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A Note from the President of the Foundation
Reasons to Support Ranger
Sometimes an article is written that addresses a serious subject
and is designed to provoke discussion. Such an article can be read here.
This article discusses the ongoing need for a vibrant and well
supported naval force centered on aircraft carrier battle groups.
For the last 50 years,
American Carrier groups have projected power and performed humanitarian
missions all over the world. No other nation can field such a combination of
capabilities.
A small number battleships of previous generations have been
preserved to provide a living interpretation of the past, from the USS Texas,
an elderly dreadnaught to the USS Missouri, site of the end of WWII. Several
saved carriers of WWII vintage provide venues to commemorate the coming of age
of air power, and the evolution to our current force structure. Current
carriers are nuclear powered and will never be made available for first hand
experiencing unless we preserve one of their sisters. USS Ranger is similar in size and capability to the
Nimitz class ships roaming the oceans today. It is imperative that she assume a new role as an education magnet,
memorial to the cold war years and a regional emergency preparedness command center.
If you haven't been to the USS Ranger Foundation website please take a moment to visit and lend your
support. If you've been a supporter, we thank you and hope you take a moment to
go to the site and see what's new.
I hope you take the time to forward this to everyone in your address book and
spread the word!
Peter Ogle
President/CEO
USS Ranger Foundation
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An important message
from the President of The Association of Naval Aviation (ANA)
I suggest you distribute to your friends and
colleagues some copies of the Kraft article and keep at least one for reference
when someone in your circle begins to denigrate the need for aircraft carriers,
and their embarked aircraft. It's not only the carrier and its aircraft of
course; it's the system, the carrier battle group with strike fighters,
electronic warfare and early warning aircraft and helicopters that makes for
the best possible warfare capability in the world, a capability on station
around the clock in support of the United States and our allies. Efforts to
reduce numbers of aircraft carriers place in jeopardy the defense of us all.
VADM Bob Dunn, USN (Ret)
The following article is
reprinted courtesy of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings
Issue: September 2009 Vol. 135/9/1,279
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By Rear Admiral Terry B. Kraft, U.S. Navy 
Carriers still provide capability unmatched by any other weapon
system in the U.S. arsenal. One need only open a newspaper to see the
incredible challenges facing our military today. An unprecedented "high-low"
mix of overseas operations, rising regional superpowers, and transnational
trends such as piracy and radical Islam all contribute to a complex range of
scenarios for military planners and defense analysts. In this budget season,
there are widely divergent views regarding the shape of our current and future
military and how to remain responsive to an ever-increasing list of
contingencies.
Much of this discussion has centered on the need for continued
construction and support of our nation's aircraft carrier force. Large
investments must be justified, and carriers, air wings, and support ships come
at significant cost. This interest in carrier strike groups is nothing new;
since 1976, more than ten different studies have examined size and
configuration issues for aircraft carriers.1 Smaller ships, more vertical take
off and landing (VTOL), and other power projection methods have been examined.
After
much time and taxpayer money is spent on these studies, the
results have always been nearly the same: to project enough force ashore to
make a difference, you need about 4.5 acres of flight deck carrying around 50
strike-fighters and support aircraft. The key comparative issue centers around
keeping a sufficient number of aircraft airborne and on station for extended
periods of time. Repeatedly, studies show that a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier
provides anywhere from 2.5 to 5 times as many ground support
aircraft when compared to a smaller carrier, despite carrying
only twice as many aircraft.
Current and future operations require aircraft to be there, on
station, and responsive to asymmetric threats while being ready to attack
moving ground targets. Ground forces, particularly troops in contact, need
flexible, multi-role air power to respond immediately. At longer ranges, the
challenge to support these requirements becomes even greater. A look back at
the beginning phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is instructive here.
In 2001, despite strong international support and invocation of NATO Article V, there were no practical basing options for tactical
aircraft at the start of hostilities. Not surprisingly, aircraft carriers were
the only viable solution for tactical air support and in fact provided 75
percent of OEF strike sorties through December of that year.2 Hornet air crews
became accustomed to six-to eight-hour strike sorties while simultaneously
providing flexible, armed overwatch of troop movements. EA-6B Prowlers began
missions that continue to this day, denying the electromagnetic spectrum to the enemy.
