Reviewed by Dr. Richard P. Hallion

The historians within the Office of the Secretary of Defense have established an enviable reputation for meticulously researched and well-crafted books, particularly their series on the various Secretaries of Defense.  Edward J. Drea's impressive new volume in this series will add further luster to both the office and its author.  Drea, a highly regarded historian of wide-ranging experience, is no stranger to those in the military history community, and he has drawn on a wide range of official and unofficial sources to brilliantly relate four crucial years in the Johnson era. 

The central focal figure of Drea's book is the enigmatic Robert Strange McNamara, Secretary of Defense from 1961-1968, his successor Clark Clifford (though well-treated) serving as a coda to the rest of the work.  From his Preface onwards, Drea is unsparingly blunt examining McNamara and his acolytes, their motivations, their actions, the impact on the military and the war in Vietnam, and the McNamara legacy, noting that (iii):

He mismanaged the military services, leaving them under-funded, under-strength, and discredited in the eyes of the nation.  He routinely disregarded military advice, particularly on strategic matters, leaving the United States weaker before the Soviet Union.  He unilaterally implemented programs and disregarded their consequences, leaving the larger society poorer for it.  Even now, McNamara remains a vilified man, and attempts to rehabilitate his reputation during the 1990s only served to reopen the raw emotions of the contentious Vietnam era.

All this constitutes red meat for McNamara's legions of critics (not least of which are those who fought while under his tenure of Secretary).  Despite this, Drea approached this history hoping to "derive a more balanced view of McNamara's and by extension OSD's, successes and failures" (iii). It is a task he takes on dutifully, recognizing McNamara's outstanding early background, "surpassing intellectual gifts. . .an almost inexhaustible amount of energy," and his unprecedented "mastery of the enormity and complexity of the Pentagon," but nevertheless concluding "for all his luminous achievements, his choices that led to the Vietnam disaster will forever remain McNamara's enduring legacy"(547). 

Indeed, after one finishes this book, it is hard to see how McNamara's reputation could possibly be worse, despite Drea's scrupulously even-handed of treatment.  Whether dealing with acquisition (example: the "do-everything" TFX [F-111] program that cost the Navy ten years of fighter development time), space policy, naval surface ship acquisition, relations with the Joint Staff, and his misguided faith in leadership via statistical analysis, McNamara blundered. 

Nothing exemplified McNamara's disastrous defense leadership more than Rolling Thunder, a misbegotten air campaign predicated on sending signals rather than achieving decisive effect.  Drea presents a masterful "view from the top" of the micro-management, faulty assumptions, and political meddling that characterized this ill-fated operation, concluding:

The largely civilian direction of the air strategy failed the tests of both conception and execution....Lacking an integrated and coherent political-military strategic foundation the air campaign proceeded by fits and starts, sputtering most of the time (82). 

Matters came to a head on Capitol Hill in the summer of 1967, when Pacific commander Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, 7^th Air Force commander Lieutenant General William Momyer, and other military figures testified that McNamara's bombing strategy was bankrupt.  Though McNamara vigorously defended his record, Senators were unconvinced. "Throughout the adversarial questioning," Drea writes, "McNamara resorted to evasion and obfuscation to ward off his critics," adding (216-7):

McNamara obstinately insisted despite testimony by uniformed leaders to the contrary that no gulf existed between military and civilian officials over target selection.  This was the McNamara of old - supremely confident, certain of his mastery of the facts. . . But three years of Vietnam had destroyed his credibility, discredited his policies, and shattered his aura of infallibility.

McNamara was done.  Three months later, amid sleet and rain, he left office, his reputation in tatters, his policies discredited.  Rolling Thunder outlasted him by just eight months until it, too (as Drea notes damningly) "ended as it had unfolded - troubled, contentious, and inconclusive" (232).

Drea's book is remarkably free from error, a tribute to its editing.  The author's tendency to jump back-and-forth over time and topic can be jarring, but is probably unavoidable, given the complexity of the subject.  It is an excellent companion to H. R. McMaster's earlier Dereliction of Duty:  Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York:  HarperCollinsPublishers, 1998 ed.).  Like that now-classic work, Drea's book tells a sad, troubling, and cautionary tale, one to be taken to heart by those entrusted today with the defense of the nation.

Dr Hallion is Senior Adviser for Air and Space Issues, Directorate for Security, Counterintelligence and Special Programs Oversight, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.  

