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Journey with DWM to
What's Next
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Some economists say "up" and some say "down". The truth is, no one knows the future. But affluent, enlightened investors recognize that DWM strategies perform in up markets and protect in down markets. Regardless of what the future holds, with DWM, savvy investors are ready for what's next. | |
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Finance: Goldman Faces SEC Fraud Charges and Criminal Charges | |

April 16th was not a good day for Goldman Sachs. It was on that Friday that the SEC filed civil fraud charges against Goldman and an employee for alleged failure to disclose that a hedge-fund that had influenced the composition of a complex mortgage-debt transaction was also shorting it. On April 27th, Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations, accused Goldman Sachs of concocting several deals and being riddled with "inherent conflicts of interest". Levin went on to say that Goldman's conduct "brings into question the whole function of Wall Street". Levin relied in part on Goldman internal e-mails, one of which from a senior executive described a Goldman-underwritten CDO as one "shi**y" deal.
Sen. John McCain was quoted in Barron's stating, "I don't know if Goldman Sachs has done anything illegal, (but) from reading these e-mails... there's no doubt their behavior was unethical."
Barry Ritholtz, author of Bailout Nation, has a wonderful way of putting complex issues into understandable terms. He says the best way to explain what GS did was to compare it to Mel Brook's The Producers. They purposefully tried to create the worst play ever, lose their investors' money and pocket the proceeds. It's not much of a stretch to suggest that Abacus 2007 was GS's "Springtime for Hitler." Ritholtz would cast the play as follows: Nathan Lane... Max Bialystock... Fabrice Tourre (GS) Matthew Broderick... Leo Bloom... Lloyd Blankfein (GS CEO) Will Ferrell... Franz Liebkind... John Paulson (Paulson & Co.) We think Ritholtz's descriptions are funny, yet the accusations against GS are not. On Thursday, the SEC referred Goldman's case to the Justice Department for a criminal investigation into whether GS committed securities fraud. The real story of this financial crisis is not about one firm but near universal risk-taking, stupidity and possibly widespread fraud. The charges against GS may drag on for years and no one knows what the final outcome will be. But, it is fair to say, that Goldman is in danger of losing its most valuable asset: its reputation and "social license." Slate describes "social license" well. It's how a company "plays with others" and how it responds to problems. If a company has social license, it behaves in such way that other businesses, institutions and individuals want to do business with it. For example, British Petroleum, which has followed up a disastrous refinery explosion with a disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, is in the process of squandering its social license to operate in the US. In this case, Goldman says it was simply making a market in securities and finding people who wanted to buy them. "Customers have no reasonable expectation that Goldman isn't selling them junk," Goldman argued. Blankfein told Levin, "Clients who make trades with Goldman Sachs don't rely on the bank for its opinions." The real issue, whether GS is convicted or not, is how much these charges and related disclosures may endanger Goldman's most valuable intangible asset, its reputation.

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Berkshire Hathaway SH Meeting: Buffett Supports GS, Moody's |

The Wall Street Journal reported Monday that Warren Buffett, whose company invested $5 billion in Goldman Sachs Group, vigorously supports the bank's CEO Lloyd Blankfein "100 percent" and, for that matter, Moody's, whose ratings have been seen as too cozy with bankers. Berkshire was hosting its shareholders' meeting last weekend in Omaha with over 40,000 people attending. It's a kind of pep rally for Berkshire and its brand of main-street investing. Buffett said, referring to the GS, "I have no problem with the Abacus transaction. If there things that were hugely troublesome, I haven't seen them. Parties to the deal should be responsible for their own actions." Buffett did have some criticisms for investment banking, "There's a lot of good in it, and there are a lot of things on Wall Street we don't like." To some extent, Buffett's defense of Goldman and Moody's could be expected. Berkshire has invested billions in the financial firms, including Goldman and Moody's. Mr. Buffett has also been taking heat for a push Berkshire has made on Capitol Hill for exemptions for several large derivatives deals his firm has made in recent years. Finally, before getting on to his table tennis game, Buffett said that Berkshire recorded a first-quarter profit of $3.6 billion compared with a loss a year earlier. He said the company's results show the global economy is showing significant signs of recovery for the first time. "We're seeing a pretty good uptick."
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Book Review: The Big Short by Michael Lewis | |