Today, one aircraft carrier provides 49 percent of OEF fixed-wing
sorties immediately after reporting on station.3 On a recent deployment,
Carrier Air Wing Eight operating from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) flew
more than 3,000 OEF sorties supporting troops-in-contact nearly 500 times. They
spent over five months of their deployment off the coast of Pakistan. Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF) has been similar. During my time in the Persian Gulf on board the USS
Ronald Reagan (CVN-76), every type of airwing aircraft directly supported
ground operations on a daily basis, including E-2 airborne early warning
aircraft flying 4.5 hour missions in-country. In looking at this and other
combat operations from Bosnia to Iraq, carriers have proven indispensable,
particularly in the key early stages of a conflict.
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Hybrid Warfare
What makes aircraft carries unique has not changed over time;
they are independent, potent, and when they show up off the coast, impossible
to ignore. Shore-based aircraft and long-range missiles all play a part, but
the fact that the geographic coordinates of their hangars and bases never
change makes them instant targets. When the requirement for host nation
permission is added to the mix, diplomatic challenges often hamper operational
effectiveness. Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan is a prime example. Although the U.S. government has been able to negotiate for
continued basing rights, the costs have skyrocketed, tripling to more than $60
million, which does not include $66 million for capital improvements to the
airfield. Even with all the money going to the government of Kyrgyzstan, the
field cannot be used for tactical missions and is limited to support only.4
Issues such as this highlight how dangerous it would be to assume current
basing privileges as options in future conflicts.
Recently, Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the point that we
need to configure our military for "the wars we are fighting now." His sense is
that Pentagon planners too often focus on the big ticket items while not
providing what our troops need in the field at the moment. While it would be
inexcusable to let that happen, I would also offer that the Navy is currently
up to its armpits in operations ranging from piracy patrols to 14,000 Sailors
on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. What may be surprising for some is that
the one constant in these overseas contingency operations (irregular warfare or
whatever other term of the day presents itself) is the aircraft carrier and
embarked air wing.
In his now famous Foreign Affairs article, Secretary Gates
divided U.S. military forces into three groups: 50 percent for conventional
warfare or major contingency operations (MCOs), 10 percent for irregular
warfare, and 40 percent that could be used for both.5 In looking at current
combat operations and future contingencies, it becomes clear that carrier
strike groups hit the sweet spot and in fact make up the most significant
portion of that "hybrid" 40 percent.
A typical argument against the aircraft carrier is that it is a
remnant of the Cold War or only viable in MCOs. Several analysts would argue
otherwise. Tactical aircraft, special operations forces, and helicopters have
played key roles during the last 11 years in a wide range of security
operations, none of them reaching the level of an MCO. This includes Operation
Desert Fox in 1998-when carrier tactical aircraft launched the initial strikes
on Iraq-to OEF in 2001. In the early stages of OIF, five carriers provided
critical air support for regular and special forces. In the case of the two
carriers in the eastern Mediterranean, those support missions spanned more than
700 nautical miles. Amazingly, 8 different strike/fighter orbits were
maintained for 27 days.6
There are plenty of other examples of carrier hybrid actions.
The USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) led tsunami relief efforts in 2004. The USS
Kitty Hawk (CV-63) deployed with critical special operations forces at the
start of OEF. What is most interesting about all of these engagements is that
none of them would fit the definition of a Cold War scenario or a traditional
major contingency. Carrier strike groups were there when needed, provided
crucial support across the spectrum of operations, then redeployed when their work was complete or they were relieved on station by
another carrier strike group.
All of this underscores the fact that carrier strike groups are
busier than ever before. Beginning with a wide range of contingency operations
during the Clinton era to sustained combat operations over the last four years,
there have not been enough strike groups to meet combatant commander demand.
Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration
of Capabilities and Resources (N8), recently noted that this "presence deficit"
includes areas such as the Black Sea, Baltic Region, Indian Ocean, and areas off the African coast.7
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Enhanced Air Wing
Capabilities
While the carriers themselves look the same, the air wings have
changed significantly since the days of the Cold War. The F/A-18 Super Hornet
remains the most significant and flexible aircraft in the world for supporting
a complete range of activities from unconventional warfare to major
contingencies. Equipped with ATFLIR, ROVER targeting system, and Shared
Reconnaissance Pods, with crews fully trained as airborne forward air controllers, the Super Hornet presents the
most capable and survivable ground support aircraft in theater. Another
significant change is the current air wing on board the USS John C. Stennis
(CVN-74), which includes a mix of 19 SH-60 R/S aircraft. These helicopters are
particularly well suited to irregular warfare, with capabilities spanning
antisubmarine warfare to combat search and rescue. Future air wings will add
even more capability with the advent of the EA-18G Growler and inclusion of
unmanned aerial vehicles. These systems are currently without peer as a
"fifth-generation" irregular warfare aircraft since, as Secretary Gates noted
"the F-22 [has] never flown a combat mission in Iraq or Afghanistan."8
All of these facts underscore why critics of aircraft carriers
have had little success in challenging the viability and utility of these ships
and their air wings. The flexibility of what they do and the respect they
garner on arrival remains unmatched by any other weapon system. Long after
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are over, Navy ships will continue to provide
vital presence in troubled regions. Key tenets that Secretary Gates has
discussed certainly will be tasked to the Navy: capacity building through
presence and engagement, institutionalization of counterinsurgency, and an
unambiguous ability to deter future conflicts.
