In Castillo v. 711 Group, Inc. ___ A.D.3d ___, ___ N.Y.S.2d ___ (2nd Dept.) the Court held that the loss of the tip of the index finger and the second joint of the index finger does qualify as a loss of a finger under the Worker's Compensation Law §11 definition, thereby allowing the impleader of the plaintiff's employer.

Previously, failure to include a specific sum in the demand clause of the claim was held not to be fatal; the simple omission could be corrected by an amendment and the action preserved. However, in Kolnacki v. State, 8 N.Y.3d 277 the Court of Appeals extinguished any such notion insisting that a specific sum be stated and dismissing the case for failing to do so.

According to the Appellate Division, Second Department in Cunha v. Shapiro, ___ N.Y.S.2d ___ (2nd Dept.), a high/low agreement to be applied to a jury verdict is considered a settlement. Thereafter, once the settlement papers are tendered the "prompt tender" provision of CPLR 5003-a is triggered.

The Second Department Appellate Term in Paez v. Varveris, 12 Misc.3d 101, 820 N.Y.S.2d 390 held that when an insurer agrees to settlement and does not pay it, the plaintiff cannot enter a judgment against the insurer directly. The court stated that the proper procedure is to file the judgment against the defendant, and let the defendant seek recovery against the insurer. (Of course, if a judgment duly entered against a defendant is not paid, a direct action by the plaintiff against the insurer does become permissible.)

In Rivera v. Santos, 35 A.D.3d 700, 827 A.D.2d 222, the Second Department ruled that a landscaper removing a tree in preparation for a home construction was not covered under Labor Law §240(1). The court reasoned the removal work was a separate phase easily distinguishable from other parts of the larger construction project.

In Bax v. Allstate Healthcare, Inc., 26 A.D.3d 861, 809 N.Y.S.2d 378 (4th Dept.) the Fourth Department upheld Justice Boniello's denial of a §240 claim where plaintiff slipped and fell on a snow covered roof while closing a smoke hatch that had opened during a false fire alarm. The court determined that the plaintiff was engaged in "routine maintenance" rather than "repair", which the statute encompasses.

In Collins v. Shager, 26 A.D.3d 784, 809 N.Y.S.2d 716 (4th Dept.) the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under §240 (1) when he slipped off of the defendant's barn roof. The Fourth Department reversed holding that a rope provided to the worker was not an adequate safety device within the meaning of the scaffold law. Thus the property owners were strictly liable under §240(1) for the injuries the plaintiff sustained.

The Court of Appeals has ruled that regardless of ownership, where a stairwell or approach is primarily used as a source of ingress and egress to its transportation facility, a common carrier has a duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the stairwell or approach. (Bingham v. New York City Transit Authority, 8 N.Y.3d 176.