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January, 2010 Volume 3, Issue 1 |
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The Impact of Arizona v. Gant:
Limiting the Scope of Automobile Searches? | |
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Coming Events
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Train the Trainer
Jan 25-28, 2010 Charlotte, NC
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A.R.I.D.E.Training
KHP Academy
Feb 17-18,2010
Salina, KS
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Lifesavers Annual Conference
April 11-13, 2010
Philadelphia, PA
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April 18-22, 2010
Dallas, TX
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DUI Boot Camp
KHP Academy
May 25-26, 2010
Salina, KS
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DUI Boot Camp
NAPC Summer Conference
July 7-10, 2010
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NDAA Summer Conference
July 11-14, 2010
Napa, CA
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IACP Impaired Driving Conference
July 22 - 24, 2010
Pittsburg, PA
Drunk Driving Over the Limit Under Arrest National Crackdown
Aug 19-Sept 6, 2010
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 By Mark M. Neil
Senior Attorney,
National Traffic
Law Center
The scope of a police officer's search of an automobile incident to the arrest of an occupant has been somewhat limited by a recent U. S. Supreme Court decision. The Court held in Arizona v. Gant[i], that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the facts of this case and held that a vehicle search is not authorized incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle.
While investigating Gant for alleged drug activity, Tucson police officers learned that Gant's driver's license had been suspended and that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest for driving with a suspended license. Officers observed Gant drive by, park and then get out of his automobile and shut the door. While about 30 feet apart, one officer called to Gant and they approached each other meeting 10 to 12 feet from Gant's car. Gant was then arrested and handcuffed.
Incident to his arrest, the officers then searched Gant's car, one finding a gun and the other a bag of cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the backseat.
Because Gant was handcuffed and could not access the interior of the car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search, the Court found that the search incident to arrest exception did not justify the search in this case.
A divided Court (4-1-4) held (Stevens, J.) generally that a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest is not authorized after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the passenger compartment of the vehicle. This is seemingly contrary to prior opinions in Thornton v. United States[ii] and New York v. Belton[iii]. Applying the safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel v. United States[iv] to limit Belton, much of what has been taught to and practiced by law enforcement officers regarding search incident to arrest is no longer valid. Gone is the more open and generous license to law enforcement officers in their ability to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle or any containers therein simply because they have arrested an occupant or recent occupant of the vehicle.
Yet, the opinion notes that Gant is consistent with the holding in Thornton and follows the suggestion of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion therein.[v] Thornton had expanded Belton to allow for searches of the passenger compartment of a vehicle that is contemporaneous incident of arrest even when the officer did not make contact until that person had left the vehicle. The rationale of allowing a search of the entire passenger compartment, regardless of the manner of contact of the arrestee, was in the search for a clear rule. Still, it is one based on ensuring officer safety and preserving evidence. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Thornton argued that if Belton searches were justifiable, it was because of the safety and evidentiary issues, not simply because the vehicle might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which he was arrested.
While at the same time limiting an officer's ability to search the vehicle incident to arrest based upon proximity and access for the purposes of officer safety and evidentiary safekeeping, the Court also indicated that there may be circumstances unique to the automobile context to justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.
The Court stated that not only is an officer permitted to "conduct a vehicle search when an arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle" but also if "it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense or warrant." (emphasis added) This allows for searches incident to arrest where the vehicle is outside of the arrestee's reach based upon reasonable belief rather than probable cause. Assuming that the defendant had been stopped and subsequently arrested for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI), the officer would be justified in searching for evidence of the consumption of alcohol if he or she had a "reasonable" belief such evidence might be found. A search might also be permitted in the case of arresting the occupant of vehicle on an outstanding warrant so long as the officer had reasonable belief that evidence of the crime charged in the warrant might be found in the vehicle.
[i] 556 U.S. ___ , No. 07-542 (2009).
[ii] 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
[iii] 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
[iv] 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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Impact of Arizona v Gant (cont.) 
Exceptions that Apply
Going on, the Court lists certain exceptions that still apply and are available to officers.
