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Modifications To "Monster Truck" A Valid Basis For Rescission By Thom Glasson
In Mercury Insurance v. Markum, 1st DCA Case No. 1D09-2054, (April 20, 2010), the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had erred in entering Summary Judgment for the Plaintiff and against the carrier on the basis that the term "modified" was ambiguous as concerning an insurance application. The Ford F-250 truck was insured under a policy issued by Mercury and in the application for coverage, the vehicle owner was asked the following question: "Is any vehicle rebuilt, salvaged, modified, altered or specially built/customized?"
The truck owner answered "no" to that question, even though he had installed larger, wider tires, as well as a lift-kit on the truck, which created a "Monster Truck" type of vehicle which is reflected in photographs made a part of the record. There was extensive argument at the trial court level with regard to the ambiguity alleged to exist in connection with the term "modified." According to the testimony of the vehicle owner, his insurance broker assisted him in completing the application and, in fact, the vehicle owner stated that he did not read the application prior to signing it. The vehicle owner indicated that the insurance broker was aware of the nature and extent of the modifications to the truck. The First DCA found that the true issue was not whether there were two interpretations of "modified" that could render the question ambiguous; rather, the issue was whether an objectively reasonable person in the vehicle owner's situation (i.e., having installed larger, wider tires and a lift-kit on his truck) could truthfully answer the question as either "yes" or "no." The Court found that no objectively reasonable interpretation of "modified" would coincide with the vehicle owner's answer of "no" to the question and, therefore, the policy was legally rescinded. However, the matter was remanded for consideration of whether the broker was acting as an agent of Mercury and whether, if the broker did have knowledge of the alterations to the vehicle, that knowledge should be imputed to the carrier.
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A New Twist by Plaintiffs in Exhaustion of Benefits (BENEX) PIP Cases It appears that Plaintiff PIP attorneys never tire of litigating old matters that have been resolved, yet they keep doing so time and again. Specifically, issues that were decided years ago in Simon v. Progressive, 904 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) keep rearing their heads. The benefits exhausted (BENEX) litigation du jour appears to be an attempt to twist or otherwise convince the court that an insurer acted in bad faith when they denied payment for a bill received higher in the line of priority based upon the then-prevailing case law and subsequently exhausted benefits to other providers. In the case specified below, the Plaintiff attempted to do just that. At the time the bills were received by the insurer, the Plaintiff had not submitted a disclosure and acknowledgment form in compliance with Fla. Stat. 627.736. Benefits were then exhausted through payments to other providers. At hearing on Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff argued that the insurer improperly manipulated the claims process to ensure that the Plaintiff was not paid; however, the Court disagreed.
The Court found that when an insurer relies upon controlling case law and acts according to the same, they cannot be found to have acted in bad faith. This is true especially when an insurer continues to process claims any pay legitimate claims until benefits are exhausted. Furthermore, the Court found that the purely speculative allegations made by the Plaintiff concerning spoliation of evidence were without merit as even if it was discovered that the insurer mistakenly did not pay the claim, the Plaintiff's claim would be barred because it had exhausted benefits in the absence of bad faith. Above all else, the Court's logic and legal reasoning in the above-described case follows Simon and the principals Simon stands for perfectly; to wit, that in the absence of a showing of bad faith, exhaustion of benefits is exhaustion of benefits.
Pembroke Pines MRI, Inc. a/a/o Brian Schoedinger v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company, 08-9857 COCE (53), Judge Robert W. Lee, County Court, 17th Judicial Circuit Broward County, Florida (March 29, 2010).
