Case Law Update from PA DUI Association

Commonwealth v. Toland,

-- A.2d --, 2010 WL2044876 (Pa. Super. 2010)

A Superior Court panel ruled that an individual found asleep behind the wheel of a parked car, with the lights activated and the motor running, was in actual physical control of his car and thus was guilty of DUI. In addition, the panel found that the Defendant was not entitled to credit for time spent in rehab prior to trial, where he had repeatedly requested continuances of his preliminary hearing, in an apparent attempt to negate a mandatory one-year sentence. Mr. Toland was arrested after police observed his car parked in front of a store at 12:52 a.m. Toland was in the driver's seat, with the motor running and the lights on. He was unresponsive when police knocked on his car window, and eventually his door was opened and he was shaken awake. It was obvious that he was manifestly intoxicated, and there was a six-pack of unopened beer, still cold, in the car's interior. Toland eventually agreed to submit blood for chemical analysis, and the parties stipulated that his BAC was "over .3". After bench trial on stipulated facts, he was convicted of 3802(c) and the trial court denied his request for credit for time spent in rehab.

On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that he was entitled to credit for the time he spent in "intensive inpatient alcohol treatment centers". On the sufficiency issue, he relied upon Commonwealth v. Byers, 650 A.2d 468, (Pa.Super. 1994). The panel pointed out that Byers has been questioned by our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Wolen, 685 A.2d 1384 (Pa. 1996) (plurality), and the panel also distinguished Byers on its facts. The panel explained that Byers involved a sleeping individual found in a parking lot, whereas Toland was parked on a roadway in front of a store. The panel also emphasized that the cold six-pack found in Toland's car supported an inference that he intended to continue drinking (and driving), and not simply "sleep off" whatever he had already consumed.

On the issue of credit for time in rehab, the panel drew a distinction between time spent in a restrictive facility and time spent in a facility where the patient is given some freedom to come and go. Toland attended several different facilities while awaiting trial. There was evidence that Toland actually worked at a part-time job while attending one facility, and that he did his own grocery shopping, as well. In addition to the issue of whether the treatment he received was the equivalent of "custody," the panel addressed whether Toland had been ordered to undergo rehab or had chosen to do so voluntarily. The panel agreed with the trial court that he had entered treatment voluntarily, and thus whether he could receive credit was a matter left to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. The panel agreed that allowing Toland to receive credit for the treatment would be unfair, given the number of defense continuances granted at the MDJ level in this case. Toland, who admitted to spending at least $100,00.00 of his own money in treatment costs, could not be granted credit for time spent in treatment that an otherwise-similarly-situated defendant would be unable to afford.

Here is the link: http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/S73036_09.pdf

Commonwealth v. Miller,

-- A.2d -- , 2010 WL2030449, (Pa. Super. 2010)

en banc, a 6-3 majority of Superior Court judges found that the Commonwealth need not establish that a hospital blood draw was performed for "independent medical purposes," when there is no evidence to the contrary. Miller crashed his car into a telephone pole and required hospitalization. Officers responding to the crash observed an strong odor of beverage alcohol, and a case of beer in the car. Miller was unconscious, and needed to be extricated from his car by emergency responders. Police did not request that blood be drawn pursuant to Section 1547, but rather obtained and executed a search warrant for Miller's medical records. The records contained documentation of blood alcohol testing performed upon Miller after his admission.

In moving to suppress the test results, Miller argued that he had not consented to testing, that the warrant application was overbroad, and that the Commonwealth had no probable cause to request chemical testing. A suppression hearing was held and the trial court granted the motion. The trial court reasoned that the Commonwealth had not shown whether the blood draw and subsequent test were conducted for medical purposes. The Commonwealth appealed, and a three-judge Superior Court panel affirmed in a memorandum opinion. The panel essentially held that without testimony from hospital personnel, there was no way to know whether the blood draw was for legal purposes (under Section 3755 of the Vehicle Code) or medical purposes. The Commonwealth sought reargument en banc.

The majority looked to the circumstances of this case and distinguished them from Commonwealth v. West, 834 A.2d 625 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 712, 889 A.2d 1216 (2005). In West, a blood draw took place after a patient had been officially discharged from one hospital, but before he was transferred to another. Under those circumstances, there was some question whether the draw was performed for legitimate medical purposes. Because the evidence presented in Miller did not raise any such question, the majority found that there was no need for the Commonwealth to affirmatively prove an independent medical purpose for the blood draw. The suppression order was reversed and the case remanded for trial.

Editor's Note:

This is a must-read case if you try a significant number of DUI cases. The dissent raises some interesting points about the role of the hospital in the context of Section 3755 blood draws. The dissent's main point is that the 3755 blood draw requires a showing of probable cause, whereas blood drawn for an independent medical purpose does not. The dissent would require prosecutors to specify and prove either type of draw in all cases where the hospital blood draw is challenged.

Here's the link: http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/e04002_09.pdf