1. Frisk for Weapons. Permitting officers to search a vehicle's passenger compartment when there is reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is dangerous and might access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons.[1] This flows from the rationale for frisking a suspect for weapons.[2]
2. Probable Cause of Evidence of Crime. Where there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.[3] Of particular interest is the mention that this allows for searches for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest, and the scope of the search authorized is broader. This exception does not rely upon an arrest for justification.
3. Protective Sweep. Where safety or evidentiary interests would justify a search, such as a limited protective sweep of those areas in which an officer reasonably suspects a dangerous person may be hiding.[4] From a vehicle perspective, this exception may be applicable when dealing with larger vehicles such as multi-passenger vans, recreational vehicles, motor homes, buses and the like.
Although not mentioned in the opinion, other exceptions should also still apply.
4. Consent. The easiest of all exceptions to the search warrant requirement is the one of consent. When the defendant makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights, the officer may search without a warrant.[5] This consent, however, may be limited in scope.[6]
5. Inventory. So long as the officer's department has a written policy providing for it, the officer may inventory the contents of a vehicle prior to it being impounded and towed for the purpose of safekeeping and avoiding claims of loss.[7]
6. Plain View. In situations where the officer is in a position in which he is lawfully entitled to be, anything plainly visible to him or her as being evidential or contraband falls under this well-established exception.[8]
7. Abandonment. If the vehicle has been abandoned, then the privacy interests normally protected by the 4th Amendment have also been abandoned and the officer is free to search the vehicle.[9]
8. Sobriety Checkpoints. Police may still conduct appropriate sobriety checkpoints to detect impaired drivers but not for general criminal activity.[10]
9. Exigent Circumstances. There may be circumstances that arise to the level permitting a search under this exception, but caution should always be used in relying upon it. Only in the direst of circumstances such as hot pursuit, imminent destruction of evidence or danger to a third person might this be applicable.[11]
Some activities do not arise to the level of a search and officers should not worry about this case having changed how they should do things. For example, dog sniffs of vehicles during an otherwise lawful stop are not affected. The dog sniff itself is not a search and as long as it is done during the pendency of a lawful stop and not beyond, there is no issue.[12]
It would also be appropriate to note that quite often vehicles are part of a crime scene, such as in vehicular homicide or DUI with Death cases. Care should be taken to remember that there is no crime scene exception for search warrants.[13] Reliance purely upon the motor vehicle exception may not be workable when the vehicle is no longer mobile because of the crash. Some evidence within the vehicle, such as crash data recorders or some physical evidence might be subject to the exigent circumstances exception if the officer has a reasonable belief that the evidence may otherwise be lost. Officers are allowed to secure a crime scene pending the issuance of a search warrant.[14]
In short, the holding in Arizona v. Gant is not an overly burdensome one on law enforcement. While it certainly limits the prior practices of officers conducting wide-ranging searches incident to an arrest of an occupant of a motor vehicle, it does still permit those searches under more defined circumstances. Perhaps the most important thing to come out of this case is the need for officers to articulate, and prosecutors to elicit, with great care and detail the basis for the search.
[1] Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
[2] Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
[3] United States v Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
[4] Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
[5] Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218 (1973).
[6] Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
[7] South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
[8] Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
[9] California v. Greenwald, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
[10] Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 469 U.S. 444 (1990), Indianapolis v. Edmund, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
[11] Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
[12] Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
[13] Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999).
[14] Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U. S. 17 (1984). |
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Case Updates
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REASONABLE SUSPICION
PBT
Under 21-admitted to drinking
Christensen v. KDOR 2009 WL 4035522 (11/20/09)
***UNPUBLISHED***
Officer stopped vehicle for a broken tail light. Upon approach the officer observed the following: bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, difficulty communicating and admitted to five or six beers. The officer also determined the driver was under 21. A PBT was administered and registered 0.11. After the PBT field sobriety tests were given. The hearing officer suspended the license. The defendant sought review of the district court which affirmed and it was appealed stating the officer did not have reasonable grounds to request testing. The state argued because the defendant was under the age of 21 the officer only had to have reasonable grounds the defendant had operated or attempted to operate a vehicle for the implied consent to even apply. The officer need not show he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The appellate court noted based on the observations of the officer (not taking into account the SFSTs) there was substantial competent evidence to support the findings. Affirmed.
