step.

 

Covert operations believed to have been carried out by Israeli intelligence agents, perhaps with U.S. assistance - a diabolically clever computer virus that crippled many of Iran's enrichment centrifuges, along with the targeted assassinations of key Iranian scientists - have significantly slowed Iran's progress toward being able to make a bomb. It is reasonable to assume that such actions, and their effectiveness, will continue.

 

But let's also assume that sabotage, in the end, will not be enough to keep Iran from reaching its goal. What then?

 

Read More..

Containing Israel on Iran
General Dempsey sends a message of U.S. weakness to Tehran

Review and Outlook

February 22, 2012

The Wall Street Journal

 

 

Is the Obama Administration more concerned that Iran may get a nuclear weapon, or that Israel may use military force to prevent Iran from doing so? The answer is the latter, judging from comments on Sunday by Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey. 

 

Appearing on CNN, General Dempsey sent precisely the wrong message if the main U.S. strategic goal is convincing Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions. He said the U.S. is urging Israel not to attack Iran-because Iran hasn't decided to build a bomb, because an Israeli attack probably wouldn't set back Iran by more than a couple of years, and because it would invite retaliation and be "destabilizing" throughout the Middle East.
  

"That's the question with which we all wrestle. And the reason we think that it's not prudent at this point to decide to attack Iran," the General said, referring to a possible Iranian response to an attack. "That's been our counsel to our allies, the Israelis. And we also know or believe we know that the Iranian regime has not decided that they will embark on the capability-or the effort to weaponize their nuclear capability."

 

In a single sound bite, General Dempsey managed to tell the Iranians they can breathe easier because Israel's main ally is opposed to an attack on Iran, such attack isn't likely to work in any case, and the U.S. fears Iran's retaliation. It's as if General Dempsey wanted to ratify Iran's rhetoric that the regime is a fearsome global military threat.

 

If the U.S. really wanted its diplomacy to work in lieu of force, it would say and do whatever it can to increase Iran's fear of an attack. It would say publicly that Israel must be able to protect itself and that it has the means to do so. America's top military officer in particular should say that if Iran escalates in response to an Israeli attack, the U.S. would have no choice but to intervene on behalf of its ally. The point of coercive diplomacy is to make an adversary understand that the costs of its bad behavior will be very, very high.  

The general is not a free-lancer, so his message was almost certainly guided by the White House. His remarks only make strategic sense if President Obama's real priority is to contain Israel first-especially before the November election.   

 

This might also explain General Dempsey's comments that the U.S. doesn't believe Iran's regime has decided to build an atomic bomb and that it is a "rational" actor, like, say, the Dutch. This would be the same rational Iran that refuses to compromise on its nuclear plans despite increasingly damaging global sanctions, and the same prudent actor that has sent agents around the world to bomb Israeli and Saudi targets, allegedly including in a Washington, D.C. restaurant.     

Iran doesn't need to explode a bomb, or even declare that it has one, to win its nuclear standoff. All it needs to do is get to the brink and make everyone believe it can build a bomb when it wants to. Then the costs of deterring Iran go up exponentially, and the regime's leverage multiplies in the Middle East and against American interests. General Dempsey's assurances obscure that military and political reality.

 

Like most of Mr. Obama's Iran policy, General Dempsey's comments will have the effect of making war more likely, not less. They will increase Israel's anxiety about U.S. support, especially if Mr. Obama is re-elected and he has a freer political hand. This may drive Israel's leadership to strike sooner. Weakness invites war, and General Dempsey has helped the Administration send a message of weakness to Israel and Iran.

Getting Iran to Back Down on its Nuclear Program

By David Ignatius

February 22, 2012

The Washington Post

 

"We are of the opinion that the Iranian regime is a rational actor," said Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on CNN on Sunday. That sounds right to me, but his comment raises a tricky question: How much pressure will it take to get this "rational" country to curb its nuclear program?   

The answer here isn't comforting: Recent history shows that the Iranian regime will change behavior only if confronted with overwhelming force and the prospect of an unwinnable war. Short of that, the Iranians seem ready to cruise along on the brink, expecting that the other side will steer away.

 

I count two clear instances when Iran has backed down, and two more "maybes." These examples remind us that the Iranian leaders aren't irrational madmen - and also that they drive a hard bargain. Here are the two documented retreats:

 

● In July 1988 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini "drank the cup of poison," as he put it, and agreed to end the Iraq-Iran war. He accepted a U.N.-sponsored truce but only after eight years of brutal fighting, Iraqi rocket attacks on Iranian cities and the use of poison gas against Iranian troops. Khomeini's decision followed the shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner on July 3 by the USS Vincennes - unintended but a demonstration of overwhelming American firepower in the Persian Gulf.

 

Read More... 

 

Why Iran Thinks it Needs the Bomb 

By Ray Takeyh

February 17, 2012

The Washington Post

 

Bombastic claims of nuclear achievement, threats to close critical international waterways, alleged terrorist plots and hints of diplomatic outreach - all are emanating from Tehran right now. This past week, confrontation between Iran and the West reached new heights as Israel accused Iran of a bombing attempt in Bangkok and others targeting Israeli diplomats in India and Georgia. And yet, on Wednesday, an Iranian nuclear negotiator signaled that Tehran wants to get back to the table.    

What does Iran really want? What, as strategists might ask, are the sources of Iranian conduct?

