In State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Langan, 16 N.Y.3d 349, 922 N.Y.S.2d 233 (2011), the driver of a vehicle intentionally drove into pedestrians. The decedent was seriously injured at the scene of the accident and eventually died as a result of the injuries. The administrator of the estate sought coverage under the decedent's own insurance policy, in particular, under the decedent's uninsured motorist (UM) endorsement (it was assumed that the driver's policy did not provide coverage because it was an intentional act). The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division's order holding that UM coverage applied. The Court of Appeals held that the "accident" referred to in the UM coverage must be examined from the UM insured's point of view, and not from the perspective of the tortfeasor.

In Fieldston Property Owners Ass'n v. Hermitage Ins. Co., 16 N.Y.3d 257, 920 N.Y.S.2d 763 (2011), the Court of Appeals held that if an insurance policy recites that it serves only as excess coverage when another policy provides primary coverage, the latter has the obligation to defend. Further, the obligation to defend extends to all of the claims brought against the insured by the injured party. This obligation commences as soon as it appears that any one of the claims requires the insurer to defend. The Court of Appeals' decision affirms decisions made by the Court in the past. In resolving insurance disputes between multiple policies, the Court held that the plain language of the relevant policy clauses must first be examined to make a determination in addressing disputes regarding coverage.

In Gafter v. Buffalo Medical Group, P.C., et al., 2011 WL 2279503 (4th Dept., 2011), the plaintiff commenced an action for damages related to a trip and fall caused by the height differential between two concrete slabs. The Fourth Department affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that, "Whether a particular height difference between sidewalk slabs constitutes a dangerous or defective condition depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case . . ." The Court identified various factors to be considered, including: width, depth, elevation, irregularity, appearance of the defect, time of day, place of defect, and the circumstances of the injury. The Court further indicates that there is no 'minimal dimension test' that a defect must reach to be considered actionable.

In Barone v. Phillips, 83 A.D.3d 1523, 921 N.Y.S.2d 453 (4th Dept., 2011), the plaintiff was injured entering his own home while running away from the defendants' dog as it charged at him. The Fourth Department reversed the Supreme Court's order denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It is well-established that an owner of a domestic animal who knows or should know of the animal's vicious propensities will be held liable for harm caused by the propensities. In addition, the Court held that an animal that behaves in a manner that is not necessarily considered dangerous or ferocious, but reflects an inclination to act in a manner that puts others at risk of harm, can also be found to have vicious propensities. However, this only applies when such behavior results in the injury giving rise to the action. In Barone, the Court reversed the lower decision and granted summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact regarding the dog's propensity to run after people.

Prepared by Manik J. Saini