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United Automobile Ins. Co. v. Oscar Salgado, Case # 3D07-461 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2009) Subject Matter: Right of rescission Holding: Absent an express exclusion by the legislature, the right of rescission contained in section 627.409, Florida Statutes (2003), applies to PIP insurance contracts issued pursuant to the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law. Application to PIP: This is an appellate decision which previously reversed an opinion issued by the trial court. The Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory relief to determine if coverage existed notwithstanding the misrepresentation made in the insured's application for insurance. The insured failed to list his brother as a member of his household on his insurance application, and as a result, United Automobile Insurance Company denied his claim for PIP benefits from a subsequent accident during his policy period for material misrepresentation. The trial court granted the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, contending that United failed to cancel the policy in accordance with Florida Statutes 627.728. The court reasoned that United could not deny coverage on the basis that the policy did not exist at the time of the loss because Florida's Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law provides that an insurer's remedy for material misrepresentation is to cancel the policy pursuant to Florida Statute 627.728(3)(a), which requires a forty-five (45) day prospective cancellation notice, rather than to cancel the policy as void ab initio. As a result, the court found that the Plaintiff's policy was valid at the time of the accident. The court in this case reversed the trial court's ruling and opined that United's only remedy was to cancel the policy prospectively under Florida Statute 627.728. The court relied on Flores v. Allstate Ins. Co., 819 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 2002), which held that rescission for material misrepresentation, under Florida Statute 627.409, has been previously applied to statutorily mandated PIP policies. Additionally, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nespereira, 366 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 1979) states that "the law is well settled that if the misrepresentation of the inured were material to the acceptance of the risk by the insurer or, if the insurer in good faith would not have issued the policy under the same terms and premium, then rescission of the policy by the insurer is proper." Finally, because the Florida legislature has chosen not to exempt the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law from section 627.409, the court further concluded that the trial court applied the incorrect law when determining that the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law is in derogation of the Plaintiff's right to unilaterally rescind the policy ab initio. This was based on the obvious and undisputed material misrepresentations contained in the insured's application for insurance. This appellate ruling greatly favors insurance companies when dealing with issues arising from applications for insurance. By allowing insurer's to cancel policies based on material misrepresentation as void ab initio, as opposed to a required forty-five (45) day prospective cancellation notice, the majority of undisputed acts of material misrepresentation at the inception of the policy will prevent the insured from later collecting on PIP benefits from the policy.
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Attorney Spotlight

Charles "Chuck" Crispell is the newest attorney in our Jupiter office. He comes with a wealth of insurance defense knowledge and experience. Mr. Crispell was in-house counsel for major carriers including Zurich, Progressive, Cigna, Allstate and Colonial Penn for 24 years, often serving as lead trial attorney. He has represented insurance companies in property casualty, personal injury, wrongful death, catastrophic claims and subrogation matters. Mr. Crispell focused on a vast array of legal issues regarding products liability, automobile and truck negligence, premises liability, toxic torts, as well as coverage and other insurance contract issues. He has extensive trial experience and has lectured in many jurisdictions regarding various aspects of insurance defense law. Mr. Crispell received his B.A. cum laude in political science from State University of New York and his J.D. from the University of Florida School of Law.
Mr. Crispell resides in Palm Beach Gardens with his wife and family. As a father of four sons, Mr. Crispell's outside interests are geared toward family and the outdoors. |
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Kirwan & Spellacy is a full-service defense litigation firm serving the diverse needs of the insurance and business community throughout Florida.
Practice Areas include:
Automobile Liability/ Uninsured Motorist
Commercial Premises & General Liability
Liability Claims
Personal Injury Protection
Special Investigative Unit/Fraud
Subrogation
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Education
Kirwan & Spellacy provides state-certified continuing education and seminars on relevant topics as a courtesy to our clients.
Course offerings include:
Proposals for Settlement: Changes & Fundamentals
Effective Use of Florida Statute 57.105
Fighting Fraud: Use of Investigative Techniques in Claims Handling and Litigation |
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Locations
Fort Lauderdale 888 S.E. 3rd Avenue Suite 301 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 (954) 463-3008
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19 West Flagler Street Suite 1100 Miami, FL 33130 (786) 275-3140
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275 Toney Penna Drive Suite 1, Jupiter, FL 33458 (561) 615-0333
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595 Cypress Gardens Blvd., Suite 320
Winter Haven, FL 33880 (863) 508-1684
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Contact Shawn Spellacy directly.
Email or telephone 954.463.3008.
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