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Canada's Road to the Pacific War: Intelligence, Strategy, and the Far East Crisis
By Timothy Wilford, University of British Columbia Press Vancouver, Canada, (2011).
Reviewed by Dr. Richard P. Hallion
In this remarkably thorough study, Timothy Wilford breaks new ground in tracing the intelligence background to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, and the role of Canada in Far East strategy on the eve of the Pacific war. In so doing, he overturns the normative traditionalist narrative prevalent in most histories that either ignores Canada entirely, or depicts it as a mere by-standing witness to the great events of 1941, standing politely and in the shadow of both Great Britain and America. Rather, as he clearly indicates, Canada was an active, long-standing and intimately involved participant in prewar Pacific strategic planning and thinking. Any subsequent book on interwar Pacific diplomacy-and on the respective roles of both the British Commonwealth and the United States-will have to consider the findings and argument in this important and provocative work.
Wilford concludes [p. 207] that "Canada not only approached the crisis [of 1941] with remarkable insight but also recognized how the anticipated Pacific War would alter its role within the Anglo-American alliance. Throughout the crisis, it stood as Britain's senior ally, sharing intelligence and strategic assessments with the Commonwealth." Ironically, the war that followed witnessed the decline of Canada's relative position of importance, as the United States assumed greater predominance within the so-called "Grand Alliance," setting the stage for the postwar world that followed. Nevertheless, Wilford rightly argues Canada played a significant (if too-often unappreciated) role in ending "totalitarian rule in both Europe and the Far East."
As he amply documents, far from being a minor or even disinterested player in Pacific affairs, Canada had a vital interest in determining Japanese intentions and the implications of Japanese policy for Commonwealth and American decision-making. Consequently, Canada developed a sophisticated and productive intelligence collection and analysis organization. Working closely with foreign powers likewise interested in Japanese intentions (for example, the United States, Australia, and Netherlands East Indies), its analysts and collectors intercepted both coded and in-the-clear communications and thereby tracked Japanese ship movements, assessed Japanese decision-making, and considered the implications of the data thus acquired for Canada's strategic planning, Commonwealth impacts, Anglo-Canadian-American policy, and Canada's internal security.
Wilford traces two regrettable but very different decisions that each had tragic results. One was the decision to accept British reasoning that sending Canadian troops to Hong Kong would establish a deterrent force giving Japan pause before considering any widening of its war beyond China. The troops, dispatched in November 1941aboard HMCS Prince Robert, were sent on a hopeless mission, and those that did not perish in the subsequent (and swift) collapse of the Crown Colony were taken into a brutal captivity. The second, based on fears of espionage and sabotage, was the Canadian government's decision (mirroring America's as well, of course) to inter its Japanese Canadian population, which led to widespread confiscation of property and consequent violation of rights and general misery.
As Wilford shows, Canada's intelligence community generally offered thoughtful, careful, and well-considered assessments of Japan's intentions and actions. Canada's careful assessment of Japan's increasingly militant Pacific policy stimulated closer cooperation with the United States,
particularly between the Royal Canadian Navy and the U.S. Navy. As a consequence, when war came, the two services had already established the basis for a strong and cohesive Pacific Coast defense. That would, of course, prove crucial when Japanese forces landed in the Aleutians, triggering a bitter and difficult campaign in the far reaches of the North Pacific.
Dr Hallion is Senior Adviser for Air and Space Issues, Directorate for Security, Counterintelligence and Special Programs Oversight, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C
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The Perfect Wreck: "Old Ironsides" and HMS Java, A Story of 1812
By Steven E. Maffeo, Fireship Press, Tucson, AZ (2011).
Reviewed by David M. Keithly, Ph.D.
For reasons that are as peculiar as they are complex, Americans seem absorbed with the legacy of the war that divided the nation and relatively uninterested in some of the conflicts that united it. Civil War re-enactors don period garb most weekends, political debates flare frequently over the use of the Confederate flag, documentaries and feature films captivate millions of viewers. Serious discussions of the War of 1812 are rare, though.
