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Fall 2009
Volume II, Issue 2 |
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Discovery of Defendant's Blood Sample In Wrongful Death The 2nd District, in Jessica Wicky v. Crisanto Oxonian, (Fla. 2nd DCA, Case No. 2D08-2853, Opinion filed August 7, 2009), has determined that a request to test a blood sample that had been obtained from an opposing party in a civil action must be brought pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.360 (Examination of the Person). In this case, the Plaintiff decedent was killed in an accident in which the Petitioner, Jessica Wicky, was driving. Ms. Wicky was asked to give a sample of her blood to be analyzed for alcohol content and the presence of controlled or chemical substances, and no alcohol or controlled substances were noted in the blood sample. As a result, no charged were filed by the State in connection with the accident. There remained a small sample of blood that had not been tested and which was in the possession of the Pinellas County Forensic laboratory. The personal representative of the Estate of Crisanto Oxonian filed a negligence action against Ms. Wicky and during discovery sought permission to test the surviving portion of Ms. Wicky's blood for the presence of a certain cough medication, which they apparently had some indication that she either had been prescribed or had taken. The Circuit Court entered an Order granting the request and Ms. Wicky filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to quash the Order based upon her representation that the taking of the small sample of blood that remained for such testing would create a material injury with no adequate remedy on appeal and as such she was entitled to certiorari with regard to this matter. According to Ms. Wicky, the destruction of the only remaining portion of the blood sample available, which would necessarily be caused by the Plaintiff's testing for this cough medication, would effectively leave her without any ability to defend herself should the State's Attorney seek criminal sanctions against her at a later date. The Appellate Court granted certiorari and noted that any request to test human bodily fluids in a civil action must satisfy the requirements of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.360 and that the Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence of how the presence of prescription cough medication in the Defendant's blood at the time of the accident might relate to the Defendant's negligence. In other words, a petitioner is required to show "good cause" as to why the testing should be ordered under Rule 1.360. Of course, normally, the 1.360 examination is sought and obtained by defendants in cases where plaintiffs have placed their physical and/or mental condition in at issue due to claims of injury in cases. While the instant case was unusual in that the Plaintiff was seeking, in essence, a physical examination of the Defendant's blood, the Court did not rule that the same was impossible; it simply ruled that the provisions of Rule 1.360 must be followed and good cause must be shown at any time that an examination of a person's body or bodily fluids is desired.
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Attorney's Fees in Workers' Comp Cases Under Control...for Now
By Nicole Jacomo
On May 29, 2009 Governor Charlie Crist signed House Bill #903 which took effect on July 1, 2009 and restores limits on attorney's fees in workers compensation cases. Specifically, this bill reverses the Florida Supreme Court's holding in the case of Emma Murray vs. Mariner Health, Inc. which held that claimant's attorneys are entitled to a "reasonable fee" for benefits obtained for their clients.
"Reasonable" is defined by a list of factors set forth in the 1968 case of Lee Engineering &Construction vs. Fellows. These factors include the amount of time the claimant's attorney spent obtaining the benefit, the experience of the claimant's attorney and the complexity of the issues, among other things.
The Lee Engineering case was the authority for determining attorney's fees until October 1, 2003 at which time the Florida Legislature removed the word "reasonable" from Florida Statute 440.34, the statutory section governing attorney's fees. This change significantly reduced attorney's fees by forcing claimant's attorneys to adhere to the statutory formula for approximately 5 years until the Emma Murray decision which was released on October 23, 2008.
Claims filed between October 23, 2008 and July 1, 2009 are not affected by House Bill #903 and claimant's attorneys will be able to obtain "reasonable" fees for those claims. However, attorneys' fees on all claims filed on or after July 1, 2009 are subject to this new legislation. This bill was highly contested by the claimant's attorneys' bar and organizations such as Florida Workers Advocates and The Florida Justice Association who lobbied vigorously against it. Critics of the bill argue that such a severe limit on attorneys' fees is unconstitutional since it prevents injured workers' from finding an attorney who is willing to represent him or her for nothing more than a nominal fee. However, proponents of the bill argue that attorneys' fees are, in large part, responsible for the escalation of insurance premiums and seek to reduce them so as to accommodate employers and insurance carriers. Employers state wide consider Governor Crist's decision to sign the bill a victory as it will assist them in retaining jobs and surviving our current economic crisis. There is no question that the claimant's bar is currently preparing to challenge the bill once again. However, in the meantime, Florida employers and carriers can benefit from the changes in House Bill #903. | |
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Kirwan & Spellacy is a full-service defense litigation firm serving the diverse needs of the insurance and business community throughout Florida.
Practice Areas include:
Automobile Liability/ Uninsured Motorist
Commercial Premises & General Liability
Liability Claims
Personal Injury Protection
Special Investigative Unit/Fraud
Subrogation
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Education
Kirwan & Spellacy provides state-certified continuing education and seminars on relevant topics as a courtesy to our clients.
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Locations
Fort Lauderdale 888 S.E. 3rd Avenue Suite 301 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33316 (954) 463-3008
Miami
19 West Flagler Street Suite 1100 Miami, FL 33130 (954) 463-3008
Jupiter
275 Toney Penna Drive Suite 1, Jupiter, FL 33458 (561) 615-0333
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For More Information
Contact Shawn Spellacy directly. Email or telephone 954.463.3008.
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Amex Assurance Company v. Gables Insurance Recovery, 16 Fla. L. Weekly 721a, (11th Circuit (Appellate) in and for Miami-Dade County June 15, 2009) Subject Matter: Deposition Holding: Error to require defendant's adjuster from Wisconsin to attend a deposition in Miami-Dade County where the defendant asserted affirmative defenses, but did not seek affirmative relief through counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint. Application to PIP: This case overruled a previous non-final order in Miami-Dade County where the court violated the essential requirements of law, ruling that affirmative defenses are synonymous with affirmative relief. As a result, the court relied on Fortune Ins. Co. v. Santelli, 621 So. 2d 546, 547 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1993), which states "a defendant will not be required to travel a great distance and incur substantial expenses to be deposed by the plaintiff, unless the defendant is seeking affirmative relief," and ordered any defendant to travel any distance upon asserting affirmative defenses. This case clarifies that the assertion of affirmative defenses does not constitute a voluntary application for affirmative relief. Specifically, a counterclaim, cross claim or third-party complaint is a cause of action that seeks affirmative relief, while an affirmative defense defeats the plaintiff's cause of action by a denial or confession and avoidance. This case will help prevent the Plaintiff from requiring insurance corporate representatives to travel across county lines for deposition for the mere fact that the Defendant has pled affirmative defenses in their answer to the Plaintiff's complaint.
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