 

The key to unraveling the Islamic republic lies in understanding Iran's perception of itself. More than any other Middle Eastern nation, Iran has always imagined itself as the natural hegemon of its neighborhood. As the Persian empire shrank over the centuries and Persian culture faded with the arrival of more alluring Western mores, Iran's exaggerated view of itself remained largely intact. By dint of history, Iranians believe that their nation deserves regional preeminence.  

 

However, Iran's foreign policy is also built on the foundations of the theocratic regime and the 1979 revolution. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini bequeathed to his successors an ideology that divided the world between oppressors and the oppressed. The Islamic revolution was a battle for emancipation from the cultural and political tentacles of the iniquitous West. However, Iran was not merely seeking independence and autonomy, but wanted to project its Islamist message beyond its borders. Khomeini's ideology and Iran's nationalist aspirations created a revolutionary, populist approach to the region's status quo.

 

Read More..

Iran is Ready to Talk

By Dennis B. Ross

February 14, 2012

The New York Times

 

SPECULATION about an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities is rife, but there is little discussion about whether diplomacy can still succeed, precluding the need for military action.

 

Many experts doubt that Tehran would ever accept a deal that uses intrusive inspections and denies or limits uranium enrichment to halt any advances toward a nuclear weapons capability, while still permitting the development of civilian nuclear power. But before we assume that diplomacy can't work, it is worth considering that Iranians are now facing crippling pressure and that their leaders have in the past altered their behavior in response to such pressure. Notwithstanding all their bluster, there are signs that Tehran is now looking for a way out.

 

Much has changed in the last three years. In January 2009, Iran was spreading its influence throughout the Middle East, and Arab leaders were reluctant to criticize Iran in public lest they trigger a coercive Iranian reaction. Similarly, Iran's government wasn't facing significant economic pressures; Iranians had simply adjusted to the incremental sanctions they were then facing.

 

Today, Iran is more isolated than ever. The regional balance of power is shifting against Tehran, in no small part because of its ongoing support for the beleaguered government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. The Assad regime is failing, and in time, Iran will lose its only state ally in the Arab world and its conduit for arming the militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon.

 

Iran's Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf, and even the United Nations General Assembly, no longer hesitate to criticize Tehran. Gone is the fear of Iranian intimidation, as the Saudis demonstrated by immediately promising to fill the gap and meet Europe's needs when the European Union announced its decision to boycott the purchase of Iran's oil. Even after Iran denounced the Saudi move as a hostile act, the Saudis did not back off.

 

Read More...

Hamas Rifts Opens Over Fatah Deal

By Joshua Mitnick

February 13, 2012

The Wall Sreet Journal

 

A move to unite with the rival Fatah party in a Palestinian government has opened up a split in Hamas.

 

The discord escalated this past weekend as Gaza leader Mahmoud al-Zahar criticized an agreement last week by exiled political chief, Khaled Meshal, to end a five-year rift with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah party. The accord named Mr. Abbas head of an interim power-sharing government, instead of naming a prime minister from Gaza, as Hamas initially demanded. Mr. Zahar told Egypt's official news agency that the pact was mistake.

 

The Hamas rift could make it harder to end divided Palestinian rule over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. It also illustrates how Islamists in the region are struggling with broader Mideast upheaval, even as they expect to wield widening influence. The Hamas disputes are likely to be debated at a coming meeting of Hamas's governing Shura council.

 

Mr. Meshal, displaced from his longtime headquarters in Syria by the upheaval there, has tried to widen Palestinian diplomatic engagement in the Arab world and with the West. He has embraced Mr. Abbas and said Hamas should focus on nonviolent, grass-roots protests against Israel rather than on military conflict.

Mr. Meshal has sought to relocate to Arab capitals with ties to the U.S., which would be a blow to Syria and Iran.

 

But Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas's prime minister in Gaza, over the weekend visited Iran, which has supplied Gaza with military equipment and trained Hamas militants. On Saturday, Mr. Haniyeh appeared with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has defied Western concerns about his country's nuclear program.

 

Mr. Haniyeh on Sunday called Iran a "strategic reserve'' for the Palestinians. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said Iran always would stand by the Palestinian "resistance'' and warned against "compromisers,'' the Associated Press reported.

 

Mr. Zahar couldn't be reached for comment, but Hamas spokesperson Salah Bardawil acknowledged there was "a difference of opinions among the leaders" of the Islamist militant organization. Hamas usually makes decisions by consensus and keeps internal disagreements from the public spotlight. 

"It's very noticeable that the Hamas leadership in Gaza is drifting away from the Hamas exiled leadership,'' said Mkhaimar Abusada, a political-science professor at Al Azhar Univeristy in Gaza Ctiy. "Meshal has been weakened. He is trying to show some moderation because of the changes in the Middle East. But the Hamas leaders in Gaza Strip are on their own territory and not as affected.''

 

Israeli officials continue to regard Hamas as a sworn enemy and have dismissed Mr. Meshal's softening. Israeli Prime Minister Benjmian Netanyahu on Sunday reiterated his criticism of Mr. Abbas for pursuing reconciliation with Hamas.

 

Political analysts said the criticism of his moves toward reconciliation with Mr. Abbas reflects disquiet among Hamas's military wing, which is concerned that it will come under pressure to sacrifice its control over Gaza for the sake of Palestinian reconciliation. Mr. Meshal has said he would accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but hasn't endorsed negotiations with Israel or its recognition.

At the end of last year, he said the Arab Spring had demonstrated that nonviolent struggle had the power of a "tsunami.''

 

Mr. Zahar dismissed such uprisings as irrelevant for Gazans because Israeli troops have withdrawn from the territory.