• The Honorable Richard Serino, Deputy Administrator, FEMA

• The Honorable Todd Keil, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, DHS

• Brig. General James Shamess (USAF ret.), Senior Advisor for Security Policy and Oversight, Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force

• Ms. Tina Gabbrielli, Director, Office of Risk Management and Analysis, DHS

 "...shall be informed by the risk of specific threats and vulnerabilities -- taking into account regional variations - and include concrete, measurable and prioritized objectives that mitigate that risk. The national preparedness goal shall define the core capabilities necessary to prepare for the specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, and shall emphasize actions aimed at achieving an integrated, layered and all-of-Nation preparedness approach that optimizes the use of available resources."

"...include a standardized, objective approach for assessing threats and hazards to identify core capabilities and where they are needed, while establishing performance objectives that measure progress towards achieving the Goal. The core capabilities that make up the Goal will represent preparedness priorities that reflect Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and private and nonprofit sector perspectives on risk. The threat and hazard identification and risk assessment should consider the range of natural hazards, potential accidents, and terrorist threats and factor in the identification of risks facing States and local communities as well as the Nation as a whole."

"Now, I know there has been some criticism on the funding level this bill is recommending for FEMA's first responder grants. Let me emphasize that not only is there more than $13 billion dollars in the pipeline that has not been drawn down, but FEMA has yet to establish a credible method for measuring the impact of these grants."

• Help ensure that the focus remains on building capabilities where they are needed;

• Allow states and localities to prioritize investments more effectively by understanding how much risk reduction could be achieved through investment in a particular capability; and

• Provide Federal officials with the basis for measuring and articulating the overall effectiveness of the grants on reducing risk to the Nation.

• Visibility. Since their inception in 1998, these grant programs have benefited every state and territory, most major urban areas, and even many privately owned and/or operated facilities. Their intended purpose -- to enhance the Nation's preparedness for large scale terrorist attacks and natural disasters -- coupled with the enormous amount of taxpayer funding involved, also contributes to a heightened level of interest and raised expectations at all levels (e.g., H.R. 3980, the Redundancy Elimination and Enhanced Performance for Preparedness Grants Act). An obvious danger here is having a less than ideal solution dictated. Effectively managing stakeholder relationships and expectations will also be essential to success.   

• Parochial Interests. One of the reasons why these programs have developed into what they are today is that responsibility is shared among many agencies within DHS - each with its own often competing interests. To succeed in changing this paradigm, there must be unanimity of purpose within the Department.

• Program Complexity. Virtually every element of the current grant process has developed within its own unique stove-pipe. Aligning all of these elements will be a complex undertaking that will require patience, collaboration and resources.

• Program Focus. While difficult for many of the reasons discussed, it is essential that a common and clear understanding of the purpose of these programs be arrived at. The reality is that these grants were established to assist State, Tribal and local government entities, as well as the owners and operators of critical infrastructure, acquire preparedness capabilities they did not previously possess and would not be likely to fund on their own outside of a shared commitment. In recent days, this has become intertwined with discussions about annual investments in routine law enforcement, fire, emergency medical, and emergency management capabilities. Refocusing on the original purpose of these programs, therefore, is also essential and would greatly facilitate the development of the necessary risk-based decision-making framework.

• "Coordinating with U.S. Northern Command to establish an incident support base in Maxwell, Alabama, enabling FEMA to move supplies (such as water, infant/toddler kits and tarps) closer to the affected areas.

• "Activating the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct debris clearance and removal, infrastructure protection, restoration and emergency repair.  

• "Working with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to help support housing operations under Emergency Support Function #6 -- Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services.

• "Activating U.S. Environmental Protection Agency personnel to perform the functions of Emergency Support Function #10 -- Oil and Hazardous Materials Response -- by conducting response efforts relating to oil and other hazardous materials and conducting short- and long-term cleanup.

Key Reports

A new report from the Department of Homeland Security "describes how DHS has addressed specific 9/11 Commission recommendations over the past ten years, making America stronger and more resilient."

Get the report  

IHSS: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activity

NAF: Countering Domestic Radicalization: Lessons for Intelligence Collection and Community Outreach