Black v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc. (3rd Dept., 2011) involved a trip and fall accident at the defendant's department store. The plaintiff claimed that she had tripped over a purse on the floor. There is no allegation that the store, or any store employees, had actual notice that the purse was on the floor. Furthermore, a store employee testified that she had inspected the area in question approximately 30 minutes before the incident and that there were no purses on the ground at that time. The plaintiff had no evidence as to when or how the purse came to be on the ground. Nevertheless, the Third Department found a question of fact as to whether there was constructive notice and reversed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the defendant store.

D'Auria v. Kent (3rd Dept., 2011) involved an appeal of an order granting summary judgment based on the "serious injury" threshold in New York State motor vehicle accidents. The plaintiff there alleged injuries to her back and to her elbow. Although it seemed that the plaintiff's primary problems were related to her back, as opposed to the elbow, claims were made for both body parts. The defendant's examining physician thoroughly explained that the back symptoms were unrelated to the motor vehicle accident. As to the elbow, however, the examining physician merely opined in a single paragraph that the elbow complaints were "a subjective complaint and there are no objective findings to support the same." There was, however, a positive MRI study of the plaintiff's elbow which the Court deemed sufficient to raise a question of fact and reinstate the plaintiff's complaint against the defendant. Although the plaintiff's primary complaint was her back, the examining physician did not thoroughly address all claimed injuries and, thus, the plaintiff's claim survived.

In Vichot v. Day (3rd Dept., 2010), the defendant's horse escaped from its stall and made its way onto a roadway where it was struck by the plaintiff's motor vehicle. The plaintiff was injured and brought suit against the owner of the horse. The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that he did not have reason to know of his horse having a propensity to escape its stall and cause a danger to the public. The trial court denied the motion but, on appeal, the Third Department held that the horse would be held to a standard similar to that applied to a dog in a dog bite case. The Court concluded that the lack of notice of a propensity for dangerous behavior was sufficient to support summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

San Marco v. Village of Mount Kisco (Court of Appeals, 2010) involved a slip and fall accident on municipal property. The defendant village had a prior written notice statute which included a reference to snow/ice conditions. The defendant moved for summary judgment relying on the statute and the trial court denied that motion. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court however, granting summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the original denial of the motion as well as the plaintiff's complaint. The Court of Appeals held that, "A prior written notice statute does not protect a municipality from liability if it can be proven that the locality created the defect or hazard through an affirmative act of negligence." Such cases had previously been subject to an "immediacy test", meaning that the municipality's actions had to immediately result in the creation of a dangerous condition. The Village of Mount Kisco had simply plowed and salted its parking lot on a Friday but had not gone back to plow or salt it again over the weekend. In the meantime, ice apparently formed on the parking lot and the plaintiff slipped and fell. Although it was undisputed that there was no prior written notice of the icy condition and that the icy condition did not form immediately upon the actions of the village, the Court of Appeals reinstated the complaint against the municipality.

In Anand v. Kapoor (Court of Appeals, 2010), the plaintiff was injured while playing golf. He was struck in the eye when a member of his party errantly hit the ball in his direction. Although the defendant admitted that he swung while the plaintiff was generally in front of him, and he did not give any warning, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment, holding that the case was subject to dismissal pursuant to the "primary assumption of risk" doctrine. The Court of Appeals found that the incident was among the risks inherent to the game of golf.