On March 15, 2010, one month before the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with fraud, Michael Lewis's latest book, The Big Short, was published. For those of you not familiar with Michael Lewis, he has also written The Blind Side (which won Sandra Bullock an Oscar), Liar's Poker, Moneyball and Home Game, among others. He's one of our favorite authors and we recommend this book highly. Sure, there have been lots of books already published about the Financial Crisis. But, Lewis has a strikingly original take on the subject that offers an enhanced understanding of the debacle. He does this by presenting a quirky group of investors who made fortunes with unpopular, calculated bets on a financial meltdown. You'll meet Steve Eisman whose research of the subprime mortgage industry and the death of an infant son led him to be suspicious, pessimistic and contrarian. Michael Burry, a physician turned hedge fund manager, came to the same conclusion. Dr. Burry, who was born with Asperger's syndrome and was prone to obsessions, became convinced in early 2005 that he needed to short the subprime market. Both men were rejected by industry "experts" and, in the case of Dr. Burry, even his own clients, who wanted him to keep his ideas to stock picking. Lewis takes us to the January 2007 convention of the ASF (American Securitization Forum) attended by thousands in Las Vegas. Lewis figured the name ASF was more dignified that the Association for Subprime Lending. But, that's what it was. Here we meet Wing Chau, head of Harding Advisory, that assembled CDO (Collateralized Debt Obligation portfolios). Wing Chau had made $140,000 in 2007 managing portfolios for New York Life Insurance Company. He made $26 million in 2008 as a CDO manager. His goal, obviously, was to maximize the amount of dollars in his care. His debate with Steve Eisman is quite comical. Wing Chau, of course, really had at least 26 million reasons to keep pushing for more CDOs to be formed. Lewis includes stories of the major banks, including Goldman Sachs, and how they participated in both the sales and shorts of the subprime market. What is amazing that virtually all of Wall Street made money, those who shorted the market and those who didn't. The only real losers were the American taxpayers. He concludes by suggesting that the crisis of 2008 had its roots in mid 80's. The first mortgage derivatives were developed in 1986. And, in 1981, Salomon Brothers issued public stock and went from a private partnership into Wall Street's first public corporation. The other Wall Street banks followed suit and, from that point on, the shareholders (and the US taxpayers) financed the risk taking. The Big Short is a great book and we highly recommend it to anyone who would like a funny, incisive, and illuminating read. |
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Ask DWM: What Are Your Thoughts on GS and Financial Reform? |

When Goldman Sachs went public in 1999, its prospectus began: "Our clients' interests always come first. Our experience shows us that if we serve our clients well, our own success will follow." We couldn't agree more with their stated mission. As our clients and friends know, that's exactly what we have established and practiced at DWM as the foundation of our firm and our dealings with our clients. But what about GS? When did their moral compass get overrun by greed and arrogance? As Michael Lewis points out, things changed for many of the Wall Street banks in the 80's and 90's. They went public and shifted the risks from the partners to the outside shareholders. The shareholders who financed the risk taking had no real understanding of the risks involved, and as the deals got more complex, their understanding diminished. It is fair to say that much of the risk taken in the last decade by Wall Street firms probably would not have existed if the partners of the firms were bearing the risks personally. Furthermore, in 1998, Congress repealed the Glass Steagall Act. This Act had kept banks separated from Wall Street since 1932. The result: Citigroup, Countrywide, and Washington Mutual, among others, shattered and/or collapsed. Then, in 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Future Modernization Act. It made derivatives completely free from all oversight and regulation. The result: AIG blew up, costing taxpayers $185 billion. And, in 2004, SEC granted a special waiver to the five biggest investment houses (Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Morgan Stanley) to increase their leverage, in most cases reducing their required capital to 4% of assets. The result: Bear Stearns and Lehman are gone, Merrill Lynch was rescued with billions of taxpayer dollars, while GS and JPM borrowed billions from the US. As the SEC charges and Senate investigations of Goldman and others are becoming more transparent, we must ask whether GS or other investment banks deserve the huge public subsidies they receive. Do they do anything that has any real social value? Do they serve as conduits for transferring savings to those sectors of the economy needing capital? Do they provide liquidity and stability in the markets to permit the free flow of capital on an ongoing basis? Or are they just running a casino? We taxpayers have given Wall Street billions based upon the theory that they perform economically useful activities. They need to prove that they do. In the meantime, GS and others are providing evidence why there is new life for the "Volcker Rule". This rule would effectively bar banks from the risky and often lucrative practice of trading for their own accounts. We're all for the Volcker Rule and other aspects of Financial Reform that would regulate derivatives, mandate tougher capital requirements, stop too big to fail, restore partnership liability to investment houses, rein in rating agencies and eliminate future taxpayer funded bailouts. Aren't you? |
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