IMPLIED CONSENT
Effects on CDL-officer misstatement of law
Cuthbertson v. KDOR --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 4421263 (12/04/09)
Defendant was not driving a commercial vehicle however he held a commercial license. Pursuant to statute the officer had no duty to read the penalties for CDL licenses because the defendant was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of the DUI arrest. While being read the implied consent the defendant asked the officer how this DUI would affect his CDL. The officer misstated the law by claiming "It's going to affect your license the same way" The defendant's results were 0.105. The defendant's license was suspended for one year however his CDL was suspended for life. He appeals. Was the defendant's due process rights violated? It was clear the defendant was given and read the correct forms provided by statute. The court has previously held the officer is NOT required to provide notice to the defendant for CDL license when he is not operating a commercial vehicle. However, if the officer decides to provide other information he must provide correct statements of law. It was noted the punishment for either a refusal or failure of the test would affect his CDL in the same way. The appellate court noted there was no prejudice to the defendant because no substantive right was violated. A harmless error argument. The only way the defendant could avoid a lifetime disqualification from driving a commercial vehicle was to take the test and post a BAC of less than 0.08. Since his BAC was over 0.08 it was no fault but his not the officers. Affirmed.
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
Left of center-absolute liability offense
State v. Chavez-Zbarra --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 4723332 (12/11/09)
Officer saw the defendant traveling northbound on a two-laned road cross the center line traveling southbound and then return to the northbound lane. An investigation took place in which the defendant was arrested for DUI. The defense challenged the stop based on State v. Marx and State v. Ross in which K.S.A. 8-1522, failing to maintain a single lane was deemed not enough to stop a vehicle. The district court suppressed all evidence and the state appeals. The appellate court noted there is a difference between K.S.A. 8-1514, left of center and K.S.A. 8-1522. K.S.A. 8-1522 has no application in this case. There is no dispute the defendant crossed into the southbound lanes of traffic. Failing to comply with K.S.A. 8-1514 is an absolute liability offense. The case is reversed and remanded. |
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Case Updates
 SENTENCING-JAIL
Probation violation-driving at work-zero tolerance
State v. Epps 2009 WL 4931371 (12/11/09)
***UNPUBLISHED***
The defendant was sentenced to 12 months on DUI and 12 months for DWH and the sentences were to run concurrently. The district court granted probation with a condition not to operate a vehicle without proper license and insurance. About 5 months later a motion to revoke was filed with an allegation the defendant drove a car without license and insurance. At the hearing the defendant stipulated to the violation but explained he had been working on the car as a mechanic and was test driving it when stopped by the cops. The state argued the driving record of the defendant showed dozens of driving offenses and he was on a zero tolerance probation. The court agreed and the defendant was to serve his underlying sentence. The defendant appeals claiming the judge abused his discretion. The appellate court found the district court did not act arbitrarily, fancifully or unreasonably and therefore it did not abuse its' discretion. The defendant also argued Apprendi and was denied.
REFUSAL
Noncooperation-would not seal lips around mouthpiece-lack of objection
State v. Wilson Slip Copy, 2009 WL 4931243 (12/11/09)
***UNPUBLISHED***
Defendant was read the implied consent and requested to take a test. During testing he did not seal his lips around the mouthpiece and only a portion of his breath apparently entered the testing equipment. He had a deficient sample of 0.105. An expert testified the defendant's BAC might have been more than indicated but it could not possibly be less than indicated. On appeal the defendant states all evidence surrounding his testing should be suppressed and not admissible. The State notes the defendant never objected at trial and therefore the merits of the appeal should not be decided. The appellate court agreed and affirmed the courts findings.
