In Chacon-Chavez v. City of Rochester (4th Dept., April 30, 2010), the plaintiff sued for injuries sustained when the ladder upon which he was standing slipped, causing him to fall. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed the Trial Court's award of summary judgment to the plaintiff with respect to his Labor Law §240(1) cause of action. In response to the plaintiff's motion, the defendant failed to establish that the ladder on which the plaintiff was working was inadequately secured and, therefore, the plaintiff's conduct could not have been the sole proximate cause of his injuries due to the plaintiff's failure to secure the ladder.

In Edwards v. Saint Elizabeth Medical Center (4th Dept., April 30, 2010), the plaintiff commenced an action seeking damages for injuries sustained when she tripped and fell over a metal trashcan while at the hospital owned by the defendant. The defendant moved for summary judgment and the plaintiff opposed the motion with the submission of an affidavit of an expert safety engineer. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed the Trial Court's denial of summary judgment to the defendant, contrary to the defendant's contentions that the expert's affidavit was submitted without foundation, was speculative and/or was lacking probative value. In his affidavit, the plaintiff's expert relied upon his review of the complete record, as well as his experience in training of biomechanics and human factor analysis. The expert also cited to scientific literature concerning "trip points" and perception, and he discussed the necessary "visual cues" required for an individual to avoid obstacles in his or her path.

In Farnham v. Meder (4th Dept., April 30, 2010), the plaintiff commenced a lawsuit seeking damages for injuries sustained when he was knocked down by the defendant's bull while chasing the bull from the plaintiff's property. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's proof at trial, the Trial Court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant stating that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the bull had a vicious propensity. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, in affirming the Trial Court's granting the defendant's motion stated that a bull is a domesticated animal as defined by New York Law. Therefore, the owner must have notice of the animal's vicious propensities to be held liable for the harm caused by the animal. Although it was undisputed that the defendant knew his bull had a propensity to break free of its enclosure and wander on to the plaintiff's property, the plaintiff failed to establish that the bull had "a proclivity to act in the way that puts others at risk of harm" or that the defendant knew of such a proclivity.

In Gross v. Hertz Local Addition Corp., et al. (4th Dept., April 30, 2010), the plaintiff brought suit seeking damages for the wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering of her husband (decedent) who died as a result of a head injury he sustained in the parking lot of an automobile ownership. On the date of the accident, the decedent brought his leased vehicle to the auto dealership for repairs and arranged to rent a vehicle from the defendant, Hertz. Hertz used office space in the automobile dealership service area and parked its rental vehicles in the parking lot. The decedent slipped and fell on a patch of ice as he walked across the parking lot in the direction of his rental vehicle. Hertz brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence based on the allegedly hazardous condition of the parking lot. Hertz met its initial burden by submitting evidence that it did not own, occupy, or have a right to control or maintain the area of the parking lot where the decedent fell. In response, neither the plaintiff nor the automobile dealership raised a triable issue fact sufficient to defeat the motion and the Trial Court properly granted summary judgment to Hertz in this regard.

In Calderon v. Walgreen Company (4th Dept., April 30, 2010), the plaintiff was injured when the scaffold he was dismantling tipped backward, causing him to fall to the ground. The Trial Court granted the plaintiff's motion seeking partial summary judgment with respect to his Labor Law §240(1) claim and the Appellate Division, Fourth Department affirmed. The plaintiff had met his initial burden establishing that the statute was violated and that the violation proximately caused his injuries. Although the defendant argued that the plaintiff was negligent in moving materials to the back of the scaffold, thereby causing the scaffold to become unbalanced, the Fourth Department concluded that his actions merely rendered him contributorily negligent and were not the sole proximate cause of the incident. As such, the Trial Court properly granted the plaintiff partial summary judgment.

In Catanzaro v. Town of Lewiston (4th Dept., May 7, 2010), the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident when his vehicle collided with a snow plow operated by the Town of Lewiston. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department upheld the Trial Court's granting of the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. In support of its motion, the defendant submitted testimony of the snow plow driver and his "wingman" who each testified that the snow plow was stopped at an intersection and that the plaintiff's vehicle slid out of control toward the intersection. In response, the plaintiff offered his own testimony that the snow plow was traveling too fast for the conditions and that its back wheels locked, causing it to slide into the intersection. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department held that the defendant met its initial burden in establishing that the snow plow truck was engaged in work on a highway and that it did not act with "reckless disregard for the safety of others", which is the applicable standard under the circumstances pursuant the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The plaintiff failed to raise a triable question of fact with respect to the issue of reckless disregard in response. As such, the Trial Court properly granted the defendant's motion.

Prepared by Michael M. Chelus