In Blanchard v. Lifegear, Inc and BJs Wholesale Club, Inc. (4th Dept., 2007), the trial court denied the defendants' motion to set aside the jury verdict. Furthermore, the trial court did grant the plaintiff's post-trial motion to increase the award of damages for future pain and suffering from $1,000,000.00 to $2,000,000.00. The medical and vocational rehabilitation experts hired by the defendants were not allowed to testify as to their opinion that the plaintiff had not sustained a permanent injury. This preclusion was as a result of an allegedly untimely disclosure on behalf of the defendants. The trial court also, sua sponte, directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, at the commencement of the trial, on the issue of causation. This occurred despite the fact that the defendants had evidence concerning the plaintiff's pre-existing injuries and treatment, including what was termed "a major permanent injury to her lumbar spine" in a 1992 motor vehicle accident. Finally, the trial court also allowed the plaintiff to play a videotape of a disc replacement surgical procedure despite the fact that there was no evidence that disc replacement surgery was contemplated for the plaintiff in the future. On the basis of these several errors on the part of the trial court, the Fourth Department Appellate Division ordered that the judgment be reversed, the verdict set aside, and that a new trial be granted, this time in front of a new judge.

In Willard v. Thomas Simone & Son Builders, Inc. (4th Dept., 2007), the plaintiff, a roofer who was nailing plywood onto the roof of a house, was using a forklift as a substitute for scaffolding. This was accomplished by laying plywood over the forks and raising the forks the necessary 16-18 feet in the air so that the plaintiff could reach the roof of the house. At one point, while at full elevation, and with no one to operate the forklift, the plaintiff decided to use a second floor portable bathroom, which necessitated him crawling into a window from the roof and walking across one of the headers. The plaintiff attempted to return to the roof in the reverse manner, but fell and was injured. The Fourth Department affirmed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff's actions were not the sole proximate cause of the injury. Additionally, the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, pursuant to New York Labor Law §240(1), was granted by the trial court and affirmed on appeal.

In Wood v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (4th Dept., 2007), a declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff seeking coverage was sued as a third party defendant in an underlying personal injury action. The primary underlying claim was brought against a property owner by an injured worker. The property owner impleaded the DJA plaintiff. The DJA plaintiff commenced a declaratory action against the defendant, Nationwide, after Nationwide had disclaimed coverage. Nationwide disclaimed coverage based upon a policy exclusion barring coverage for injuries sustained by an employee of the plaintiff. However, in this case, Nationwide sent a reservation of rights letter to the plaintiff in October of 1995, but did not actually disclaim coverage until approximately 19 months later in May of 1997. Nationwide contended that it was awaiting a decision from the Workers' Compensation Board as to whether the injured party was an employee of the plaintiff. The Fourth Department agreed with the trial court's decision that this was not an adequate justification for the untimeliness of the eventual disclaimer. As a result, Nationwide was ordered to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in the underlying action.

In Tomasello v. 64 Franklin, Inc. (4th Dept., 2007), the defendant, a night club, was sued for personal injury as a result of the plaintiff's slip and fall on the defendant's premises. The incident was apparently captured on surveillance video, but the defendant lost the actual videotape. In order to sanction the defendant for the spoliation of this evidence, the trial court determined the issues of notice and negligence in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant and dismissed the defendant's affirmative defense alleging culpable conduct on the part of the plaintiff. The Fourth Department reversed the trial court's determination in this regard, ruling that the sanction was too harsh. The Fourth Department also ruled that an adverse inference charge would be more appropriate a sanction.

In Corbett v. Adelphia (4th Dept., 2007), the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant when she slipped and fell in the doorway to the defendant's premises that she alleges was defectively constructed. The defendants moved for summary judgment submitting evidence that the entrance way was not defective and that it was in compliance with the applicable codes and regulations. The Appellate Division held that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact with her experts' affidavits because the experts failed to connect the supposed defect to the causation of the slip and fall. Furthermore, the Court held that the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact regarding whether the alleged defect was not "too trivial to be actionable".

In Miller v. Spall Development Corp. (4th Dept., 2007), the plaintiff commenced an action under Labor Law §240(1) after he allegedly fell off of a 4-foot A-frame ladder. However, the plaintiff had no actual recollection of working atop such a ladder. As a result, the Fourth Department reversed the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment. It was the Fourth Department's contention that the plaintiff failed to establish his entitlement to judgment on liability as a matter of law when he could not demonstrate that "the statute was violated and that the violation proximately caused his injury".

In Farnham v. Meder (4th Dept., 2007), the plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against his neighbors. The defendants' bull struck and injured him after the plaintiff had attempted to chase the bull off of his property. The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a ruling that the plaintiff's actions constituted primary assumption of risk, a doctrine normally applicable to voluntary participation in sporting events or other normally hazardous activities. The trial court ruled that, since the plaintiff had chased the bull off of his property on prior occasions, and since the bull had never demonstrated this type of behavior in the past, the activity engaged in by the plaintiff was not so patently hazardous so as to fall within the scope of the primary assumption of risk doctrine. The Fourth Department affirmed the trial court's ruling in this regard.

Controversy and confusion has been created by the variance in language between New York Insurance Law §3240(f)(1), which creates mandatory uninsured motorist protection, and §3240(f) (2), which creates supplementary underinsured/uninsured motorist protection. The difference between the two statutes was the explicit requirement under Section 3240(f)(1) of a "serious injury", as defined by Section 5102(d), in order to collect non-economic loss. Within section 3240(f)(2), the "serious injury" threshold is not referenced. Previously, the lower courts had ruled that, given this difference, SUM claims did not have to demonstrate "serious injury".

In Raffellini v. State Farm (2007), the New York Court of Appeals ended this dichotomy by ruling that claimants seeking recovery for injuries under their supplementary underinsured/uninsured motorist protection endorsement must demonstrate that the injury is "serious", as set forth in New York Insurance Law § 5102 (d) in order to collect non-economic loss. This decision was based upon the Court's analysis of the legislative history, as well the regulations set forth by the Superintendent of Insurance.