What better time, therefore, than the 200th anniversary of that war to publish a novel tracing a voyage and victory of the USS Constitution or "Old Ironsides," as it is affectionately known? The Perfect Wreck is a highly detailed and erudite account of the sea fight between the Constitution and HMS Java. Steven Maffeo's knowledge of technical elements of sailing ships and tactics, the political background in Britain, and the ways of the Admiralty and the military mind is the result of wide reading and an obvious zest for the period.
In the War of 1812 at sea, the swift American sloops and the oversized frigates won a dozen single-ship naval duels, losing only two. But these exhilarating victories had little appreciable bearing on the outcome of the war. When hostilities ended, the British still had over 800 ships in the Royal Navy, while the American fleet had been reduced from sixteen men-of-war to about three. More militarily significant were the hundreds of bold American privateers. These speedy craft even ventured into the English Channel, where they succeeded in bringing the war painfully home to the British merchants and shippers.
One often hears that neither the War of 1812 nor the Peace of Ghent that ended it settled much. This is not true. The Indians of the Northwest, abandoned by the British at the peace table and beaten by the Americans on the battlefield, ceased to be either a menace or a source of friction. The four joint commissions established by the treaty proved to be landmarks in the amicable adjustment of international disputes. Other controversies, such as impressment, were conveniently ignored. Growing rapidly and awkwardly, America could ask for nothing better than to postpone the final adjustment of such issues until a day when it would be a world power. A century later every unsettled dispute of 1814 had either disappeared into oblivion or been settled by mutual accommodation.
Perhaps most crucial is that the fiery furnace of war brought forth a new nation. The USS Constitution became a revered component of the national psyche, for example. America's humiliating defeats faded from mind, while the glorious victories, such as those of "Old Ironsides" are celebrated in verse and song. The republic came to sense as never before its unlimited potentialities and its future greatness. Americans began to perceive that the country's destiny lay in the West as well as on the ocean. True, America took some hard knocks, but it did gain a grudging respect from British statesmen and warriors. The hot breath of American broadsides spoke a language that could not be misunderstood. Gone were the sneers about Yankee cowardice and degeneracy, for the American fir-built frigates proved themselves in combat. Never again was the United States to be treated by Britain and France as other than a sovereign nation. In this sense the War of 1812 may properly be called the second war for American independence.
In the United States the embers of 1776 were stirred anew. When Congress faced the problem of rebuilding the burned-out buildings in Washington, one member proposed to encircle the ruins of the Capitol with an iron railing and place thereupon an inscription: "Americans! This is the effect of British barbarism! Let us swear eternal hatred to England!" Fortunately, this spiteful proposal was not accepted.
"The leaves of a tree delight us more than the roots," wrote Tolstoy-a good maxim for many historical studies. Yet the student of war must be aware of the interaction of political, social, and economic factors. The leaves of a tree may attract us, but the roots are ultimately inescapable. Thus in history, the fascination of the story often lies in the tension between the individual and the circumstances of the time in which he lives.
Dr. Keithly is a retired reserve officer.
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The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent
By J.C.A. Stagg, Cambridge Essential Histories, Cambridge University Press, (2012).
Reviewed by John Grady
J.C.A. Stagg, a professor of history at the University of Virginia and the author of two books on James Madison, has written a superb, concise history of the War of 1812. A part of Cambridge University's Essential Histories Series originally designed for undergraduates, "The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent" ties together the political economic, military, naval and diplomatic aspects of the conflict.
What emerges from the work is how the repeated and failed United States "walk to Canada," in Thomas Jefferson's words, forged Canadian nationalism and a lingering suspicion that lasted into the 20th century of its southern neighbor's true intentions when it came to setting new or eliminating all borders by invasion. It also marked the end of Native Americans in the eastern half of the United States as a military force.
In an interview to accompany the book's release, the editor of the Madison papers said the defense of Upper Canada and Lower Canada to Montreal, a vast territory with few people which a number of leading Britons were willing to forego, created a "mythology" among the English speakers that local militia forces [possibly with Indian help by some accounts] could best the Yankees without British naval gunfire or Redcoat support on the ground. This is a central thesis of Alan Taylor's masterful 2011 book, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies.
Canadian nationalism, leading to its Confederation status in 1867, became another unexpected byproduct of the war.