PROTOCOL 
Paper Jam-best evidence rule-logbook
State v. Ayala 2009 WL 5063262 (12/18/09)
***UNPUBLISHED***
When operating the Intoxilyzer 5000 the testing result printout got jammed in the printer. No printout was obtained but the officer observed the results on the digital readout of the instrument and recorded the BAC as 0.154. The officer recorded the results in the logbook. The defendant was charged and filed a motion to suppress the testing due to the paper malfunction. The defendant claimed that 8-1001(p)(2006) requires "upon the request of any person submitting to testing,..a report of the results of the testing shall be made available to such person." The district court denied the suppression. There was a stipulation of facts and plea and the defendant files this appeal. The appellate court states the legal requirements in place to assure that a breath test is sufficiently reliable to be admitted had been met. The officer was certified by the KDHE, as was the Intoxilyzer 5000 that was used. Additionally, the test was administered according to KDHE's protocol. Because the proper foundation was laid for the admission of the test result, the fact that a printer jam prevented a printout of the result merely goes to the weight of the evidence. Although the printout was not available to verify the breath test result, the stipulated facts included that the officer observed the test result displayed was .154 grams of alcohol and Ayala's breath test result was properly recorded into the subject test logbook. Although the statute requires a "report of the results" it does not specify the type of report. The defendant was given a copy of the logbook where the results were reported and that was sufficient. Affirmed. |
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Case Updates |
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 MIRANDA
PBT
PBT statute although threatening is ok-patrol car discussion on car stop
State v. Smith 2009 WL 5062492 (12/18/09)
***UNPUBLISHED***
Defendant was stopped for pulling a trailer without working taillights. The officer stated he would give a warning ticket to the defendant and to have a seat in his patrol car. While in the car the officer asked a series of questions that led him to believe the defendant may be intoxicated. SFSTs were given and the defendant was asked to take a PBT. The officer did give the standard warnings before administering the PBT. The defendant was arrested and his BAC was 0.099. The defendant suggested during a suppression motion Miranda should have been given prior to the questioning in the patrol car and the use of his deep-lung air for the PBT violated his 4th Amendment. The court denied both requests; thus the appeal. The Miranda warnings are intended to prevent coerced confessions, but parties recognize in a routine traffic stop that although they may be momentarily delayed, they will soon be free to go on about their business. While it is true a patrol car is sometimes used as a "temporary jail" that is not what happened here. A number of cases were cited Price 233 Kan. 706 (1983), Almond 15 Kan.App.2d 585 (1991) and Berkemer v. McCarty 468 U.S. 420 (1984). As for the PBT, the court found the defendant consented to the testing. The defendant claims he was coerced due to the reading of the rights concerning a traffic infractions. The court indicated the Supreme Court noted: Compulsory testing for alcohol or drugs through drivers implied even coerced consent does not violate the Constitution it is reasonable in light of the State's compelling interest in safety on the public roads. The defendant did not cite any case law suggesting that consent is invalid or unlawful when obtained after giving a driver accurate information about the consequences of a test refusal. The defendant also challenged the PC for the arrest-no merit was found. Affirmed.
DEFICIENT SAMPLE
Rescission of refusal upon giving deficient sample
State v. May 2009 WL 5206248 (12/31/09)
***UNPUBLISHED***
Defendant was involved in a traffic crash resulting in her receiving a large gash on her head. She refused treatment. The officer, fearing a head injury, did not give SFSTs but did request a PBT. The defendant was able to provide a valid sample and was arrested. Upon requesting an evidentiary test, the defendant failed to provide a sufficient sample and received a deficient reading of 0.156. After hearing the results the defendant immediately requested to try again. The officer denied her request. The defendant requested suppression of her refusal and the evidence of the deficient sample test result. The court determined everything should be suppressed. The State appeals. The appellate court relied heavily on Standish v. KDOR 225 Kan. 900 (1984) stating a refusal is a deficient sample; however if the defendant rescinded her "refusal" then the following factors must be reviewed 1) within a very short and reasonable time after the prior first refusal 2) when a test administered upon the subsequent consent would still be accurate 3) when testing equipment is still readily available 4) when honoring the request will result in a no substantial inconvenience to the police and 5) when the individual requesting the test has been in the custody of the arresting officer and under observation for the whole time since arrest. In this case all factors were ruled in favor of the defendant so the appellate court determined her initial refusal was essentially cured and therefore could not be used against her. As for the deficient sample results the court cited Gray 270 Kan. 793 (2001) stating: When a finding has been made that a person charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) properly rescinded his or her initial refusal to take a chemical test and the arresting law enforcement officer does not give the test, the proper remedy is to suppress any reference to testing procedures and not to dismiss the charges where other evidence is alleged to exist sufficient to substantiate the DUI charge.