 
By Donald G. Shomette, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, (2010)

Reviewed by Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Even before war was declared on Great Britain, American War Hawks cried out for the taking of Canada. With Britain pre-occupied with war against Napoleon it was thought that Canada would be easy pickings. That it was not is another story, but without ground troops to thwart the Americans and because of their priorities on the Continent, the British devised a plan to hit the Americans in their soft underbelly: the Chesapeake Bay.

Throughout 1813 Royal Navy warships cruised the bay at will, wreaking havoc on towns and plantations on both coasts. Often operating from a base they established on Tangier Island they ranged from Hampton Roads to Head of Elk. Washington, Annapolis and Baltimore lay open to the invaders. Shore defenses and militia were scarce and the capable frigates of the U.S Navy were either sailing elsewhere on the high seas, bottled up by British blockade or, in any case, so few that they were not well-suited to do battle with the large number of Royal Navy ships present. In addition, Marylanders, Southern Marylanders especially, were split as to whether or not the war was a good idea in the first place and a majority supported or withheld their support, or even worked with the enemy. As a result, bay commerce virtually ceased and British Marines and sailors fired towns, plantations and looted tobacco stores and freed slaves at will. The Chesapeake economy was in shambles.

Meanwhile, Joshua Barney, a veteran of both Navy service in the Revolution and privateering early in the War of 1812, devised a plan. After suitable bureaucratic delay, the Secretary of the Navy authorized Barry to build a small fleet of oar-propelled barges, armed fore and aft with canon and small arms and with draft suitable for the shallow waters of the bay. Appointed commodore of the newly designated Chesapeake Flotilla, Barney oversaw the building of his fleet, recruited men and acquired guns and stores, none of the effort easy. He was finally able to sail from Baltimore in 1814.

His fleet was a smaller than he really wanted but set sail anyway. Nature confounded his movements with high winds and heavy seas and by the time he got to the mouth of the Potomac he discovered the British were already there, in force. Returning north he entered the Patuxent and found haven in St. Leonard's Creek. There in a notable effort he battled the Royal Navy to a draw forcing them to bypass St. Leonard's. Unfortunately, once Barney was bottled up there was no hindrance to the British moving up the Patuxent as far as Lower Marlboro, continuing with their looting and destruction along the way. Finally, when the British withdrew to offload and replenish, they left only a couple of ships to keep Barney penned in. Very soon thereafter, with the help of a detachment of U.S. Marines, he executed a brilliant plan, allowing his small fleet of barges and all hands to escape and move north on the Patuxent.

Though chagrined at allowing Barney to escape their trap, the British continued to range the whole Bay and its tributaries at will, which they did with vengeance and terror. With the arrival of troops who had fought with Wellington their efforts spread to include the lower Potomac. Only Barney's Chesapeake Flotilla ensconced at Lower Marlboro kept them from further operations in that direction.

The federal government was at a loss as to what to do. Most federal troops were in the north, the militias were totally ineffective and Barry was bottled up in the northern reaches of the Patuxent. In the end, the U.S. government dithered and military leadership vacillated. After a feint up the Potomac, the British forces ascended the Patuxent. Facing overwhelming numbers Barney withdrew even further north. When the British landed at Nottingham, a place no longer on the maps but upstream from Lower Marlboro, Barney was essentially bypassed and to avoid capture of his barges he blew them up. That didn't end his war, however. He moved overland with his men and his guns to Upper Marlboro and then to Bladensburg where his small force proved to be one of the more effective fighting units. Nevertheless, the Battle of Bladensburg was a stunning defeat for the poorly led United States forces, opening the way for an easy march to Washington.

Once Washington burned the British moved back to their ships, descended the Patuxent and moved north to Baltimore. There, Fort McHenry held through the night and a National Anthem was born.

Buried in Flotilla is a story of grit, determination and outright heroism on the part of Commodore Barney and his men. There's also the story of the perfidy of the Federalists in Southern Maryland who not only opposed the war but went over to the enemy when they got the chance. That was not the last time American citizens aided and abetted an enemy, but it's a sad chapter nevertheless. The Royal Navy hardly comes across as heroic. With overwhelming force they laid waste to countryside that had done them no harm, their excuse being that Americans had treated Canadians thusly and therefore they deserved retaliation.

Finally, this is the story of how one man almost made a difference. Joshua Barney was and is one of our pre-eminent naval heroes, ranking right along with Jones, Barry, Decatur and Farragut. Three U.S. Navy ships have been named for him; fittingly, all were hard-charging combat capable destroyers, just like Joshua Barney.

