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INTERIOR WINDOW CLEANING IS ENCOMPASSED WITHIN LABOR LAW.
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The plaintiff, a window cleaner in Broggy v.
Rockefeller Group, Inc. (Court of Appeals, 2007),
was injured when he fell off a desk he was using to
clean windows. He sued the building owner,
managers, lessors and lessees of the building under
Labor Law §§200, 202, 240 and 241 (6). The Court of
Appeals noted that though window cleaning is
encompassed in the labor law sections relied upon by
the plaintiff, he did not meet his burden of showing
that an elevated risk existed or that defendants did not
provide safety devices.
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PLAINTIFF MUST DEMONSTRATE A VIOLATION OF A REGULATORY REQUIREMENT TO PREVAIL ON A LABOR LAW §241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION.
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In Morris v. Pavarini Construction (Court of
Appeals, 2007), the plaintiff was working on the
construction of a new building when a concrete form
fell on him. He sued the construction manager and
the owner under Labor Law §241(6). The Court of
Appeals held that in order for the plaintiff to recover
against the defendants under §241(6), he had to
show a violation of a specific regulatory requirement.
The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division
was premature in affirming the motion of the
defendant for summary judgment. The Court of
Appeals remanded the matter to special term for a
hearing to determine whether the procedures and
instrumentalities used at the jobsite fell within the
definitions of mandates found within the regulations.
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THE MOVIE THEATER SHOULD ALWAYS BE KEPT CLEAN!
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In Cooper v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., CA 06-
03262 (4th Dept. 2007), the plaintiff stepped on a nail
at a movie theater and alleged in his complaint that
the defendant owner failed to remove debris from the
theater. The plaintiff introduced circumstantial
evidence that there was no maintenance or cleaning
done at the theater. When the defendant's employees
were deposed, they had no knowledge of cleaning the
theater that day and provided no testimony evincing
that maintence was performed. The Appellate
Division affirmed denial of defendant's summary
judgment motion because the defendant failed to
meet its burden of establishing it did not create the
dangerous condition. The defendant did not establish
that it lacked actual or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition and the defendant failed to prove
that the nail had not been on the floor for a sufficient
length of time to permit an employee to find and
remedy the condition.
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JUST WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT PESKY BLACK ICE ON ROADWAYS?
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In Hart v. State of New York, (3rd Dept., August
2, 2007), the claimants were involved in a motor
vehicle accident due to black ice on the roadway near
an area where rocks were cut out of a rock formation.
The trial court acknowledged that the supervisor
received notice of icy conditions, including knowledge
of a prior automobile accident due to the icy
conditions. However, notice was given only 15
minutes prior to the claimants accident and there was
inadequate time to remedy the condition.
Furthermore, an inspection conducted a few hours
earlier deemed that the roadway was not icy.
Claimants appealed the trial court determination in
favor of the State. The Appellate Division affirmed,
holding that icy road conditions and the occurrence of
an accident do not establish liability, unless it is also
shown that the State failed to diligently remedy the
dangerous conditions once it was provided with actual
or constructive notice.
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IS THE MUNICIPALITY OR THE NEARBY LAND OWNER RESPONSIBLE FOR A "DANGEROUS" POTHOLE IN A RIGHT-OF-WAY?
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In Moons v. Wade Lupe Construction Company,
Inc., (3rd Dept., August 2, 2007), the plaintiff, was
injured when she twisted her ankle in a pothole
allegedly on the defendant's driveway/parking lot. The
jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant and
plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed,
holding that the pothole was located within the Town's
right-of-way. The Court held that owners of land
abutting public property are not liable for keeping that
public property in a safe condition merely by reason of
the proximity of their property. This, even though the
area of the defect may be used to gain access to the
abutting owner's property. Thus, liability for the
pothole in the right-of-way could only be imposed on
the defendant if it was shown that said defendant
created the pothole or that a statute or ordinance
charged the defendant with maintenance of the right-
of-way.
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UNDER INSURANCE LAW §5102(D), THE DEFENDANT MUST PROVIDE QUANITATIVE LIMITATIONS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE PLAINTIFF LACKED A "SERIOUS INJURY" AND DID NOT MEET THE REQUIRED THRESHOLD.
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In Jenkins v. Miled Hacking Corp., (2nd Dept.,
2007),
the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and
claimed she had sustained a serious injury within the
meaning of Insurance Law §5102(d). The defendant
moved for summary judgment and the trial court
denied the motion. The Appellate Division held that
the defendant failed to meet its burden in that the
physicians' reports and evidence submitted by the
defendant failed to adequately quantify the injuries so
as to establish the absence of a significant limitation
of motion that could be permanent in nature.
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"SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" FOUND BETWEEN ASSAULT VICTIM AND POLICE DEPARTMENT.
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In Taino v. City of Yonkers, (2nd Dept., 2007),
the plaintiff in this wrongful death action received a jury
verdict over a million dollars against the City of
Yonkers and City of Yonkers Police Department. The
Appellate Division noted that a municipality may not be
held liable for the failure to provide police protection
because the duty to provide such protection is owed to
the public at large rather than to any particular
individual, absent a special relationship However, the
Appellate Division held that the jury verdict should not
be set aside based upon the proof presented. The
decedent had a special relationship with defendants
in that he justifiably relied upon the police
department's representations that a patrol car was in
route to protect him from his assailant.
Prepared by Carla J. Miller Montroy
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