T H E  R I S K  C O M M U N I C A T O R

The Monthly Newsletter of the
Security Analysis and Risk Management Association

November 2009

In This Issue
News: CBP and TSA Under Fire, SARMA Welcomes Caroline Hamilton
Altiok: Model-Based Assessments for Waterways and Ports
Key Reports: Predicting Rare Events, Anti-Gang Coordination Efforts, and More

SARMA Thanks the Gold-Level Sponsor of our 3rd Annual Conference

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The views expressed in The Risk Communicator reflect the views of their authors, and do not neccesarily reflect the views of SARMA, the US Government or the employers or clients of the contributors.
President's Corner


Dear Fellow SARMA Members,

As a time typically reserved for enjoying family and friends, Thanksgiving is a unique holiday. Personally, I have many wonderful memories of good company, great food and, being a native of Texas, watching what we referred to as the "Dallas game." Win, lose or draw, it was always a good time -- even when we had guests who were rooting for the Cowboys' opponent.

SARMA also represents a family of sorts -- bound together as it is by a shared professional experience. Just as we come together to celebrate and renew our families at Thanksgiving, SARMA needs the support and attention of its "family" to thrive. Although SARMA is slowly growing its professional staff, we remain largely dependent on the volunteer spirit of our members to function -- whether that is developing the profession's common knowledge base, implementing the associated training and certification programs needed to mature the profession, planning the next well-received conference, or serving as a source of unbiased information on security risk management issues for government decision-makers.

There are many benefits to be gained from being a member of the SARMA family and participating in these activities -- both personally and professionally. However, as in real families, with benefits also come responsibilities. While that doesn't quite equate to taking out the trash or doing the dishes, it does mean giving back and, by doing so, bettering the organization as a whole. In that spirit, I would urge each of you, especially our stalwarts, to look for ways you can actively contribute to this shared success.
 
Our new committee structure is one area that offers a variety of such opportunities. Ranging from the business of running the association to projects that are central to fulfilling SARMA's mission of service, these 16 committees are the backbone and hub of everything we do and everything we hope to achieve. Besides the opportunity to serve on one or more of these committees, four are currently lacking a chairman or chairwoman. These are: Training & Certification; Publications; Conferences & Events; and International Affairs. Ensuring that these critical committees have strong leadership is one of my highest priorities, so if you have an interest in taking on such a role in one of these areas, please contact me at kerry.thomas@sarma.org. You can also visit the SARMA website for more information on our eight Business Committees and eight Project Committees.
 
As you enjoy this issue of The Risk Communicator, I would also ask that you take a moment to think about what you enjoy in this profession, as well as what frustrates you and what you think is missing or could be better. Then I would ask that you become a part of the solution by sharing your thoughts and ideas, as well as your talents and passion, with SARMA.   
 
Wishing you and your family a safe and enjoyable Thanksgiving... from your SARMA family!
 
Sincerely,
 
 
Kerry

Kerry L. Thomas
President
Security Analysis and Risk Management Association
News

CBP and TSA Under Fire For Failing to Apply Risk Management Principles

The federal government's transportation and border security efforts are being frustrated by a failure to adhere to appropriate risk management practices, according to new reports by two oversight offices. 
 
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) airport security technology planning, most recently established in a March 2008 review, "does not incorporate some key risk management principles [including] a risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and performance measures," as required by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the Government Accountability Office reported. The NIPP requires risk assessments to be based on threat, vulnerability and consequence assessments.
 
Between 2002 and 2008, TSA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have invested over $795 million in research, development, test and evaluation, procurement and deployment of checkpoint screening technologies. These efforts, which have focused on detecting explosives and creating strong identity validation systems, have been severely criticized in recent years after a number of technological failures. Among these were the explosives trace portal, which TSA noted were deployed in 2006 despite tests that "suggested they did not demonstrate reliable performance in an airport environment," according to GAO.
 
The transportation agency told GAO that, although it had not yet performed a risk analysis based on threat, vulnerability and consequence, it was currently preparing an analysis of the entire aviation sector, known as the Aviation Domain Risk Assessment (ADRA). That review, however, has been delayed repeatedly, leading GAO to conclude that, "we could not determine when the ADRA will be completed, to what extent it will incorporate all three elements of a risk assessment, and whether it will identify and assess risks to the checkpoint."
 