 DWS
SEARCH
State v. Witmer 2009 WL 3082577 (09/25/09)
***UNPUBLISHED***
Defendant was stopped for an expired tag. The officer could smell alcohol on her breath and requested she step out of the car to perform SFSTs. The defendant did not indicate impairment on any of the tests however the officer arrested defendant for DWS. The arrest occurred outside the vehicle. The officer then searched her car incident to her arrest and looked in the glove box and found some pills which turned out to be hydrocodone which she did not have a prescription. The court of appeals found that the officers had no reasonable basis to believe there was any evidence of the crime of driving on a suspended license in the car. She was handcuffed in a patrol car and could not get into her car for any weapon. Court cited Arizona v. Gant and found the search was unlawful. |
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 FIVE TIPS FOR BETTER LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTOR COLLABORATION
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1. Do a Ride along with local law enforcement every year. You learn, you teach, and you earn respect. Win. Win. Win.
2. Personally call to schedule officers for court. Once a case is actually going to trial, you probably need the officer to show up. Personally call the officers and let them know that you need them for the case, when you need them, and provide a copy of their report. Update the officers as the case proceeds and always, always follow up if the case goes away or gets continued.
3. Discuss plea negotiations with the arresting officer. This teaches officers what is important to you in your cases, and gives you an opportunity to learn valuable information from the officer. Most officers see lots of prosecutors in their career. If you want to make your job easier, tell them how to do their job well.
4. Be available for case discussion and questions. The best officers are always learning. If you make yourself available, they will gladly call. The more they learn, the better the cases are that come from their arrests.
5. Let officers know how their cases are resolved. The proof of a good arrest is a conviction. If that isn't possible in a case, let the officer know why not. Make their days and yours by letting them know when you get a plea. If an officer has gone above and beyond, be sure to let his or her supervisor know with a quick email or call.
Bottom line: communication and collaboration generate respect and ensure effective enforcement and prosecution.
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NOTICE
The Federal Highway Administration (THWA) realeased on December 16, 2009, the 2009 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), which will become effective on January 15, 2010.
Here is the link to it: MUTCD
PLEASE NOTE: The requirment for law enforcement to wear high-visibility vest has been retained in the new MUTCD; however, vest are now required on all highways, not just federal-aid ones.
See ยง 6D.03.06 (on page 564) of the new MUTCD. |
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 The Swiss Slap Speeder with $290 Fine
By Jason Paur
Next time you're in Switzerland driving down a windy village road at the foothills of the Alps, you may want to make sure you're either very mindful of the police or very poor.
If you decide you want to speed your way through Switzerland, be warned there is no such thing as a standard fine for driving say, 35 mph over the limit. No, no, no. If you're caught speeding in the land of fine watches and neutrality and you have a lot of money, you better hope you've kept your money stashed somewhere the Swiss can't find it (a Swiss bank account?).
A 53-year-old man learned that lesson after receiving a record-setting fine of nearly $290,000 for driving 85 mph in a 50 mph zone through the small town of St. Gallen. Adding insult to injury, he was driving a car worth a fraction of the fine - a Ferrari Testarossa.
Why the hefty fine for a mere 35 over the limit?
In 2002 Swiss voters approved replacing prison terms for some offenses, including speeding, with fines based on your income. According to Tages Anzeiger, the lead-footed driver has an annual income of more than $820,000 and is worth well over $20 million.
