1. Beit Din commonly lacks authority to demand payment for grama or indirect damages resulting from the defendant's actions or inactions (see 4. below for exceptions).

2. Nevertheless, the defendant carries a personal moral responsibility lotzeis yedei shamayim, to compensate the victim for (a) intentional indirect damages (b) and/or indirect damages as a result of his/her legal negligence; though is generally absolved from such compensation for (c) unintentional/accidental indirect damages due to his/her action or inaction [Choshen Mishpat 386, Imrei Yosher].

3. Merely preventing a second party from accruing potential earnings is by and large categorized as no more severe than an indirect damage and absolved from legal consequences [Bava Metzia 73b, Talmud Yerushalmi Bava Metzia 5: 3], and according to Imrei Binah (see Responsum at end of Sefer on Choshen Mishpat) categorically lacks even the responsibility lotzeis yedei shomayim .

4.Nonetheless, a caretaker / custodian / shomer / bailee accepts upon him/herself a superior responsibility grade and is liable for indirect damages to the bailment resulting from his/her custodial negligence. (A borrower even pays for accidental damages thereof.) [Shemos 22: 6 - 13]

5. An employee is required to provide a duty of care to the employer similar to that of a paid custodian.

As such, Nesivos opines that an employee would be legally accountable for indirect damages resulting from a careless failure to effectively execute his/her prescribed duties. Chazon Ish however, limits such accountability towards articles of custody.

6. Whether to classify the phenomenon of forgetting to carry out a task as (a) legal carelessness/negligence or (b) accidental by nature is a point of consideration with sweeping Halachic consequences [see Orach Chaim 108: Magen Avraham 10, Yoreh Deah 232:12, Choshen Mishpat 291: 7].

(7. For our purposes, we will assume a CSR is an employee of the insurance firm, while an insurance broker at times functioning as an employee of the client and at times of the firm.)

Application

Jonathan Adams lost his home and belongings to a fire. Were his insurance policy in order, as a result of the fire, he could have earned money from Izkowitz commensurate with the sum of the fire damage.

Izkowitz's CSR forgot to carry out her prescribed task. As a result of her forgetfulness, Adams lost the opportunity to earn money commensurate with his loss from a potential fire; ostensibly an indirect damage lacking even the moral compensation requirement.

Presumably, the CSR functions as Izkowitz' employee as opposed to Adams' employee. Thus, any discussion (point 5) of accountability for lost potential gains resulting from employee's failure to execute prescribed tasks is relevant between the CSR and the firm, not between the CSR and Adams [See Divrei Malkiel Vol. 5 Responsum 232]. Hence, Izkowitz' CSR is not responsible for Adams loss. (Note: Halachically, Israel Itzkowitz himself is only liable for his employee's mistakes if common practice or agreements required so.)◆