A comprehensive network of controls and enforcement is necessary to ensure sensitive technology does not make it into the hands of unauthorized individuals. However, the lack of legal restrictions over domestic sales of these items, combined with the difficulties associated with inspecting packages and individuals leaving the United States, results in a weak control environment that does not effectively prevent terrorists and agents of foreign governments from obtaining these sensitive items. The key to preventing the illegal export of these sensitive items used in nuclear, IED, and military applications is to stop the attempts to obtain the items at the source, because once sensitive items make it into the hands of terrorists or foreign government agents, the shipment and transport out of the United States is unlikely to be detected.

Despite prior audit recommendations, important management weaknesses persisted in CBP's tracking of in-bond cargo, with the result that CBP still does not know whether in-bond cargo shipments of greatest security or revenue interest are in fact entered into U.S. commerce or exported as required. In particular, CBP continued to have high numbers of open in-bond transactions with uncertain disposition. In addition to needed improvements on specific programs, we also found that CBP had to find a way to better balance security and important trade functions such as revenue collection. Although CBP's priority mission relates to homeland security, it collected more than $34 billion in fiscal year 2008, making it the second largest revenue generator for the federal government. Because of the high concentration of duties collected on textiles and apparel--four percent of U.S. imports generate approximately 40 percent of U.S. duties collected--any efforts to focus on revenue functions would likely generate improved oversight of textile and apparel imports.