Skagg assigns the British maritime steps - Orders in Council restricting trade and impressment of sailors aboard American merchantmen and Navy vessels taken to defeat Napoleon as prime reasons why Madison decided to go to war. The president saw no other alternative, he argues. If there is any doubt about that reasoning, remember the large banner that David Porter flew in Valparaiso when confronting two British warships: "Free Trade and Sailor's Rights."
What surprised me the most was Skagg's depiction of Madison's relationship with the "War Hawks," the young generation of congressional activists led by Kentuckian Henry Clay, speaker, and New Yorker Peter Porter, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, in the House They didn't exactly push him into war. They wanted to make sure if they built up the United States Army and Navy that Madison would fight. The New England Federalists, already embittered by Thomas Jefferson's ill-thought Embargo Act and hostile to any war with their largest trading partner -- Great Britain, were joined by a shifting coalition of Republican-Democrats who despised federal taxes [largely tariffs on imports] in rushing headlong into battle.
Being an architect of the Constitution and essential in winning its ratification, Madison dutifully kept the separations of powers in place when he secretly sent to the Congress his call for a declaration of war.
The book, organized by year, is insightful throughout for not only undergraduates but students of the war. Skagg does cover the single ship-on-ship battles of the United States and Royal Navies that navalists from Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt on so revered as demonstrating American prowess on the high seas, but he rightfully puts them in the context of embarrassments to Great Britain rather than turning the war in the United States' favor.
Going past what most of us know about this war - the burning of Washington [in retaliation for the American sacking of today's Toronto] and the "rockets' red glare" over Baltimore's Fort McHenry, Skagg focuses correct attention on the ground and naval fighting from Detroit to Put-in-Bay to Lake Champlain and the too- often catastrophic failures of the Army commanders there and the hesitancy of senior naval commanders to confront the British on the Great Lakes and to support land operations that would leave their bases open to attack.
As he did in setting the stage for the war on the western frontier, Skagg does an excellent job of putting the "Creek War" in Georgia and Andrew Jackson's operations along the Gulf Coast before the Battle of New Orleans into context. These battles in the "Creek War" dispatched the Indians as a force in the South and opened their lands to American speculators. The Gulf Coast operations also neutralized the Spanish, whose monarchy were British allies, and forced adjustments in the Royal Navy's plans for attacks there. I was surprised that he did not credit naval shipboard gunfire support during the battle for the Crescent City in providing critical enfilading fire on the advancing British forces. Historian Robert Remini, the author of a three-volume biography of Andrew Jackson and a smaller work on the battle itself, credits Captain Daniel Todd Patterson with being "one of the most important and valuable figures in the defense of the city."
A small quibble.
For all the American missteps, the United States was very fortunate to have Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, counsel his government to return to "status quo ante-bellum" in its stalled peace negotiations in Ghent. Great Britain was exhausted financially by its long-running wars against France. The frontiers between Canada and the United States ran thousands of miles making them indefensible. The population differences were so vast - 7.5 million in the United States to 300,000 in Canada - that sheer weight of numbers would eventually prevail. It was time to end a faraway war that could not be won.
What did the American government learn from the war? Build up the professional Army, organize that Army, train the militia, learn how to supply and equip an Army and militias in peace and war, secure the coast with forts and a strong and larger Navy, and provide the federal government with the means to prosecute a war when it is in one.
On paper, all that looks good. "War Hawk" John C. Calhoun as secretary of War set out to reform the Army. A board of commissioners - senior naval officers - was created to advise the secretary of the Navy on policy and strategy. For the first time, standards were set in shipbuilding. Tariffs were raised, so future Albert Gallatins, the secretary of the Treasury during the war, wouldn't have to "tin cup" his way around the financial markets and deep-pocketed patriots to find enough money to keep up the fight. The Second National Bank of the United States, anathema to the loyal Jeffersonians, was created to provide the government credit when needed and act as a federal depository.
The reality was harsher than paper stratagems. The Panic of 1819 put almost all those reforms on hold. Cut costs, balance the budget. Sound familiar - even without the S word [sequestration]?
Skagg's tight history is chock full of those insights.