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Floating Targets?
Unable to effectively criticize aircraft carriers based on need
or warfighting utility, some have latched on to yet another tired argument:
"Carriers are vulnerable! They'll be taken out by missiles!" Once again, such
discussions are not new, and in fact date back to World War II. In a recent
television series on the Discovery Channel called Enterprise, graphic computer
animation demonstrated how carriers of that era were constantly under attack
from the entire battlespace. The USS Enterprise (CV-6) fought in nearly every significant sea battle of World War II, surviving to
eventually earn 20 battle stars.
What the Enterprise series brings home is that lucrative targets
need determined defense to prevail. Carrier strike groups of today get underway
with sophisticated, multi-layered, and fully netted three dimensional defensive
systems. Advancements such as Cooperative Engagement Capability, as well as
advanced antisubmarine warfare and missile defense tactics will continue to
protect high-value units at sea.
When looking at carrier threats, much has been made of China's
DF-21/CSS-5 antiship ballistic missile. This journal went so far as to feature
a picture of a carrier (and unlucky cruiser) blowing up on its May cover. While
it is important to look closely at weapon innovations of other countries, it is
just as important to not over react to what may or may not be on the horizon
for China or any other nation. Last year it was the low-end swarm attack that
concerned analysts, now the DF-21 has provided new ammunition for the old
argument of aircraft carrier vulnerability. While the range of the DF-21 is
under
debate, what remains central to the success of a 1,500-km
missile is targeting and locating data. The strident article from Dr. Erickson
and Mr. Yang (using information primarily from Chinese field manuals) in the
May Proceedings devoted exactly one sentence to the task of locating and
targeting an aircraft carrier, stating that it would be a "key technical
challenge." In fact finding a ship at sea in the middle of thousands of square
miles of ocean, even an aircraft carrier, is extremely difficult. The question
remains as to whether potential adversaries have the level of persistent
accuracy needed to stage antiship ballistic missile attacks. Should targets not
cooperate by radiating military radars or communication gear, the challenge
becomes nearly insurmountable given the current technical state of play.
One final question to ponder regarding the DF-21 is what type of
situation would lead China to launch such an attack. Presumably there would be
plenty of other indicators of increasing hostilities leading to a range of
military options to defend our assets. Such things do not occur in a vacuum.
Moreover, ceding the maritime high ground seems imprudent simply because some
believe we can't keep pace with the competition in the Pacific. The German Navy
after Jutland comes to mind.
The DF-21 discussion is useful, however, in that it highlights a
key tenet of China's possible military strategy in the Pacific: area denial. If
the Chinese can push naval striking forces farther out to sea, those platforms
become less effective. Long-range missiles, submarines, and even a future
Chinese aircraft carrier will undoubtedly be part of that mix. At a time when
things like the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and budget pressures are
coming to a head, some of these "threats" seem to have taken on a life of their
own. Like the first carrier Enterprise, U.S. military weapons and technology
will flex to meet this challenge and ensure we continue to operate "inside the
ring."
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The Global Commons
What must not be lost in this discussion is the rise of the
Chinese navy. By the next decade, China will have more warships than the United
States. They are building submarines five times faster than us as well.9 As the
Chinese acquire more deepwater ports, the concept of area denial in the Pacific
comes into sharper focus. While the possibility of direct conflict with China
is remote, what concerns regional allies
is the ability of U.S. ships to freely operate throughout the
region, unhindered by the Chinese or any other nation. Since World War II, the
Navy has provided critical engagement and deterrence options to U.S. leaders
and our key allies in the Pacific.
Military analysts and political leaders devote much time and
effort trying to predict future conflicts that will in turn inform requirements
and configuration decisions for our military forces. In the requirements
business, we live in the world of "five years from now" due to the inevitable
delays and limitations or the acquisition process. It's a challenging way to
shape a force.