Vice Admiral Dunn, USN (Ret), is president of the Naval Historical Foundation and lives in Alexandria. This review originally appeared in The Washington Times.

By E H Domienik, Snipebook Publication, Venice, FL (2006).

They Called Me Wee Vee

By E H Domienik, Snipebook Publication, Venice, FL, (2008).

Apology

By E H Domienik, Snipebook Publication, Venice, FL, (2010).

I Remember the Yorktown is the first of three self-published books that Gene Domienik has written concerning his service in the U. S. Navy during World War II. The book focuses on his tour of duty onboard Yorktown (CV 5) from October 1941 to its loss at the Battle of Midway on 7 June 1942. The author was a 17-year old who had just graduated from the Navy Machinist Service School when he was assigned to Yorktown. On board Yorktown, he served in M (main propulsion) Division. This book is an interesting read of life in the prewar and early war Navy as seen by an enlistedman. At times, the author's memory is at odds with accepted historical facts, but these glitches do not destroy this account of Yorktown going to war.

The author starts his story by recounting how, upon graduating from Machinist Service School, he and his fellow graduates with sea bags on their shoulders were marched to Pier 7 in Norfolk. Upon arrival at the pier, a chief read out orders that assigned each graduate to a ship; for Domienik, it was Yorktown. As Yorktown was at sea, he was sent onboard Kilauea (AE 4) for later transfer to the carrier. His tale of service on board Kilauea and Yorktown gives one a rare glimpse into the life of a snipe both onboard and ashore. He faced the same old problem that all underage sailors faced, what to do on liberty when there is no USO Club, and he is not old enough to enter a bar. I was taken aback by the fact that upon reporting to M Division, he was assigned a mentor to help him to adjust to the Navy and make sure he did not run afoul of any regulations. (I never got such help while I was an enlistedman, 1958-1961).What I also found interesting was how dependent he was on scuttlebutt concerning his ship's activities, and how sure his shipmates were that they would not go to the Pacific Theater following the attack on Pearl Harbor, for they were an Atlantic fleet ship.

I found the author's story of Yorktown's short life in the Pacific interesting but disappointing. I wish he had spent less time trying to describe the big picture and concentrated more on what he was doing. In particular, as I read the chapter on the abandonment of Yorktown at Midway, I was besieged with questions I wanted to ask the author concerning just where was his General Quarters station, what actions did his repair team perform in trying to save Yorktown, and what was his route topside when he abandoned ship. I also found interesting his statement that Yorktown lacked enough life preservers to equip each man and that many of the life preservers the ship did have were defective.    

Those interested in researching the life of the enlistedman during the period 1940-1942 should consider reading this book.

They Called Me Wee Vee is the second book in the trilogy that Gene Domienik wrote about his service in World War II. After surviving the sinking of Yorktown (CV 5), he was assigned to the battleship West Virginia (BB 48). The author has chosen an unusual method of telling his story; the story is told in the first person by the ship. The story West Virginia tells covers her life from late 1941 until early 1946. At times her tale is at odds with accepted historical fact, but if one can overlook these faults, this still is an engrossing tale of a ship at war. One other fault is that the story, as told, is lacking in technical details but does summarize West Virginia's career in World War II.

The story of West Virginia at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is well-written. The main topic here is a recount of the horror some members of her crew experienced upon being trapped alive in her hull after she sank. This is followed by a brief narration of her salvage and repair and the arrival of sailors from the sunken Yorktown to form her M Division. The story of the recovery of the remains of two dead sailors from the propeller shaft alley, eight months after her sinking, is particularly chilling. It is unbelievable what the Navy expected of their men and how these sailors lived up to these expectations.

Once again, those interested in the life of the enlisted man in World War II will find much of interest such as the fact that the Yorktown survivors had to pay to replace their uniforms lost when the ship sank, the lack of compensation for lost personal items, the difference between draftees and prewar sailors in response to cleaning bilges, the ship party held in Bremerton in December 1942 during which the dance hall was wrecked, and the restrictions imposed concerning liberty while the ship was at the Bremerton Naval Shipyard. Mixed in with these tales, we follow Domienik as he progresses upward in rank.