Similar problems beset U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), according to a new report by the DHS inspector general's office. Despite efforts to detect the shipment of radiological weapons in cargo containers, the agency "has not conducted a formal risk assessment to determine which pathways, including maritime cargo, pose the highest risk of biological and chemical weapons entering the nation." Although in 2007 the agency identified such a need itself, "it has not taken significant action" but rather relies on "risk assessments prepared by other government agencies," the IG said.
 
In its recommendations, the IG suggested that CBP move forward on its earlier plans to "conduct or commission a formal risk assessment" of the issue. CBP responded positively to the recommendation, but few details about current and proposed operations are available due to significant redactions in the report.
Legislative Update: Appropriations Bill Requires FEMA Preparedness Task Force
by Kerry Thomas

As reported in the September issue of The Risk Communicator, the Senate included language in its version of the FY 2010 Homeland Security Appropriations bill requiring the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to "establish and operate a state, local, and tribal preparedness task force" to look at, among other things, how it measures the impact of the grant programs it oversees. When the bill emerged from conference last month, this provision not only survived, but was strengthened. Of particular note, language included in the conference report states that the task force shall evaluate "the most appropriate way to collectively assess our capabilities and our capability gaps." While it does not specifically mandate the use of enterprise risk management principles as the unifying framework for the analysis, this language certainly leaves open the door to doing so.

Under the terms of the bill, FEMA is now required to report to Congress within 45 days of the date of enactment (October 28, 2009) on its proposed approach for implementing the task force requirement. SARMA will continue to monitor this issue and provide updates as the process evolves.
SARMA Welcomes Caroline Hamilton as New Membership Committee Chair

Most homeland security experts try to stay away from politics. But for Caroline Ramsey Hamilton, SARMA's recently named Membership & Outreach Committee chair, the world of electioneering was where her risk management career began. As a political consultant in California in the 1970s, she relied on a background in statistics to develop a successful forecasting tool that enabled her to identify critical voters -- and the issues that would resonate with them.
 
It was a former naval officer client who in 1979 suggested that her software program, called RiskWatch, would be a good fit for the defense industry, which was just starting to confront information technology security issues. From there, she spread out to managing physical security and infrastructure projects, as well as expanding her IT business to include HIPAA compliance issues for hospitals.
 
Ms. Hamilton's approach emphasizes what she calls holistic security. IT security has for too long been considered separately from infrastructure security, she says. When IT issues first arose, companies and agencies developed unique systems to address them, while at the same time physical security regimes developed without any regard for the needs of the IT security team. This original structural decision was a great error, according to Ms. Hamilton. After all, physical security systems now rely heavily on networking, and IT security is always under threat of being physically compromised.
 
Integrating IT and physical security programs is among her biggest challenges. She is currently focused heavily on assisting hospitals in developing comprehensive security solutions -- a major challenge owing to a confluence of serious health privacy issues and the unique problem of having to care for what are euphemistically called "forensic patients," i.e., injured or sick criminal suspects.
 
Ms. Hamilton will provide a detailed look at hospital security issues in a future issue of The Risk Communicator. Until then, please join us in welcoming one of our newest additions to the SARMA team!
Analysis
Using Model-Based Risk Assessment for Waterways and Ports
by Dr. Tayfur Altiok 

Ports, waterways and coastal areas experience dynamic risks, with surges and severe highs and lows due to maritime traffic and water and weather conditions. Maritime environments can be highly complex, especially in ports with long channels, such as the Delaware River and the Houston Ship Channel in the United States, not to mention international waterways such as the Straits of Istanbul, Malacca and Hormuz. It is critically important to be able to quantify risks in these waterways so that sound risk-mitigation policies can be developed to minimize potential human injuries and damage to infrastructure that can cause disruptions to the global supply chain.

Although risk management professionals have traditionally taken the lead in doing the number crunching typical of the discipline, maritime risk management requires a broad swath of expertise and disciplines. There are simply too many instigators, situational factors and consequence levels -- especially in port/waterway scenarios -- for any one individual to master. In addition to the wide variety of accidental events such as collisions, groundings, allisions, spills and others, instigators such as human error, steering failure, mechanical/electrical failures, and navigational failure present significant challenges as well. All of these in turn can be affected by unique situational factors such as current and tide.