One interesting vision of the future comes from academic and
author Robert D. Kaplan. Based on current and projected energy demands, he
notes the importance of the vast energy trade transiting the Indian Ocean and
Strait of Malacca. Instability in Pakistan and the rise of India are
interesting trends in the region. The United States will continue to be tasked
to guard the global commons, controlling piracy and providing humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief while interdicting terrorism. He notes that by
2030, India will have the largest population of any country in the world.10
With this regional growth, it becomes clear that the competition for resources
will be acute. These factors help explain the current naval expansion of both
India and China and highlight the need for the Navy to remain engaged in the
theater. Kaplan further notes that "the U.S. Navy may in the future be able to
work with individual Asian countries, such as India and China, better than they
can with each other."
Kaplan's vision of a Navy involved in the theater and engaged
with multiple sea-going nations is beginning now. Combined Task Forces 150 and
151 patrol from the Gulf of Aden to the Seychelles and comprise a force of more
than 27 different navies, including, interestingly, China. These types of
efforts underscore the significant leadership responsibilities of the United
States in the region and argue for continued presence.
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The Way Ahead
The final argument in favor of continued aircraft carrier
construction might be the fact that everybody else seems to be building them.
Last November, an official in China's Ministry of National Defense mentioned
for the first time in a public venue the possibility of his nation acquiring
aircraft carriers. Around the same time, Admiral Hu Yanlin, former political
commissar of the People's Liberation ArmyNavy, stated "China has the capability
to build aircraft carriers, and should do so."11 His country has already purchased three carriers built by the former Soviet
Union and one built by Australia. It has also been reported that, since 1987,
China has been training PLA pilots to one day command aircraft carriers. The
United Kingdom, Russia, and India have all shown a keen interest in building
carriers.
It seems clear, then, that aircraft carriers continue to provide
the kind of "hybrid" weapon system so critical for current and future defense
and presence operations. I would argue that, rather than attempting to link
aircraft carriers to the Cold War or fret about supposed vulnerabilities to
untested weapon systems, we focus on what is important to the future of our
Fleet and how to ensure carrier strike groups remain relevant tomorrow. The
first challenge will clearly be the looming strike fighter shortfall, something
that has been articulated by Navy leadership over the past year. While the Navy
remains committed to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), continued acquisition of
the F/A-18 presents the best and most cost-effective way to populate our
aircraft carriers with air wings of sufficient size to generate a meaningful
amount of combat sorties until the JSF becomes a reality. It is also important
that we retain our sharp focus on the need to pursue effective defensive
systems to protect our capital ships. As a nation we must continually challenge
how our defense dollars are spent. In the case of aircraft carriers and the
Sailors and aircrews that execute the Navy's mission around the world, that
investment pays off every single day.
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1. Center for Naval Analyses, - Small
Carrier CapabilitiesII letter to ADM Nathman, 23 May 2005.
2. Fox, Mikolic, Brown - Carrier Operations,II
Study by Center for Naval Analyses, 13 May 2009.
3. CNO Comments, Naval War College
Current Strategy Forum, 16 June 2009.
4. Jessica Golloher, - US,
Kyrgyzstan Reach Deal on Continued Use of Manas Air Base, II Voice of America
News, 23 June 2009.
5. Robert M. Gates, - A Balanced Strategy, II Foreign Affairs,
New York, Jan/Feb 2009, Vol. 88, Issue 1, pp. 28-32.
6. CNA Carrier Study, Fox.
7. VADM McCullough, OPNAV N8,
Comments Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces of the
House Armed
Services Committee on
Shipbuilding, 15 May 2009.
8. Testimony, Secretary Gates to
House Armed Services Committee, 13 May 2009.
9. Robert D. Kaplan, - Center Stage
for the Twenty-first Century, II Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 2009, Vol. 88, Issue
2, pp. 16-29, 31-32.
10. Kaplan, - Center Stage II
11. Bao Daozu, - Military Deputies Urge Building of
Aircraft Carriers,II China Daily, 6 March 2009.
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About
Rear
Admiral Kraft is a career naval aviator. A veteran of Operations Eldorado
Canyon, Desert Storm, Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, his
commands have included the USS Shreveport (LPD-12) and the USS Ronald Reagan
(CVN-76). He is currently Head, Maritime Aviation, Unmanned Systems &
Aviation Training Plans and Programs.
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USS RANGER
MUSEUM FOUNDATION
A registered, non-profit corporation established March 5, 2001.
Organized
for the purpose of securing, maintaining and operating the
decommissioned super carrier USS RANGER CV-61 as an educational center,
museum and Military Memorial.
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