Supreme Court Rules on PSTCA Case

The Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA Neb. Rev. Stat. sections 13-901 to 13-927)was deliberated by the Supreme Court in Connelly v. City of Omaha, 284 Neb. 131, --- N.W.2d --- (2012). Two children were injured in a city park which could be used and was free of charge for recreational purposes, when their saucer-type plastic sled collided with a crab apple tree. Actions were commenced against the City under the PSTCA (1) by the parents to recover medical expenses and loss of services based on their daughters' injuries and (2) by the daughters, by and through their parents, for injuries incurred in the accident. Damages were awarded in both actions by the district court after it found that the accident and resulting injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the City. Additionally, parties challenged the constitutionality of the one million dollar cap on damages imposed by Neb. Rev. Stat. sec.13-926.

The Supreme Court evaluated issues associated with (1) the determination of liability by utilizing negligence elements, (2) a comparative fault apportionment, (3) measure of damages for in-home nursing care and (4) the damage cap.

The City asserted that the district court erred by finding it liable. With some exceptions, "in all suits brought under the [PSTCA] the political subdivision shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual." Section 13-908. Therefore, a negligence action brought under the PSTCA has the same elements as a negligence action against an individual, i.e., duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages. The Court determined that this was a premises liability case and it cited the basis for proving such a case. The Court addressed several aspects of tort law and some of its reasoning is summarized below.

After viewing evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the evidence related to the sled accident in which the sled hit a tree it was found by the Supreme Court that the district court did not err in finding that the City should have realized the crab apple trees posed an unreasonable risk of harm to sledders.

The Supreme Court then analyzed the City's arguments related to comparative fault. It recognized that there was credible evidence to support the district court's apportionment of fault and that the apportionment bore a reasonable relationship to the respective elements of negligence proved at trial. The City, as the owner of a public park historically used for sledding, knew that the crab apple trees posed a risk to those who used the park for sledding, yet took no action to decrease or eliminate the risk. It was shown that the district court carefully considered the City's factual arguments regarding the father's comparative responsibility for the accident, but determined that it was significantly less than that of the City.

Section 13-926 of the PSTCA was an issue that was also weighed extensively by the Court. The parties to the lawsuit argued the applicability of the damage cap of (1) One million dollars for any person for any claims arising out of a single occurrence; and (2) Five million dollars for all claims arising out of a single occurrence.

One of the children injured challenged the constitutionality of the damage cap provided in sec. 13-926. The Court had upheld the constitutionality of the damage cap established by sec. 13-926 in Staley v. City of Omaha, 271 Neb. 543, 713 N.W. 2d 457 (2006) and again in the Connelly case. The Court was not persuaded by an argument that the Legislature lacked a rational basis for including Omaha with all other political subdivisions to which sec. 13-926 applies. The child's contention was that the Legislature's concerns regarding insurability and fiscal stability of political subdivisions which led to the enactment of the damage cap did not apply to Omaha, due to its size and ability to self-insure. The Court stated, "But that is a determination best left to a legislative body, not a court... We will not second-guess the decision of the Legislature to treat the City in the same manner as all other political subdivisions with respect to capping damages recoverable under the PSTCA. We conclude, as we did in Staley, that the Legislature had a rational basis for enacting sec.13-926."

In evaluating, the City's assertion that the district court erred in determining that one of the child's injuries triggered three separate damage caps, one for the child and one for each of her parents, the Court determined the child's claim and her parents' claims are subject to separate damage caps. The Court was then required to determine whether both the mother and father were each entitled to recover up to $1 million for their claims against the City under sec. 13-926(1), or whether their combined claims were subject to a single one million dollar cap.

The Court stated "Clearly, [the mother and father] are both "persons" having "claims" resulting from [the daughter's] injury, but their claims for medical expenses and loss of services are not separate and distinct. Rather, these claims are joint in nature. The parents' joint claims were based on the same proof, and the parents could not each separately recover the full amount of damages for medical expenses and loss of services." Based on the Court's interpretation of  sec. 13-926(1), it concluded that the parents' claims were subject to a single damage cap of one million dollars.

A remaining issue was how to apportion the father's comparative fault against the single damage cap applicable to the joint parental claim, given that the mother was not found to be at fault. The Court agreed that a statutory limitation on damages such as that of sec. 3-926(1) "applies to cap the total recovery after the reduction of the plaintiff's damages for his or her comparative negligence, rather than applying to the total damages established before the reduction for comparative negligence, since the latter approach would multiply the effect of the damage limitation."

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in the daughters' action awarding damages to one child in the amount of $8,176.84 and to the other in the amount of $1 million dollars. With respect to the parents' action, the Court modified the judgment in favor of them by combining the amounts and reducing the total to $1 million dollars payable to them jointly; and the Court affirmed as modified.