RECENT HEADLINES
We are pleased to announce that Thomas J. Speyer has
accepted a position as adjunct professor at the
University of Buffalo School of Law. Mr. Speyer will
be teaching a course on trial techniques set for the
Fall 2006 semester.
On April 26, 2006, at the Holiday
Inn in Amherst, New York, Arthur A. Herdzik,
presented a New York
State Bar Association continuing legal education
seminar : “Ethics and Civility in Litigation:
Introductory Lessons for
21st Century Litigators.”
Mr. Herdzik focused on issues of ethics and civility.
He also participated in a panel discussion on ethics
and civility with other program faculty which included
State Supreme Court Judge John M. Curran and David
L. Edmonds, Jr., Chief Counsel, Attorney Grievance
Committee for the Fourth Judicial Department.
If you
are interested in obtaining a copy of the course
material prepared by Mr. Herdzik entitled "Can an
Aggressive Litigator be Civil," please contact us and
we will make arrangements to forward the material
to you.
Quick Links...
|
|
|
|
LABOR LAW UPDATE
|
|
The New York Court of Appeals provided greater
clarity to the concept of proximate cause in
Robinson
v. East Medical Center, LP et.al., (April 4,
2006). In
this case, the plaintiff fell when he was attempting
to install rods from the top of a six-foot ladder he
knew to be too short to adequately reach the proper
height. He also knew that the work site had taller
ladders available to him, although they were in use
elsewhere at the time. The Court ruled that, “(p)
laintiff’s own negligent actions – choosing to use a
six-foot ladder that he knew was too short for the
work to be accomplished and then standing on the
ladder’s cap in order to reach the work – were, as a
matter of law, the sole proximate cause of his
injuries.” The Court was not persuaded by the fact
that the plaintiff had specifically requested an eight-
foot ladder from his supervisor immediately before the
accident. Additionally, he could have waited for one
to become available before beginning the task, or he
could have performed a different task altogether.
In Freeman v. Ryan ,et.al. (4th Dept., March
17,
2006) the Fourth Department granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff under New
York Labor Law § 240(1), despite the fact that the
defendants owned the home where the plaintiff was
allegedly injured. The Court denied the defendants
the protection of the statute’s homeowner exemption
because the defendants had not lived in the
residence for the previous seven years, instead
utilizing it as rental property. Furthermore, the
house was unoccupied at the time of the injury, due
to a fire that necessitated the work being performed.
|
|
MUNICIPAL LAW UPDATE
|
|
In Baptiste v. New York City Transit
Authority, (1st
Dept., April 27, 2006), the plaintiff was a passenger
on a New York City bus that became stuck during a
particularly hard snowfall. As a result, the
passengers were instructed to exit the bus and await
a second bus that was redirected to pick them up.
After the passengers waited about twenty minutes, a
second bus arrived. While walking a short distance
to the second bus, the plaintiff was injured when she
slipped and fell on snow and ice. The plaintiff sued
the Transit Authority, alleging that its failure to equip
the bus with snow chains was the proximate cause
of her injuries. The Court disagreed, ruling that, “(i)n
this case, the claimed negligence, i.e., failing to
equip the bus with snow tires or chains, would have
merely furnished the condition or occasion for the
bus to become stranded; it was not the cause of
plaintiff's subsequent slip and fall.” As a result, the
Appellate Division overturned a jury verdict of
$450,000.00 and entered judgment in favor of the
defendants.
|
|
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY UPDATE
|
|
In Sanley v. Nowak, (4th Dept., April 28,
2006), the
Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order of
partial summary judgment against the defendants as
to the negligence of the defendant operator. The
trial court had granted the plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgment based upon the fact that
the defendants' vehicle had skidded out of control,
across the center line and into the path of the
oncoming plaintiff, hence causing the accident. The
Court found that, “such conduct is only prima facie
evidence of negligence ...; it does not mandate a
finding of negligence. Such evidence, together with
the explanation given by (defendant), presents
factual questions for determination by the jury.”
While the Appellate Division agreed with the trial
court’s ruling that the emergency doctrine defense
was not available to the defendants, it nevertheless
ruled that the defendants were entitled to argue that
their conduct was “reasonable under the
circumstances.”
Michael J. Chmiel
|
|
|