John Grady, a veteran journalist, is a frequent contributor to Naval History Book Reviews.
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One Marine's War: A Combat Interpreter's Quest for Humanity in the Pacific
By Gerald A. Meehl, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, (2012)
Review by Colonel Curt Marsh, USMCR (Ret)
Gerald Meehl delivers a compelling story of Robert Sheeks who served in World War II as a Japanese language interpreter. The primary title "One Marine's War" is pointed in that each person's experiences in war are unique to him. I must admit though that the subtitle "A Combat Interpreter's Quest for Humanity in the Pacific" made me a little leery of what I was about to read since it implies something other than a normal story of combat. With trepidation I was prepared for an anti-war or apologist subtheme similar to what I found in James Bradley's books, Flags of Our Fathers and Fly Boys. But fortunately this was not the case with this book. Accordingly, it is well worth reading and provides a perspective of combat in the Pacific that helpfully expands the narrative beyond the combat stories most of us are familiar with. We also get a few snapshot views of such memorable Marine leaders as Colonels "Red" Mike Edson and David Shoup.
The book starts out with the story of how the author met Robert Sheeks purely by happenstance on a trip to Borneo in 1979. He was clearly impressed by Sheeks and after they spent some time together he persuaded Sheeks share his life story, and in particular his unique experiences as a Marine officer in the Pacific.
Robert Sheeks was born and raised in Shanghai as the son of an American businessman. He learned to speak and read the Chinese language as a boy with local tutors. As a youth he observed the Japanese incursion into China and their occupation of areas around Shanghai. He saw firsthand the brutality of the Japanese military against the Chinese people and came to hate all Japanese. During this period the 4th Marines in Shanghai provided some stability and protection to the international community. In 1935 his family sailed back to the West Coast of the United States where he finished High School. He convinced his parents to let him join the Marine Corps Reserve and he hoped to eventually fight the Japanese to avenge the atrocities he saw. In 1940 he was accepted to attend college at Harvard University. The attack on Pearl Harbor occurred during his sophomore year and along with his peers he prepared to be mobilized for war. Only a month later in January he was approached by Commander Hindmarsh of the U.S. Navy (and a Harvard Ph.D.) to join the Navy to become a Japanese Interpreter. I found this revealing in how quickly the U.S. military started to mobilize the vast spectrum of capabilities necessary in defeating Japan. Promised a commission, Sheeks agreed to the program if he could still join the Marines.
The Japanese language school was initially set up at UC Berkley with several Nisei, or Japanese-American citizen, instructors. This interesting collection of students included some boyhood friends from Shanghai, several sons of missionaries to Japan and some other odd geniuses with Far East experience. The school eventually had to move to Boulder, Colorado so that the Nisei instructors could avoid internment. This intensive program took about a year to complete. After working so closely with the team of dedicated Nisei instructors, Sheeks learned a great appreciation for the Japanese culture and to reserve his hatred for the Japanese military rather than the people.
His first combat operation was with the 2nd Division serving in the "D-2" Division Intelligence section in the assault on Tarawa. Memorably, he rode with 2nd Div CG, General Hermle and his staff in an amtrack to the end of the single peer following a message from the beach stating "Issue in doubt." With much confusion about the assault, the General ordered Sheeks to go ashore and "see if you can get a prisoner and find out what's going on." He later supported LtCol Shoup who provided the real combat leadership on Tarawa. The only enemy survivors were severely injured Japanese soldiers or Korean laborers who were of no military value. The Japanese soldiers on Tarawa did their best to kill or be killed, and the Marines did their best to kill them. It was evident that surrender was not an option for the Japanese. This was a point of frustration for Sheeks although he did accomplish a lot of work translating documents and documenting the defensive structures on Tarawa.
During the refitting period in Hawaii Sheeks focused on the problem of how to get Japanese soldiers to honorably surrender. Part of the problem was that they didn't know how to surrender and he also needed a way to communicate with them. He created several pamphlets to be dropped from the artillery spotter planes and he fitted out a jeep with a speaker and generator. Both items became invaluable in the following assault on Saipan. His primary job on Saipan turned out to be talking Japanese soldiers and civilians into coming out from hiding in caves. He had many successes but others refused requiring Marines to blast them out. Sheeks viewed his mission as combat support to avoid casualties by his fellow Marines and also one of humanity to the Japanese survivors. Despite the documented incidents of the Japanese killing themselves, many did come out resulting in a significant number of lives being saved. He continued this mission with the assault on Tinian. In the end over 15,000 Japanese civilians and other non-combatants came out of hiding and were held in an internment camp until the end of the war.
