Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Segida, -- A.2d --, 2009 WL 5103613 (Pa. 2009), a case of great importance to DUI prosecutors.  To quickly review, Paul Segida was arrested for DUI after running off the road on the way home from a bar.  His BAC was .32%.  He was convicted at trial of both 3802(a)(1) general impairment and 3802(c) highest rate of alcohol.  In the Superior Court Segida argued, in essence, that without specific proof of when the crash occurred he could not be convicted of either charge.  He also argued that the Commonwealth could not prevail without proving that he hadn't consumed alcohol after the crash. 

In the Superior Court, Allegheny County conceded its proof was insufficient on the 3802(c) charge irrespective of Segida's arguments.  This was because the time of the blood draw was not established at trial.  Thus, on that charge, the Superior Court agreed that the evidence was insufficient.  On the general impairment charge, the Superior Court concluded that the Commonwealth had not established when Segida was driving.  Thus, even though it was clear that Segida was incapable of driving safely when the officer arrived at the crash, the Superior Court determined that the Commonwealth had not proved that he was incapable of driving safely at the time that he was driving.  The Commonwealth petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court granted the petition.  The precise issue raised was whether 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) is an "at the time of driving" offense.

Justice McCaffery authored the majority opinion.  Essentially, Allegheny County lost the battle, but won the war.  The majority agrees with the Superior Court that 3802(a)(1) is an "at the time of driving" offense.  In reviewing the Commonwealth's evidence, however, the majority finds abundant circumstantial proof that Segida was in fact incapable of driving safely whenever it was precisely that he crashed.  The majority takes special note of Segida's "strikingly" high BAC, and recounts the trial evidence in support of the conviction (Segida admitted he was on his way home from a bar after drinking, he failed Field Sobriety Tests, he appeared intoxicated, etc.)  Moreover, the majority specifically rejects the Superior Court's intimation that the Commonwealth needed to prove that Segida did not consume alcohol after the crash.  In footnote 6, the majority states:  "The statutory text of subsection 3802(a)(1) will not support an additional element that would place the burden on the Commonwealth to prove that Appellee drank no alcohol after the accident." 

The case has been remanded for re-sentencing, on the 3802(a)(1) charge.

Editor's Note:  All participating Justices agreed with the result, although Justice Newman and Justice Eakin filed concurring opinions to voice their belief that 3802(a)(1) is not an "at the time of driving" offense. 

Well Done Allegheny County!

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CLICK HERE FOR THE LINK 

The Supreme Court granted the driver's Petition for Review in Strawn v. Pa. DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing.  In Strawn, an en banc Commonwealth Court held that license suspensions for DUI, leaving the scene of an accident, reckless driving, and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, all arising from the same incident, are to be served consecutively.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue as follows:  "Whether the Commonwealth Court erred in affirming licensee's multiple driving privilege suspensions under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1532(b), where each suspension arose from a single criminal episode."