In Page One Auto Sales, Inc. v. Brown and Brown of New York, Inc., 2011 WL 1206065 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept.), the plaintiff, an automobile dealership, commenced an action seeking damages for alleged breach by defendant, plaintiff's insurance broker of its duty to procure an insurance policy containing "false pretense coverage." False pretense coverage is intended to cover losses in the event that the plaintiff purchased automobiles with defective titles. The lower court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, denying defendant's motion for summary judgment and reinstating the plaintiff's complaint. The Appellate Division concluded that when there is a specific request for insurance, the agent has a duty to obtain the requested coverage or to inform the client of his or her inability to do so. In this case, there was evidence establishing that the insured had made a request for the missing "false pretense coverage" subsequent to the receipt of the policy. The Appellate Division held that there were triable issues of fact with respect to defendant's liability and the amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff.

In Zarnoch v. Williams, 2011 WL 1217484 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept.), the plaintiff commenced an action seeking damages for injuries he sustained when he was struck by a motorcycle operated by defendant Williams after Williams had patronized a restaurant operated by co-defendants Klosek & Varick Restaurant, Inc. Williams had parked his motorcycle upon a sidewalk adjacent to the restaurant and struck plaintiff when attempting to drive away. Co-defendants Klosek & Varick Restaurant, Inc. appealed from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The Appellate Division concluded that the lower court erred in denying Klosek & Varick Restaurant, Inc.'s post-trial motion to set aside the verdict and dismissed plaintiff's complaint against those defendants. The Appellate Division held that the lower court erred in instructing the jury with respect to the special use doctrine. The special use doctrine creates an exception to the general rule that the duty to keep public sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition lies with municipalities. The special use doctrine applies when permission has been given by a municipal authority to landowners to interfere with a street or sidewalk for private use and convenience in no way connected with the public use. A special use is typically characterized by the installation of some object on the sidewalk or street or some variance in the construction of the sidewalk. In this case, the Appellate Division held that there was no indication in the record that the sidewalk had ever been altered in any way for the exclusive benefit of the Varick defendants. Further, the record established that the Varick Restaurant did not direct co-defendant, Williams, to park on the sidewalk nor did they have the authority to direct him in such a manner.

In the case of Kirby v. Suburban Electrical Engineers Contractors, Inc., 2011 WL 1218338 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept.), , the evidence submitted by plaintiffs in support of their motion for leave to renew established that a private investigator for the plaintiffs met with and obtained a favorable statement from an employee of defendant, Daniel Scharrett, before defendant moved for summary judgment. The Appellate Division held that the plaintiffs failed to present new evidence warranting leave to renew. The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that their purported new evidence was not in existence at the time of defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' argument for leave to renew was based on the contention that they needed time to locate Scharrett and transfer the information contained within his earlier statement to an affidavit or deposition responsive to the defendant's motion. Therefore, plaintiffs' leave to renew was denied.

In the case of Carthon v. Buffalo General Hospital, 2011 WL 1219255 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept.), plaintiff, Administratrix of the estate of her husband (decedent), commenced an action seeking damages for his wrongful death. The decedent was a resident of a nursing home owned and operated by defendant. The decedent died while eating dinner at the facility. The decedent had suffered from several ailments which left him unable to speak and left him with difficulty swallowing food. The care plan in effect for the decedent at the time of his death called for him to be supervised while eating. The plaintiff alleged that the decedent died as a result of choking on food. Defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that the causes of action sounded in medical malpractice instead of ordinary negligence and the defendant established that the care provided to the decedent did not deviate from the accepted standard of medical care. The Supreme Court denied defendant's motion. The Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims resounding in ordinary negligence as much as they were based on allegations that defendant's employees failed to carry out the directions of the physicians responsible for the decedent's care plan. However, the Appellate Division held that defendant met its burden on the motion with respect to those claims of medical malpractice by submitting the affidavit of their expert physician, who indicated that the defendant did not deviate from the accepted standard of medical care in the treatment and assessment of the decedent.

In the case of Christine Kolodziejczak as PNG of Claire Kolodziejczak v. Raymond Kolodziejczak, 2011 WL 1218136 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept.), the plaintiff commenced an action individually and on behalf of her daughter seeking damages for injuries sustained by her daughter when two of her fingers were severed by a log splitter. The plaintiff asserted causes of action for negligent supervision and negligent entrustment against her child's grandfather and the owner of the property where the accident occurred, Raymond Kolodziejczak and Ray Kolo Excavating, Inc. as well as the child's father, Scott Kolodziejczak. The grandfather permitted the father of the children (defendant, Scott Kolodziejczak) to operate the log splitter on the grandfather's property. The grandfather was not present when the accident occurred. The grandfather moved for summary judgment and the lower court denied the motion. The Appellate Division concluded that the trial court erred in denying the part of the grandfather's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the negligent supervision cause of action because the grandfather did not supervise or control plaintiff's daughter at any relevant time.