Background

One is morally bound to uphold a reasonable commitment (one which an honest man in his capacity can practically fulfill). Should the situation unforeseeably change to the extent where it would be commonly understood that the commitment was in error, one cannot be bound to the commitment [Choshen Mishpat § 204:7-8; Rema ibid.].

Nevertheless, it is noble to uphold a verbal commitment- reasonable or unreasonable (whether or not people actually depended on the commitment), even if the circumstances change drastically [Aruch Hashulchan § 204:8].  

Congruously, breaching a verbal commitment generally carries fewer legal implications than would breaching a written commitment or a promise bolstered by a legally binding "kinyan" or prescribed physical act implicating obligation.

Below however, are some examples verbal commitments lacking the bolster of a conventional "kinyan" which are nevertheless legally binding [See Issue 25].  

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1.   A verbally commissioned B to manufacture a defined item with the expressed intent of purchasing it from the manufacturer upon its completion. B duly relied on A and manufactured it. A reneged on the commitment. If B is unable to sell the item immediately and will suffer a financial loss, A must compensate B for the financial loss he/she caused him/her [Choshen Mishpat § 333: 8].

2.   A verbally hired B to manufacture a defined item with the expressed understanding of owning the item from the onset. B duly relied on A and manufactured it. A reneged on the commitment. A must pay B for the provided services whether he/she wishes to accept the finished product or not [Nesivos Hamishpat ibid. 15].

3.   A verbally asked B to present money to C with the expressed intent of paying B. The benefit C receives as a result of B honoring A's request functions as would a legally binding "kinyan" whereby lawfully obligating A to unconditionally uphold his/her commitment [Ran Maseches Kiddushin 4b].

4.   A verbally asked B to discard money with the expressed intent of paying B. As no one benefited from the money which B discarded, A's request lacks a legally binding "kinyan". A cannot be lawfully bound to pay B [Aruch Hashulchan § 380: 4, Shulchan Aruch Even Ha'Ezer §30: 33].

Application

Shoprite

If protocol would have been that Wakefern would order based upon a verbal discussion, then although Bernstein could legally have backed out upon finding a considerably better deal, he would be liable to compensate Wakefern if they would be unable to sell the produce and whereby incur a loss on his account. However, since protocol was to submit a monthly order form, Bernstein did not have to expect Wakefern to order produce based upon their initial conversation. Bernstein would therefore be absolved from compensating Wakefern for any resultant subsequent loss.

Pedal to the Metal

The livery driver ultimately chose to speed on his own accord. Even if Barry would have told him to speed and he would pay for any ticket, Barry would be absolved from paying. Why? Barry made a verbal commitment which lacked a legally binding kinyan. Even if it would have been certain that the driver would have gotten caught, one cannot argue that the ticket money the driver paid as a result of Barry's request would function as a legally binding kinyan to obligate Barry to honor his commitment because no one benefited from the ticket money. It would be similar to A asking B to discard money rather than to honor his request by presenting money to C.