And another tip if you are caught and given a hefty fine in Switzerland: Don't make any big claims to try and get out of the ticket. The Testarossa driver was initially fined a little less than $90,000 by the local jurisdiction. That was raised to $145,000 by the next court after the driver claimed diplomatic immunity, saying he is diplomat from the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. That didn't sway the court, which boosted the fine to $290,000.
"The accused ignored elementary traffic rules with a powerful vehicle out of a pure desire for speed" the court said.
On the upside, apparently he has to pay only half of the fine now. The rest is deferred and will be eliminated for good behavior. |
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ROAD DEBRIS |
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A pedestrian is defined as a person on foot, in a wheelchair or device for physically disabled person or a person using an electric personal assistive mobility device ie. Segway K.S.A. 8-1446
Discovery in an administrative hearing is limited to the following if the licensee failed the breath test: 1) officer certification & notice of suspension 2) documents indicating result of any evidentiary breath test 3) copy of affidavit showing certification of officer and the instrument 4) a copy of KDHE instrument protocol. K.S.A. 8-1020(e)
An "occurrence" as mention in the implied consent means: test refusal, test failure or alcohol or drug conviction or any combination of these arising from one arrest K.S.A. 8-1013(e)
A person holding a commercial drivers license may not enter into a diversion agreement of any offense, except a parking ticket, no matter what type of vehicle he was driving when committing the offense. K.S.A. 8-2,150
A pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or drugs to a degree that renders them a hazard shall not walk or be upon a highway but can be on the sidewalk. K.S.A. 8-1543
A driver intending to turn or move left or right shall give a signal and such signal shall be given not less than 100 feet before turning. K.S.A. 8-1548
Although "drug" is not defined in the traffic statutes it is defined in K.S.A. 65-1626(p) as: (1) Articles recognized in the official United States pharmacopoeia, or other such official compendiums of the United States, or official national formulary, or any supplement of any of them; (2) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease in man or other animals; (3) articles, other than food, intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; K.S.A. 65-1626
Alcohol is not defined in the DUI law but guidance can be found in K.S.A. 8-2,128(a): "Alcohol" means any substance containing any form of alcohol including, but not limited to, ethanol, methanol, propanol and isopropanol.
In a prosecution for illegal parking the person listed in the complaint was at the time of the violation the registered owner of the vehicle this evidence shall constitute prima facie presumption that the registered owner was the person who parked or placed the vehicle at the place where the violation occurred. K.S.A. 8-2114
Under Kansas law, K.S.A. 8-1759a, highway patrol troopers are authorized to stop vehicles upon reasonable cause "to believe that a vehicle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law or that its equipment is not in proper adjustment or repair. "
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By Karen Wittman, KS-TSRP
Last Legislative session the legislature in HB 2096 authorized the formation of the DUI Commission. This Commission was charged with review of the DUI laws, to develop a balanced and comprehensive legislative proposal that centralizes recordkeeping so that offenders are held accountable, assures highway safety by changing the behavior of driving under the influence offenders at the earliest possible time, and provides for significant restriction on personal liberty at some level of frequency and quantity of offenses. A daunting task to say the least!
 The commission is made up of legislators, law enforcement, alcohol and drug treatment providers, judges and prosecutors. I was chosen as the Attorney General's designee. The Commission got right to work meeting
1. Don't implement the HB 2096 changes for punishment of 3rd and 4th DUIs
2. Support and encourage the legislature to hold hearings on licensing for addiction counselors
Everything else mentioned or suggested in the report were discussions made in various subcommittees but not yet voted on by the Commission as a whole. What I am suggesting is everything is still open for discussion! I HIGHLY ENCOURAGE you to review the report by the Commission. YOU HAVE A VOICE!!! If there is a problem you are aware of not mentioned in the report or a solution you have to one of the problems identified in the report-send it to me or any other commission member. We are all wanting to produce a DUI law that will make Kansas roadways safe. None of us on the commission have all the answers and we look to you the people that have to enforce or prosecute the DUI laws for help. The Commission will again begin meeting closely before or shortly after this legislative session ends. I am in hopes I will receive information from you to make the next round of DUI Commission meetings a success.
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