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This bulletin covers a 1984 BLEVE explosion in Mexico City that destroyed an entire LPG terminal and killed hundreds of people.
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1984 Mexico City BLEVE kills hundreds, injures thousands, destroys LPG terminal
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The PEMEX San Juanico terminal distributed LPG that came by pipeline from three refineries. The terminal had 6 storage spheres and 48 horizontal cylinders—a capacity of 16 000 cubic meters. A ground level flare was used to burn off excess gas.
Construction of the terminal originated in the early 1960s, reportedly to API standards with much of the manufacturing completed in the USA. Within the ensuing 20 years, houses and distribution depots of other companies had been built to within 130 meters from the terminal.
In the predawn hours of 19 November 1984, events that preceded the initial explosion included:
- The terminal was being filled from a refinery 400 kilometers away
- The LPG inventory on site was about 11 000 cubic meters
- The control room and a pipeline pumping station registered a fall in pressure
The cause of the pressure drop was unidentified and no one initiated emergency shutdown.
A pipeline that connected a storage sphere to a series of cylinders had burst and within 10 minutes the gas cloud reached the ground flare and ignited. It was too late for emergency shutdown procedures to be effective. Five minutes later the first boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) occurred followed by some 15 explosions over the next 90 minutes.
The diameter of one fireball was a reported 300 meters (1000 feet). LPG rained from the sky and was ignited by fireballs generated by explosions. Bursting vessels became missiles that weighed up to 20 tonnes and flew more than 100 meters (330 feet)—one traveled more than 1200 meters (4000 feet).
Primary accounts of the event reported mainly about rescue and firefighting; little was reported about on-site management. About 4000 people participated in rescue and medical activities. Fires were fought until about 11 p.m. that evening—some 17 hours after the initial ignition.
The terminal was destroyed. Fatality estimates ranged from 500 to more than 600; injury estimates ranged from 5000 to 7000.
One result of such accidents is the American Petroleum Institute (API) Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout (API RP 752 and 753). Many forward-thinking companies have focused on appropriate siting issues and standards including siting evaluation studies and hazards management.
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Contributors to the Disaster
- Failure of the overall system of
protection, including layout, emergency isolation and water spray
systems
- No gas detection system
- Emergency isolation was too late
- General lack of understanding of potential hazards
- Traffic chaos as residents fled and the emergency services tried to gain access
Practical Lessons
- Establish a safety philosophy and emergency procedures including training, drills, and exercises
- Perform a site assessment in line with API RP 752 and 753
- Vapor cloud explosions receive much attention, but Mexico City demonstrated that BLEVEs are an equally important hazard to be considered - CCPS (see reference below) provides methods for evaluating BLEVE hazards
- Apply principles of risk-based design, but understand worst-case consequences and plan accordingly
- Prevent or limit escalation to adjacent hazards (ie domino effect), preferably by separation and then fire protection
- Provide and test designated emergency access and egress routes suitable for emergency services and to allow people to escape
References
- American Petroleum Institute. 2003: Recommended Practice 752 "Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Buildings"
- American Petroleum Institute. 2007: Recommended Practice 753 “Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings"
- Hawrelak, D. 1999: The Tragedy of San Juanico PEMEX, Mexico City, 19 Nov 84. The University of West Ontario. PowerPoint presentation online at instruct.uwo.ca/engin-sc/cbe317/ES-317y/LectureNo3/3.0_BLEVE_Case_Study/3.1_PEMEX_Slides.ppt Accessed 23 February 1984.
- Health and Safety Executive. 2009: PEMEX LPG Terminal, Mexico City, Mexico. 19th November 1984. Online at http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/casepemex84.htm Accessed 23 February 2009.
- Lees, F.P. 1996: Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control. Second edition. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- CCPS, 1994: Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires and BLEVEs. Center for Chemical Process Safety
- Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. 10 February 2009. Safety&em;status and signals (Annual Report) Online at http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/PDF/Safety 09.eng.indd(1).pdf
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