Overall the book is well written and the narrative flows well. There is an excellent bibliography and a set of notes for each chapter which illustrates the quality and depth of research done by the author. The only obvious error I found was in reference to MajGen Thomas Watson who was the Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Division at Saipan and personally awarded Sheeks with his Bronze Star. Sheeks meets him in Washington after returning from overseas and the author wrongly indicates that Gen Watson was the Commandant of the Marine Corps, while he was probably just assigned to HQMC. Other than this one error "One Marine's War" provides a compelling and well documented account of Robert Sheeks' unique experiences in the Pacific as a Marine officer and is a worthy complement to other books of personal accounts of the war.
Curt Marsh is a retired Marine Corps officer and Naval Aviator who flew the A-4M Skyhawk. He is now a contractor supporting the FAA.
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Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: The Story of Landing Craft Infantry Group 34
By Captain Lindsay R. Henry USNR (Ret.) and Captain Thomas E. Henry USNR (Ret.) (2009)
Reviewed by Charles H. Bogart
This self-published book consists of two separate accounts concerning Captain Lindsay Henry's service in World War II. The first 80 pages contain an account by Captain Lindsay Henry of his naval service from 1941 to 1945. The second part of the book contains a biographical sketch of the author by his son, Captain Thomas Henry.
Captain Lindsay Henry was a lawyer who returned to active duty in the Navy in 1941. After a number of shore jobs, he managed to have himself assigned to the U. S. Navy's Amphibious Force. Following a period of training, he was promoted to command Landing Craft Infantry Group (LCIG) 34, which consisted of 12 LCI(L)s. His flagship was LCI(L) 408. As he prepared his Group for passage from the United States to England, a Medical Board found him unfit and he was ordered ashore. The means by which he overcame this real medical disqualification must be read to be appreciated. He sailed for England in February 1944 with ten of his boats as part of a convoy. His boats were detached from the convoy at the Azores to sail on their own to England. His plan on how his Group would confront a U-boat had some of the LCI(L) attacking and the rest fleeing. He and his ten boats, however, arrived in England without encountering a U-boat. Later his two remaining boats joined up with the Group.
On June 6, 1944, LCIG 34 landed a portion of the U S Army's 29th Infantry Division on Omaha Beach. Captain Lindsey Henry's flagship suffered a number of hits and lost one man killed, while LCI(L) 553 was destroyed by German gunfire. Following the assault landing, LCIG 34 made a number of shuttle runs from England to Normandy bringing in fresh troops and evacuated wounded and prisoners of war. Later they were assigned to ferry service on the Seine River. In June 1945, LCIG 34 sailed from Europe for the United States.
In telling the above story, the account suffers from a lack of dates to place various actions within a set time frame and occasionally wanders from the wartime naval story to touch on other matters. Having said this, I found his tale of his wartime duties of great interest and a nice addition to the literature of the amphibious Navy.
The second portion of the book is an account by Captain Thomas Henry that fills out the firsthand account written by his father. Using wartime letters, personal remembrances, and accounts from friends, he provides the reader with background on his father's pre and post war service as a lawyer and District Attorney in New York. Among his pre-war cases, he served as prosecuting attorney against Fritz Kuhn of the German American Bund. Within this biographical sketch are letters his father sent to his wife while in the Navy. These letters, along with copies of naval documents, help to flesh out our understanding of who his father was. One should read this section first before reading the autobiographical account as this will allow you to set this wartime adventure within a time framework.
The book is a nice addition to the field of firsthand accounts of how the Navy landed the Army on the shores of Normandy. Those interested in this naval campaign will enjoy the book.
Charles H. Bogart is a frequent contributor to Naval History Book Reviews, and was named a 2011 Naval Historical Foundation Volunteer of the Year.
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