Needless to say, once terrorism-related incidents are added the list, one ends up with a very large number of potential scenarios. The solution is to develop a simulation model that will identify all of them. A mathematical risk model is used to calculate risks for each scenario as they develop in the simulation model. (We define risk as the expected consequence involving possibilities of incidents along with their consequences.) The parameters of the risk model are obtained using expert opinion and historical data. That is, the risk and simulation models work hand in hand.

Model-based risk assessment methodology allows maritime decision makers to investigate the impact of various risk reduction and operational policies as manifested in the risk profile of ports or waterways.  In the case of safety risks assessment, after defining all the potential variables, the next step is to develop a simulation model of the maritime traffic that will capture the vessel entry and navigation procedures through the waterway and generate water and weather conditions that will result in hazardous situations that can potentially cause maritime accidents. A vector of situational variables is used to maintain information on the components of the situations, such as vessel and cargo types, vessel locations, interactions among vessels (opposite direction, same direction, overtaking, etc.), current, visibility, local facilities and infrastructure, and other relevant data. (See Fig. 1. of the Delaware River around the Philadelphia area.)
 
Altiok1b

Fig. 1:  Simulation model of the vessel traffic in Delaware River near Philadelphia
 
For risk profile computation, the waterway is divided into several slices depending on the particular geography, infrastructure and navigational difficulties. Slice risks are computed based on potential accidents in each slice, and when put together, produce the requisite risk profile of the waterway, such as the one shown in Fig. 2.
Altiok2b

Fig. 2: Profile of the Strait of Istanbul, in which there are 22 slices and the profile is shown over 24 hours.
 
Notice that the profile presents regional and temporal variations in risk, naturally suggesting a number of operational risk-mitigation policies such as traffic scheduling with respect to type of cargo, escort requirements, vessel separations, overtaking rules and lane closures.
 
In the case of security risks assessment, after defining all the potential threats and vulnerabilities, the next step is to identify all potential terrorist attacks along with their situational factors and their consequences. Here a simulation model becomes necessary since some of the most worrisome threats involve a high density of people and/or vessels in and around the port or waterway -- for instance, rush-hour land traffic over bridges combined with vessel congestion due to bridge clearance or anchorage queues. The risk model includes a reasonable set of potential terror incidents with plausible consequences. The simulation model generates the aforementioned situations to feed the risk model. Once a risk profile similar to the one shown in Fig.2 is produced, a number of mitigation policies can be produced. It is worth noting as well that maximum risks in a risk profile are typical disaster indices and therefore provide valuable information for risk-reduction considerations.

Dr. Tayfur Altiok is a Professor in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Director of the Laboratory for Port Security at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey.
Key Reports
Mitre Corp: Can Rare Events Be Predicted?

A Mitre Corporation study sponsored by the Department of Defense finds great uncertainty about efforts to identify and predict rare events and warns "there is danger in premature model building and the use of such models, to the exclusion of careful data collection."

Get the report

DOT: Report on Review of FAA's Progress in Enhancing Air Traffic Control Systems Security

A new report by the Department of Transportation says that "additional action is needed to strengthen security protection and minimize the impact of long-term service disruption" and notes that "review teams did not perform an adequate analysis of site-specific system configurations during the site-selection process to determine which operational locations were most likely to exhibit configuration variances."  

Get the report

A Review of the Department's Anti­-Gang Intelligence
and Coordination Centers


A new report by the Department of Justice's Inspector General finds that the National Gang Intelligence Center and the Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordinating Center "are not effectively collaborating and are not sharing gang­-related information," nor have they "established a gang information database for collecting and disseminating gang intelligence as directed by statute."

Get the report
Jobs
Analyst Position with the DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC)

General:

ABSG Consulting Inc. is seeking a talented young professional to provide technical and management consulting services to the federal government, specifically in the area of homeland security risk analysis for critical infrastructure and key resources. Education and experience with the systems engineering discipline is key requirement as well as strong foundations in the physical sciences. An active security clearance is preferred.

Education:
  • BS or MS in systems engineering.
Experience:
  • One to two years experience in an engineering related discipline using the systems engineering lifecycle to design and engineer complex systems.
Skills:
  • Strong technical background in mathematics or physical sciences required.
  • Must have relevant coursework in risk analysis, operations research, or other technical disciplines designed to support data-driven decision making.
  • Must possess and have demonstrated excellent written and oral communication skills for technical subjects.
Please send resumes and cover letter to:

Micah McCutchan
Program Manager
ABSG Consulting, Inc.
E-Mail: mmccutchan@absconsulting.com