The tale of West Virginia's shakedown cruise upon leaving Bremerton contains interesting tidbits including hull seams opening up when the 16-inch guns were fired, problems with engine room piping and wiring, and non-functioning radar. At one point, due to all of the extra work carried out at sea by the crew to correct engineering problems not addressed by Bremerton Shipyard, the men of M Division requested a transfer off of the ship. Eventually all of the engine room problems were corrected by the crew and West Virginia steamed off for war.    

The tale of the Battle of Surigao Straits adds nothing new to this well-known action; however, there is a new twist to the days after the battle. The author states that West Virginia became non-operational due to an outbreak of diarrhea, with some sailors dying from this sickness. However, the ship was ready for the invasion of Iwo Jima and then took part in the invasion of Okinawa. West Virginia had returned to Pearl Harbor for repair when the atomic bomb was dropped but was in Tokyo Bay when Japan surrendered.

While participating in the surrender a ceremony in Tokyo Bay, that iconic World War II photo was taken that showed West Virginia cruising past Mt. Fuji. West Virginia returned to San Diego following the surrender ceremony carrying 1,000 repatriated American Prisoners of War. At San Diego, she threw a large ship party and split the $12,000 remaining in her ship's fund with the wives of her men lost during the war. She then returned to Pearl Harbor for a Magic Carpet run to San Francisco. During this last time at sea, her hull developed a leak forcing her into dry-dock for hull repair. Following this hull repair, she went to Bremerton and joined the mothball fleet. She would remain here until sold for scrap in 1959.  

This book reads as if it was written for a middle or high school student rather than a military historian, but it is still an interesting read.

Apology is the final book in the Domienik trilogy differing as here he makes a case that Lexington (CV 2), Yorktown (CV 5), and West Virginia (BB 48) should each be awarded a Presidential Unit Citation. The material on Yorktown and West Virginia is basically a retelling of the tale in his first two books with some additional material and a few corrections. The material concerning Lexington is new. In presenting its case, the book does suppose that the reader has a greater knowledge of the war than is revealed within these pages.

The author divides the book into three sections and devotes one of these sections to each ship. Basically, he summarizes each ship's history and then lays out the criteria of why he believes the ship is deserving of being awarded a Presidential Unit Citation. I will not attempt to summarize the author's reasoning of why each ship is deserving of this award. Personally, I was not convinced by the author's arguments that these three ships' service during the war differed that much from the World War II service of the majority of the Navy's ships. However, with that said, after reading this book, I will accept that many other readers may disagree with my reasoning as to which of these ships deserved such an award.

This is an interesting book setting forth one man's beliefs concerning the part three different ships played in World War II.

Charles H. Bogart of Frankfort, Kentucky is a frequent contributor.

Aircraft Carrier Command. Rear Admiral Peter B. Booth, USN (Ret), Trent's Prints, 2011, 285 pages.

Black Hell: The Story of the 133rd Navy Seabees at Iwo Jima. Kenneth E. Bingham,  Binghamus Press, 2011, 430 pages.     

Destroyerman. John T. Pigot, Bevan Press, 2007, 152 pages.    

Letters Home: My Life Aboard the USS Biscayne during World War II. Stanley J. Morrison as told to Daniel Paul Morrison, King of Patagonia Press, 2011, 104 pages.  

Run the Gauntlet: The Channel Dash 1942. Ken Ford, Osprey Publishing, 2012, 80 pages.   

Talking about Naval History: A Collection of Essays. John B. Hattendorf. Naval War College Press, 2011, 354 pages.

The German and The Austrian Navies (Volumes I and II). Marc E. Nonnekamp, CreateSpace, 2009, 440 and 346 pages. (note: these volumes contains text in both English and German).   

The Untold Experiences of a Navy Corpsman: A US Navy Hospital Corpsman with a US Marine Corps Reconnaisance Patrol Team in the 1950's on Covert Korean Missions. C. Gilbert Lowery, Authorhouse, 2011, 167 pages.   

The U.S. Navy Seabee Alaskan Oil Expediation 1944. Kenneth E. Bingham,  Binghamus Press, 2011, 249 pages.     

United States and Allied Submarine Successes in the Pacific and Far East During World War II. John D. Alden and Craig R. McDonald. McFarland and Company Publishers, Inc., 2009, 366 pages.  

The U.S. Navy Seabee Alaskan Oil Expediation 1944. Kenneth E. Bingham,  Binghamus Press, 2011, 249 pages.     

Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. P.W. Singer,  Penguin Books, 2009, 499 pages.